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The question of belonging to one family, for many people in India and 
Pakistan is not merely an abstract idea but an actual fact. In addition, there are 
many people in both countries who were born on what is now the territory of 
the other. Indians and Pakistanis are not just neighbours, they are closely 
related. It is surprising that people with so much in common, who can enjoy so 
much of each other's, culture, who can amicably play cricket against each 
other, can still regard each other with suspicion. 
There are those who cite differences of religion as the original cause of 
partition, and a continuing source of conflict. Yet, they forget that the purpose 
of religion is not to build beautiful churches or temples; it is to cultivate 
positive human qualities such as tolerance, generosity and love. Every major 
religion of the world, no matter what is philosophical view, is founded first and 
foremost on the belief that we must reduce our selfishness and ser\'e others. 
One rehgion, like a single type of food, can not hope to satisfy all. Some people 
benefit from one teaching, others from another. All faiths, despite their often 
contradictory philosophies, possess the ability to produce fine warm-hearted 
human beings. Therefore, religion should not be a cause for division, but the 
ground for mutual respect. 
If India was torn to pieces in 1947, the years that followed saw her being 
audaciously fooled both by her neighbouring State as well as by those who 
moulded her destiny over the past half a century. During the last sixty years, 
India and Pakistan fought four wars in 1947-48, 1965, 197land 1999 and they 
came close to war in 1987, 1990 and again they are on the border facing each 
other in a different mood. Today, relations between India and Pakistan exist in 
a state of violent peace: a state in which friction points erupt into periodic 
battles or brief gory conflicts, but there is no war-declai-ed or undeclared. These 
friction points manifest themselves in different form^ ranging from low 
intensity conflict and border skirmishes, to a medium intensity conflict in 
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localised area. Her problems with Pakistan still remain unsolved, haunting her 
in the forms of terrorist infiltration, the proxy wars, the armed fights staged in 
Kargil and other places isolated bomb blasts and sometimes sporadic outbursts 
of communal frenzy called Jehad. Over the years, India has had to sacrifice a 
lot of her men and material resources either to fight the enemy or to feed the 
migrants who made their way to India. 
Inspired with the existing situation, a need is felt to take up a study 
which could evaluate the cost of partition borne by India and Pakistan in terms 
of the losses they suffered and the opportunities which they have forgone 
because of their rival nature for each other. Specifically, the present study 
attempts to analyse critically various dimensions of Indo-Pak relations ever 
since the partition of India, to examine the perceptions of some of the great 
leaders like Nehru, Jinnah, Gandhi etc. regarding the partition and to find major 
irritants that often hindered the peace process between the two nations with a 
view to suggest some remedial measures. 
According to the need of the present work, the whole study is divided 
into five chapters. It should be mentioned that the entire study is based on 
historical facts as well as updated information collected from books, journals, 
magazines, newspapers, white paper, selected speech of the leaders of both the 
nations, etc. 
The first chapter is of introductory nature which begins with the 
discussion of the genesis of India's partition and perceptions of Nehru 
associated with it. This is followed by a brief outline of different types of 
problems which occurred immediately after partition. 
The Indian sub-continent gained independence after century old struggle 
against colonialism. When the sub-continent gained independence, it was 
expected that newly emerged nations India and Pakistan would embark on 
sustainable development programme in order to achieve better life for their 
respective population. Unfortunately, India and Pakistan have developed a 
somewhat adverse relationship since the partition of the sub-continent. The 
relations have been a hostage to history, dating back to pre-partition days when 
Hindu-Muslim relations were politicised to the extent that partition seemed to 
be a logical outcome. The origin of India-Pakistan mistrust lies in the 
ideological differences between the Congress and the Muslim League. The 
diametrically opposite social manifestations of their ideology provided the 
basis for the post independence conflicts. The role played by the British, ever 
since 1857, had strained the relations between the opposing political ideologies. 
The two leading and old parties, Congress and Muslim League were 
different in their perceptions regarding the partition of India and the creation of 
separate nation for Muslims. The differences between the Congress and the 
Muslim League approach was essentially in their perceptions about religion 
and politics: whereas the League believed 'it was the sole representative of 
Indian Muslim', the Congress believed 'it was medievalism to think of 
communal groups functioning as political groups'. The great dilemma that the 
two-nation theorists faced was that "it was difficult for a minority to battle with 
a majority; democracy w o^uld ensure the victory of a larger group". Although. 
the Congress party agreed to accept the partition of India, thereby indirectly 
accepting the two-nation theory sponsored by Jinnah. Mahatma Gandhi, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad and many other 
nationalist leaders of the Congress considered this to be defeat of the main 
objective of their struggle under the banner of Indian National Congress. 
India's partition in 1947 and riots resulting from it caused a serious 
damage of life and property on both sides. It was such an event in the history 
which can not be forgotten. This partition posed a number of problems. These 
were: transfer of population and problem of religious minorities, problem of 
recovery or compensation for abandoned property of refugees in India and 
Pakistan, division of State assets at the time of partition, canal-water disputes. 
boundary disputes, issue of integration of Princely States, namely-Junagadh, 
Hyderabad and Kashmir. Eventually Junagadh and Hyderabad acceded to India 
but Kashmir is still an outstanding issue of controversy between the two 
countries despite its accession to India. 
The chapter two of this thesis is, therefore, devoted exclusively to the 
examination of Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan and how this issue 
was internationalise. State of Jammu and Kashmir was a composite State. It 
was ruled by a Hindu ruler, but was inhabited by both Muslims and Hindus. 
While in Kashmir, the Muslims are in a majority, in Jammu the Hindus are 
dominant and in certain parts the Buddhists form a sizeable section of people. 
Thus, Kashmir has been the major issue and a bone of contention 
between India and Pakistan. The partition gave rise to many disputes and 
problems. All of these disputes, except the dispute over Kashmir were solved 
gradually through mutual negotiations. One of the basic reasons of Kashmir 
dispute was its geographical location. "The geographical situation of the State 
was such that it would be bounded on all sides by the new domination of 
Pakistan". Its only access to the outside world by road lays through the Jhelum 
Valley and road which runs through Pakistan, via Rawalpindi. The only rail 
line connecting the State with the outside world lays through Sialkot in 
Pakistan. Its postal and telegraphic services operated through areas that were 
certain to belong to the domination of Pakistan. The State was dependent for all 
its imported supplies like salt, sugar, petrol and other necessities of life on their 
safe and continued transit through areas that would form part of Pakistan. 
Under the present de facto position of the State; Jammu, the Valley and 
Ladakh region are in India. The Tribal areas are in Pakistan, and Hill Districts 
(mainly Poonch) stand divided between India and Pakistan. Because of its 
strategic situation and geographical position, Kashmir is intimately connected 
with the security of India. 
In August 1947, when the paramountcy of the British crown lapsed 
Kashmir became an independent State and under the partition settlement it had 
the option to accede either to India or Pakistan or to remain independent. The 
Maharaja of Kashmir, Mr. Hari Singh decided to maintain the independence of 
Kashmir and as such did not accept either of the two Instruments of Accession 
that were forwarded to him by the Governments of India and Pakistan. Three 
days before the partition (August 12, 1947) the Maharaja proposed a "Standstill 
Agreement" with India and Pakistan. But that agreement was not followed by 
Pakistan and Pakistan promoted a large-scale invasion. After continuous 
pressure and attacks from Pakistan, Maharaja of Kashmir requested the Indian 
Government for its support and decided to accede to India, with a formal 
declaration on the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir to India. 
In view of continuous tension in Jammu and Kashmir sponsored by 
Pakistan and the failure of all bilateral efforts to resolve this dispute, the 
Government of India under the influence of Lord Mountbatten decided to refer 
this dispute to the Security Council in the hope that the United Nations would 
bring to bear the weight of world public opinion upon Pakistan and prevail 
upon it to discontinue its aggression in Kashmir. The Government of India 
under Article 35 of the U.N. Charter lodged a complaint against Pakistan on 
1^ ' January 1948. On 15 January 1948, Pakistan denied India's charges and 
lodged a counter-complaint with the Security Council. It listed ten charges 
against India, of which only one related to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
After a careful consideration of the existing situation, the Security Council 
appointed a three-member Commission on January 20, 1948 including India, 
Pakistan and United States. The Security Council added two more members, 
Belgium and Colombia, by a resolution of April 21, 1948. The Commission 
was to investigate and mediate in the dispute of Kashmir. The Commission 
passed a resolution containing various recommendations to settle the dispute. 
The commission made vigorous efforts for making both the countries agree on 
its recommendation. However, the resolution of April, 1948, finally ended with 
dismay. In a series of subsequent efforts. United Nations Commission for India 
and Pakistan proposed a cease-fire resolution which was unanimously passed 
by both the governments on 5 January 1949. 
Both India and Pakistan failed to implement this settlement. Pakistan 
persistently refused to withdraw its forces from Kashmir and thus, according to 
India made the resolution inoperative and ineffective. Pakistan wanted a 
synchronised withdrawal of troops of both the countries; and India insisted on 
the demilitarisation of the PoK as a condition preceding to plebiscite. The 
UNCIP failed to resolve the tangle. In August 1949 it suggested that the points 
of difference be submitted to arbitration. This proposal was accepted by 
Pakistan but rejected by India. By the end of 1949 the UNCIP accepted its 
failure and in its final report of 9 December 1949 suggested the appointment of 
a single mediator for replacing the Commission. 
On the recommendation of the Commission, the Security Council 
appointed a number of mediators from time to time to look into the matter of 
Kashmir settlement and to suggest appropriate measures to resolve the issue. 
But no satisfactory performance could be made. Even the bilateral talks 
between India and Pakistan were futile in respect of the differences in their 
perceptions regarding Jammu and Kashmir. 
The relations between India and China had considerably deteriorated as 
the Chinese had occupied several thousand square miles of the territory of 
Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. This resulted in tensions between India 
and China, China was supported by Pakistan. These tensions led to Chinese 
aggression on India in 1962. This aggression compelled India to mobilise its 
army in security and the associated increase in defence expenditure. 
The National Conference leader of Kashmir Sheikh Abdullah, who had 
been under detention since 1953, was released in May 1964. The Sheikh who 
was the architect of Kashmir's close links with the rest of India now turned 
hostile, and demanded the right of self-determination for the people of 
Kashmir. He was openly supported by Pakistan. He met Nehru and went to 
Pakistan to meet Ayub Khan. He argued that Kashmir dispute could be solved 
only if relations between India and Pakistan were normalised. Soon afterwards 
Nehru died, and nothing further was heard of the efforts of Abdullah. In 1964, 
Pakistan once again appealed to the Security Council for discussing the 
Kashmir issue. After two fruitless debates the Security Council, on 18 May 
1964, passed a resolution proposing that Kashmir dispute should be solved 
through mutual negotiations between India and Pakistan. 
An armed clash occurred in April 1965 when two divisions of the 
Pakistan army crossed the border and occupied parts of the Runn of Kutch. 
India had not anticipated this aggression. Fighting went on till the end of June. 
As a result of the mediation by British Prime Minister Wilson, cease-fire took 
place and it was agreed that both the armies would go back to the position of 
January 1, 1965. However, Pakistan did not follow cease-fire, rather it initiated 
invasion in Kashmir and created tensions. This led to the outbreak of a war 
between India and Pakistan in August-September, 1965. The war proved that 
India was superior in many respects. During the Indo-Pak war, efforts for peace 
were made by both the super powers in the context of their respective national 
interests. 
Shastri and Ayub Khan met at Tashkent on 4 January 1966. In the 
meeting both countries stood by their rigid positions. There was no progress for 
six days. Finally, after strenuous negotiations, which were often on the verge of 
collapse, the Tashkent Declaration was signed by the two countries in the 
presence of Soviet Prime Minister in the hope and promise of a peaceful future. 
In reality only those parts of the declaration, which related to troops 
withdrawal, exchange of PoWs and restoration of diplomatic links were 
implemented. These provisions were speedily implemented and these tasks 
were completed by 25 February 1966. 
The issue of Kashmir remained unsettled in all negotiations thereafter. 
In other words, the rigid nature of India and Pakistan on this issue did never 
take it to path of success. Another major war between India and Pakistan was 
fought in Kargil in 1999. It caused a serious damage of life and property more 
on front of Pakistan than on front of India. This war again proved India's 
superiority over Pakistan since then no commendable efforts could be made to 
resolve Kashmir issue. 
Another dimensions of Indo-Pak relations which required a closer 
examination and infact, was a major shock to Pakistan was the creation of 
Bangladesh in 1971. Chapter three of the present study, therefore, deals with 
an assessment of how Pakistan got separated into West and East Pakistan. The 
analysis made in this chapter utilised the historical facts and had attempted to 
trace the reasons of Indo-Pak war in 1971. 
The birth of Bangladesh in December 1971 was a direct outcome of the 
Indo-Pakistan war in which Pakistani troops surrendered unconditionally in 
erstwhile East Pakistan. It was culmination of revolt of Bangladeshis against 
tyrannical Pakistani regime. The revolt had begun in March 1971, when the 
most popular leader of Awami League Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was arrested 
and taken to a West Pakistani Jail. India had full sympathy with the people of 
East Pakistan in their struggle for independence. Interim Government of 
Bangladesh had been constituted as early as in March 1971 but India had 
refrained from giving recognition to it for fear of provoking Pakistan into a 
war. But, when eventually the war did begin on December 3, 1971 India 
decided to go ahead and recognition was granted to Bangladesh on December 
6, 1971. Pakistani surrender took place on December 16, 1971. During that 13-
days war in the winter of 1971 nearly 20,000 Indian soldiers laid down their 
lives. 
The Shimla Agreement of 1972 was a milestone because it formed the 
legal basis for setting the problems arising out of the Bangladesh war and for 
normalisation of India-Pakistan relations and establishment of durable peace in 
the sub-continent. The Shimla Agreement was signed on July 2, 1972 by the 
then Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Pakistan President Mr. Z.A. 
Bhutto. Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, assisted by their high-level 
delegations, held complex and extensive discussions op various issues arising 
out of the war, as well as on general bilateral relations. The issues ranged from 
the repatriation of prisoners of war, the recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan, 
normalisation of diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan, resumption 
of trade and fixation of international Line of Control in Kashmir. 
Both countries implemented almost all the provisions of the agreement 
w ithin a short duration of three years of the conclusion of the pact. In the past 
several agreements were signed between the two countries within the intension 
of resolving their disputes and establishing peace between them as well as in 
the region, but none of them proved useful in establishing cooperative 
understanding and durable peace in full spirit. 
India and Pakistan share a history of rivalry and conflict that spans over 
sixty years. Since their emergence as independent States from the detritus of 
the British Indian empire, India and Pakistan have gone to war four times: in 
1947-48, almost immediately after independence, they fought a long and 
intense battle over the formerly independent State of Jammu and Kashmir; in 
1965 they fought another war over the same piece of land; in 1971 the two 
engaged during the civil war that severed East Pakistan into the nascent State 
of Bangladesh; and in 1999 they fought once more in the mountains of 
Kashmir. In addition to these actual wars, twice during the past sixty years the 
two countries have endured many crises that brought them close to war. 
In the fourth Chapter of this thesis, a critical evaluation of Kargil war is 
made along with its background and its aftermath. The Kargil war that occurred 
between India and Pakistan in the summer of 1999 was just the result of long 
prevailing conflicts between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Atal Behari 
Vajpayee's efforts immediately preceding the Kargil war in the form of Lahore 
Declaration did not prove of much help in restoring peace and solving the 
pending issues between the two nations. The geographical location and the 
ignorance of Indian Government of Kargil region were the two most important 
factors that contributed to the war. 
Despite the positive and cooperative sentiments expressed in the Lahore 
Agreement and in the weeks thereafter, the Pakistani military, with the 
acquiescence of Nawaz Sharif, planned a military operation in Kashmir 
designed to revive the Kashmir issue on the international agenda and possibly 
jump-start the flagging insurgency. The 74 days "Operation Vijay" ended with 
a victory of India. 
After the Kargil war, the relationship between India and Pakistan settled 
back into a pattern of mutual recrimination. Outside pressure on the two to 
resolve their differences over Kashmir continued. Meanwhile, immediately 
after Pakistani coup Indian armed forces were put on full alert. But, Pakistan-
sponsored militancy was intensified. The military coup contributed to 
Pakistan's further isolation in the global community. 
The then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on 24 May 2001 
extended, an invitation to Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the Chief Executive of 
Pakistan (soon to declare himself President), to visit India to discuss possible 
means to improve bilateral relations. Musharraf readily accepted Vajpayee's 
invitation, and a Summit was planned for 14-16 July 2001 in the northern 
Indian city of Agra. Consequently, President Musharraf, accompanied by his 
wife. Begum Musharraf, arrived in New Delhi on 14 July 2001. Though, Agra 
Summit ended without any satisfactory agreement between the leaders of two 
nations. But Foreign Ministers Jashwant Singh and Abdus Sattar at their press 
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conferences on 17 July 2001 asserted that the Summit though not leading to 
any definite forward looking conclusions was not a failure. It, according to 
them, marked the beginning of a process of re-engagement and dialogue 
between the two countries. Against the backdrop of markedly divergent 
assessments of the Summit, the two sides agreed to hold ministerial-level and 
foreign secretary-level talks. However, frequent terrorist activities sponsored 
by Pakistan from time to time disrupted the process of dialogue between the 
two nations. The event of 11 September 2001 not only forced the postponement 
of the General Assembly but also transformed the terms of discussion between 
the two sides. 
In fact, growing terrorism in Kashmir and other areas constituted the 
post-Agra message from Pakistan whose acts of hate and violence continued. 
The Indo-Pak equation has changed to such an extent in recent years that, apart 
from asking the familiar question whether Pakistan can still threaten India 
seriously, one also asks whether the chances of normal relations between the 
estranged neighbours have improved, and if they have, whether in due course 
can one expect long-term peace. This question has assumed an added 
significance in the light of the recent violations by Pakistan of the cease-fire 
agreement that took place in 2003 between India and Pakistan. Thus, Indo-Pak 
relations are passing through the stage of which require concerted efforts by 
both the governments to change their mindset and political ideology against 
each other and to join hand in hand to extend all kinds of political, economic 
and social cooperation for each other and to face the challenges posed by 
developed countries. 
Finally, chapter five of the thesis contains some concluding observations 
of the work and presents some policy recommendation. 
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The two States of India and Pakistan were bom in August 1947. India 
and Pakistan share a history of rivalry and conflict that spans over sixty years. 
The primary focus of their conflict has been the disputed territory of Kashmir, 
where the two nations fought wars in 1947-48 and 1965, and were a diplomatic 
confrontation drew them close to war again in 1990. Frequently confidence 
building efforts have worked to dampen hostility and convey the message that, 
although local commanders might occasionally engage in provocative action, 
national level leaders remain in control and will not be drawn into conflict. 
However, these measures have not eliminated the sources of friction, and the 
deadly spring 1999 battles along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir serve as 
a reminder that events on the ground in this remote region can sometimes force 
the hand of national decision-makers. 
Even now it is not too late to tell the world of this fact and take 
necessary measures. But the operation now would be much more costly in 
terms of men and war materials because the Pakistan has built a strong army 
and developed nuclear power over the long period of time. But this cost may 
still be less than the cost we are incurring from continued hostility and cross-
border terrorism in the form of continuous military deployment and killings of 
civil and military personnel. The everlasting issues of conflict between India 
and Pakistan could not be resolved so far to a satisfactory level. 
It is against this backdrop that the present study is undertaken. The main 
objectives of this study are— 
1. To examine unpleasant event of India's partition in historical perspective. 
2. To establish the worth of India's partition in terms of the perception of great 
leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Mahatma Gandhi 
etc. 
3. To analyse critically major dimensions of Indo-Pak relations and to find 
major hindrances that came in the way of peace process between India and 
Pakistan. 
The present work is an analysis of Indo-Pak relations in post Nehru era. 
More specifically, it aims at the exploration of the condition of conflict and 
cooperation between the two countries. Almost uncertain and fragile nature of 
peace and cooperation in the region as a whole has been one of the most 
glaring aspects of contemporary South Asia. Somehow the traditional 
constructions of security based on geographical determinants of threat have still 
dominated the peace and security debate in the region. This continues to be so 
despite the end of cold war, disintegration of Soviet Union, reorientation of 
Non-Aligned Movement, nuclearisation of the sub-continent, globalisation led 
economic reforms, communication leap frogging and newer rapprochements 
and changing alignments emerging in the beginning of 21*' century. 
This roller-coaster type of relationship between the two giants of South 
Asia is one of the main reason for selecting this topic. Although there have 
been plenty of works on Indo-Pak relations but my approach is slightly 
different from the others. My approach during this entire work is firstly to 
identify and analyse the root causes of major irritants between the two, in their 
historical perspective and then to suggest some likely solutions to these deep 
rooted irritants. 
The present study is largely based on both primary and secondary 
sources such as Lok Sabha Debates, Foreign Affairs Record, Rajya Sabha 
Debates, Reports of External Affairs and Ministry of Defence, selected 
speeches of both Indian and Pakistani leaders and political and military 
officials, Pakistani National Assembly Debates, White papers of Indian and 
Pakistani governments on the Kashmir issue. The relevant information has also 
been collected from published books, journals, newspapers and magazines. 
New facts have been found in the published or electronic media have been 
utilised to make the study up-to-date and balanced as far as possible. 
IV 
Four wars were fought between India and Pakistan in 1948, 1965, 1971 
and 1999, and they came close to war in 1987, 1990 and again they are on the 
border. The present study concentrates on political, diplomatic, strategic and 
economic relations of India and Pakistan against the backdrop of the process of 
normalisation. The study has explored and analysed the Indo-Pak relations in 
the post Nehru era in chronological order. Keeping in view the purpose of the 
present work, the entire study is divided into five chapters. 
The first chapter is of introductory nature which begins with the 
discussion of the situation that led to the emergence of Pakistan. This is 
followed by Nehru's approach with regard to India's partition. The chapter 
ends with an outline of various types of problems that arose immediately after 
India's partition. These problems include transfer of population and religious 
minorities, recovery or compensation for abandoned property of refiigees in 
India and Pakistan, division of States assets at the time of partition, canal-water 
disputes, boundary disputes, and issue of integration of Princely States-
Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir. 
The second chapter throws light on perhaps the most vital area of 
tension: the issue of Kashmir. Since India and Pakistan gained independence in 
1947, the former Princely State of Kashmir has been a continuing source of 
dispute between the two countries. Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue in the 
United Nations again and again because of the massive support given by the 
major powers in the U.N. I have also explained how the 1962 conflict of India 
and China brought a qualitative change in foreign policies of India and 
Pakistan, and how India realised the need to strengthen her defence system. In 
the later part of this chapter I deal with a list of factors that affected the 
situation in the region in different ways and finally led India and Pakistan to the 
war of 1965. The Tashkent Declaration of 1966 and its achievements in 
normalising sub-continental relations have been explored. Despite hopes that a 
solution to this conflict would ensure peace in the region, there has been no 
settlement of the Kashmir dispute, and dissonance still continues. 
The biggest shock that Pakistan ever experienced in the history was the 
separation of East Pakistan in the form of an independent nation (known as 
Bangladesh), which has easily got the acceptance of nationhood not only from 
India but from other developed nations. Therefore, in chapter three an attempt 
has been made to identify the root causes which preceded the Indo-Pak war of 
1971. The chapter proceeds with a critical appraisal of 1971 war between India 
and Pakistan. An assessment is also made of the Shimla Agreement to 
normalise the relations between India and Pakistan and the situation 
immediately arose out of that agreement. 
Since the signing up of Shimla Agreement by India and Pakistan in 
1972, various efforts have been made from both the sides to respect the 
modalities of the Shimla Agreement and to resolve all pending issues. 
However, lack of political will, sense of hatred and above all, the greed of 
acquiring Kashmir at any cost is reflected each time in their dialogues on the 
front of Pakistan. The peace process in general and the Lahore Declaration in 
particular got a shock when, in 1999, the Pakistani military, with the 
acquiescence of Nawaz Sharif, planned a military operation in Kashmir 
designed to revive the Kashmir issue on the international agenda and possibly 
jump-start the flagging insurgency. 
The fourth chapter of the present study is thus devoted for a detail 
examination of Indo-Pak war in Kargil in 1999 and the situation emerged 
thereafter. Under post Kargil war situation military coup during the regime of 
Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan, Agra Summit, attack on World Trade Centre 
(W.T.O.), and reactions by India and Pakistan has also examine. 
Finally, chapter five, the conclusion sumps up the main findings of the 
study and present some positive suggestions which may be useful for the better 
relations, if followed honestly, for both India and Pakistan. Presently the 
violation of cease-fire agreement of 2003 by Pakistan reflects that it will take 
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CHAPTER - 1 
PARTITION OF INDIA AND ITS IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS 
1.1 INDIA'S PARTITION 
The poverty of the Indian sub-continent and its deep-rooted social 
backwardness inevitably encourages the growth of separatist tendencies. The 
Indian sub-continent gained independence after century old struggle against 
colonialism. When the sub-continent gained independence, it was expected that 
newly emerged nations India and Pakistan would embark on sustainable 
development programme in order to achieve better life for their respective 
population. Unfortunately, India and Pakistan have developed a somewhat 
adversarial relationship since the partition of the sub-continent. The relations 
have been a hostage to history, dating back to pre-partition days when Hindu-
Muslim relations were politicised to the extent that partition seemed to be a 
logical outcome. The origin of India-Pakistan mistrust lies in the ideological 
differences between the Congress and the Muslim League. The diametrically 
opposite social manifestations of their ideology provided the basis for the post 
independence conflicts. The role played by the British, ever since 1857, had 
strained the relations between the opposing political ideologies. The failure of 
1857 mutiny left Indian Muslims with two opposite reactions. Those who had 
taken part in the mutiny, set up the "Darul ulum" at the Deoband in 1867. It 
was designed to teach Islamic laws and their heritage to counter the threat to 
Western civilisation penetrating the minds of Indian Muslims. On the other 
hand, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan set up a society at Aligarh in 1862 to exert 
Muslim to change their religious approach to learning and reconcile themselves 
to Western education and culture. 
The Deoband and Aligarh Movements were seen as two diagonally 
opposite views of the Muslim reaction. Deoband movement was seen as one 
for saving the Muslim culture and heritage. It was totally nationalist and 
absolutely anti-British. On the other hand, Aligarh movement was seen as 
imparting a new image to Islam and totally subjugated and utterly loyal to the 
British. Deoband movement was afraid of domination by the British while the 
Aligarh movement dreaded the domination by the Hindus. The former joined 
their forces with the Indian National Congress while the later with Muslim 
League. Thus, the conflict between the philosophy of secularism and Islam in 
India was fundamentally started by the different approaches of Indian National 
Congress and the Muslim League. Their differences can be historically traced 
back to 1906 when there was a demand that Muslims should vote separately 
from Hindus to elect their own representative. The Muslims felt that the larger 
community in India would 'totally override the interests of the smaller 
community'.^ Later under Muslim pressure, the Indian Council's Act of 1909 
gave definite recognition to the claim of the Muslim community that it formed 
a political entity, distinct from the Hindus. Muslims were given separate 
constituencies and their representatives were to be elected by purely Muslim 
voters. This principle of 'communal representation' henceforth became a 
necessary part of all constitutional enactments and culminated in the 
recognition of the Muslims as a separate nation. The Congress felt that since it 
represented all the minorities, as also the majority community, system of the 
"separate electorates", based on religion, was not required. The Muslim League 
was of the view that the Congress party was opposed to separate electorates 
because it would imply a formal recognition of Muslims as a separate political 
entity. 
After the first world war the demand for the transfer of greater power to 
Indians became increasingly insistent and with it the rivalry between the 
Hindus and Muslims for larger participation in the politics also sharpened, 
leading to Hindu-Muslim rioting all over India. As the Simon Commission 
said, 'it was a manifestation of the anxieties and ambitions aroused in both 
communities by the prospect of India's political future'.-^ After detailing the 
communal violence between the years 1920-40, Ambedkar labelled it 'twenty 
years of civil war between the Hindus and Muslims of India, interrupted by 
brief intervals of armed peace'."* 
Like the earlier partition of Bengal, the establishment of communal 
governments in Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal gave the 
two-nation theory a new movementum. The taste of power promoted the feudal 
and other Muslim "Zamindars" to make further demands such as the separation 
of Sindh, the conversion of the NWFP into a full-fledged province, 
introduction of 'reforms' in Baluchistan and statutory communal majorities in 
Punjab and Bengal. In 1928, they also demanded that the British government 
should transfer power directly to the provinces. Some of them gave an open 
call for the formation of a 'federation' of Muslim provinces in North-West 
India. Taken together the demand for a Muslim federation and direct transfer of 
power to the provinces amounted to demanding partition of the country into 
Hindu India and Muslim India.^ 
On the other hand, the Indian National Congress steadily expanded its 
base and became the meeting ground of all nationalist Indians. In 1906, the 
Congress had declared self-government within the British Empire as its 
immediate goal. However, the character of the organisation quickly changed 
with the increasing role of the lower middle class, small peasants and industrial 
workers. The Home Rule agitation and the appearance of Mahatma Gandhi on 
the political scene brought about a decisive change in the Congress. It attained 
full stature as an organisation of the masses, representing all section of the 
society. In 1920, the new constitution of the Congress declared as its objective 
"the attainment of Swaraj by the people of India".^ Gandhi also felt that the 
programme of non-cooperation was necessary if we wished to achieve Swaraj 
and solve the Khilafat problem in a satisfactory manner. 
The growing moral and political influence of the Congress was viewed 
with great disquiet by the British rulers. Encouragement was given to 
individuals and organisations that opposed the claims of the Indian National 
Con gress, particularly to those Muslims who obliged them by opposing the 
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Congress. Despite this, however, Congress continued getting popular support 
from the progressive Muslims. The progressive elements among Muslims, 
which constituted a very large number, subscribed to Congress ideology of 
secular nationalism. 
By 1930, the Muslim youths in the country had caught up with the 
advanced and educated communities. Since the Muslim community lacked 
entrepreneurial tradition and, most of the Muslim "Zamindars" were in heavy 
debts due to their lavish living, the British trained Muslim youth found that 
they had no future except in goverrmient service. As they lacked confidence to 
compete with the non-Muslims in competitive examination, therefore, they 
pinned their hopes on politician to increase the weightage for Muslims in 
various branches of administration.^ This is how these educated Muslim youth 
and the Muslim government servant developed a vested interest in communal 
politics, and a large number of them were attracted towards separatist ideology. 
The first open demand for the establishment of a separate nation for the 
Muslim was raised by a group of Punjabi students studying in London. 
Thereafter, the movement for a separate Pakistan became increasingly popular 
amongst the Muslim youth and Muslim government servants. They were also 
influenced by the writings of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, founder of Aligarh 
Muslim University. He felt that the only way for the Muslims to achieve parity 
with the Hindus and make up for the lost time was to cooperate with the British 
and openly show loyalty to them. He also felt that the Muslims had to 
disassociate themselves from anti-British nationalist activities. He thought it 
impossible that Hindus and Muslims could peacefully share power in the event 
of transfer of sovereignty to Indian hands.^ 
In this background, unfortunately, communalisation of politics was 
given a new thrust both by Hindu and Muslim communalists. Jawaharlal Nehru 
was not very happy and he wrote to Syed Mahmud on October 5, 1936: 
"It is our fate that always the reactionary 
MusUms should take the lead in everything and the 
nationalists should follow in their wake dump driven 
cattle. That has been the case often enough in the 
past. It is going to continue, I hope not. It is about 
time on this issue as on others a little aggressive 
spirit should be displayed by those who call 
themselves nationalists and advanced". 
Till 1937, the year, which marked the parting of the ways between the 
Hindus and the Muslims in India, Congress had perhaps more Muslims on its 
rolls than the League. The gape in this agreement widen when the same subject 
was discussed at the round table conference in London, held prior to the 
passage of the Government of India Act of 1935 by the British Parliament. This 
Act created a federal structure, with some powers being decentralised to the 
provincial governments. Under this Act the elections were held in 1937 for the 
provincial legislatures. League took part in this election under the stewardship 
of Jiimah. The Congress won a clear majority in Madras, the United Provinces, 
Bihar, the Central Provinces and Orissa. In other parts of India, in contrast to 
the Congress success, the performance of the Muslim League was very 
disappointing. It won only 109 of the 482 Muslim seats, securing barely 4.8 
percent of the total Muslim votes. The Congress candidates had won most of 
the remaining Muslim seats. When Jinnah was approached by the Congress 
about the possible Congress-League coalition in the provinces, he did not 
accept the proposal. The main reason for such a stand was that the Congress 
was determined to introduce land reforms and democratise the entire political 
system in the Princely State which was not acceptable to not only the Britishers 
but also to Muslim League. 
One of the most important consequences of Congress rule in the 
Provinces was its impact upon the League's campaign to redefine the 
Constitutional position of Indian Muslims. The League demanded that "Indian 
Muslims be recognised as a 'Constituent factor' in all further constitutional 
negotiations; that they be allowed to play 'an equal part' with the majority 
community and that it be deemed the only organisation to speak on behalf of 
'Muslim India'."'' The governments on position wavered dangerously between 
its commitment to give full weight to minority views and interests and its 
determination not to allow a minority, whatever its size, to interrupt the course 
of reforms towards full responsible government. 
During this period, Jinnah raised the bogey of "Hindu Raj" and "Islam 
in Danger" to whip up communal hysteria among the Muslim masses. He made 
allegations against the Congress that it was trying to divide the Muslim in order 
to create a Hindu majority India. This was the turning point when the politics in 
India became openly communal. 
These developments left no other alternative for Jinnah than to come 
forward with his pernicious two-nation theory — divide India on communal 
lines. All provinces were claimed for the proposed Pakistan because they had a 
Muslim majority. Some reasons were claimed because they had Muslim rulers. 
Regions like Berar and Camatic were claimed because they had been seized 
from Muslim ruler by the East India Company. The Pakistan resolution was 
passed by the Muslim League at its Lahore session of 1940. In this session they 
had demanded a separate and sovereign State for the Muslims. When Gandhiji 
and Rajagopalachari made offers to the League to form a ministry at the 
Centre, Jinnah repeatedly turned it down on the ground that no League ministry 
at the Centre would ever be responsible to a legislature in which the Hindus 
had a majority. Throughout the 1940, Jinnah repeatedly and categorically 
dismissed the suitability of applying the principles of arithmetic to the problem 
of representation.''^ He flatly rejected the Cripps Mission proposals of 1942 as 
the thrust of Mission's Draft Declaration did not so much recognise a 
minority's right to a constitutional veto as its right to opt out of any future 
constitutional arrangement and evolve a wholly new constitution.''^ While 
rejecting the proposal Jinnah emphasised that the Mission had seriously 
overlooked the question of the integrity of the Muslim community and had 
failed to recognise that India's problem was primarily 'international in 
character'/^ 
Nevertheless, the League's claim to parity was to receive a substantial 
boost in the summer of 1945, when renewed efforts were made to create a 
representative Interim Government. To achieve this, plans were announced for 
a reconstruction of Viceroy's Executive Council on the basis of a balanced 
representation of the main Indian communities and "an equal proportion of 
Muslims and caste Hindus"/^ But the government's understanding of 
communal parity was not acceptable to the League. Jinnah denied that parity 
between Muslims and caste Hindus could ever be meaningful, and explained 
that in the event of coalition Indian Muslims would immediately be reduced to 
a third on the proposed council, thereby destroying any semblance of parity. 
The League's impressive electoral victory at the provincial and central 
levels in 1946 hardened its resolve to push "once for all" for recognition of 
parity between Muslims and non-Muslims based on the League's exclusive 
claim to represent Indian Muslims. A convention of League legislators 
resolved to press for the equal recognition of 'two separate constitution making 
bodies... of Pakistan and Hindustan' representing the interests of Muslims and 
non-Muslims respectively.^ Influenced with this approach, Jinnah also rejected 
the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 and also refused to nominate his members for 
the interim government under the Presidentship of Lord Wavell. The Congress 
had also strongly resisted the Mission's proposal of a constitutional 
organisation of permanent groups of provinces and parity of representation 
between groups of provinces. 
The differences between the Congress and the Muslim League approach 
was essentially in their perceptions about religion and politics: whereas the 
League believed 'it was the sole representative of Indian Muslim', the 
Congress believed 'it was medievalism to think of communal groups 
functioning as political groups'.^° The great dilemma that the two-nation 
theorists faced was that "it was difficult for a minority to battle with a majority; 
democracy would ensure the victory of a larger group".^' 
The argument in favour of Pakistan as a separate state was best 
summarised by an ideologue: "Muslims having ruled India before the advent of 
the British were entitled to rule atleast the Muslim majority areas".^^ It was 
thus, essentially a power game, and rests were mere justifications and the urge 
to rule was in the back of the whole movement. With this urge to rule, Jinnah 
stubbornly resisted Gandhi's repeated suggestion that they should jointly strive 
for winning India's freedom and then settle her future. 
On 16 August 1946 Jinnah gave the call for "direct action" that 
unleashed the reign of communal holocaust. Muslims were commanded to do 
or die at the call of "Islam in Danger".^^ The League units took out massive 
procession all over the country, raised provocative slogans and resorted to mass 
scale killing. The atrocities thus committed surpassed medieval barbarity. 
There were unprecedented scenes of communal orgy. Situation went on 
worsening more and more that forced the realistic leaders of the Congress to 
accept the plan of country's partition as a very bitter pill so as to save the whole 
body from contamination. It was the worst communal riot in the 120 years 
during which records have been compiled on the informal man-to-man war 
between Hindus and Muslims and Sikhs. Although Jinnah, like other 
Congress leaders, deplored the violence in Calcutta, it had reinforced his 
contention that the establishment of Pakistan was the only alternative to civil 
war. The pressures for partition, which Jinnah was leading and had helped to 
create, had been powerful but not irresistible upto that point. After the Calcutta 
explosion, there was no turning back and partition became inevitable. In March 
1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed Viceroy to succeed Lord Wavell. 
Dynamic, persuasive and bold, Mountbatten plunged into a new effort to settle 
the constitutional crisis. He first proposed an alternative that would transfer 
power to the provincial governments, which, if they chose, could later from a 
central government. The Princely States would be free to conclude any 
arrangements they could make. The Indian leaders immediately rejected it 
with heat and finality. The ebullient Mountbatten was temporarily defeated. He 
then turned to a solution prepared by his senior Indian advisor, V.P. Menon, 
and which had been ignored earlier. He proposed partition of the country, 
including the disputed States of Punjab, Bengal and Assam, and the 
establishment of two separate governments as the only means of assuring a 
peaceful transfer of power. Mountbatten obtained general approval of partition, 
in writing from Hindu and Sikh leaders, and from Jinnah by his usual curt 
nod. The date for independence, originally set for June 1, 1948 was preponed 
toAugust 15, 1947. 
Thus, the irreparable tragedy took place. India was divided and, on the 
corpse of a million people, Pakistan entered the family of nations on August 
14, 1947. Although, the Congress party agreed to accept the partition of India, 
thereby indirectly accepting the two-nation theory sponsored by Jinnah. 
Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad 
and many other nationalist leaders of the Congress considered this to be defeat 
of the main objective of their struggle under the banner of Indian National 
Congress. This is clearly expressed by Nehru in his speech on the night of 15 
August 1947 he said: 
"Long years ago we made a tryst with 
destiny and now the time comes when we 
shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in 
full measure but very substantially".^ ^ 
1.2 NEHRU'S APPROACH TO INDIA'S PARTITION 
As it is clear from the above that India's partition was accepted as a 
compulsion by great Indian leaders of Congress. Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel, 
the two big congressmen in the Interim Government, accepted partition on the 
understanding that by conceding Pakistan to Jiimah they will hear no more of 
him and eliminate his nuisance value, or, as Nehru put it privately—'by cutting 
of the head we will get rid of the headache'. 
Later both the leaders realised that they had committed a blunder. Nehru 
confessed: "when we decided on partition I do not think any of us ever thought 
that there would be this terror of mutual killing after partition. It was in a sense 
to avoid that we decided on partition. So we paid a double price for it. First, 
you might say politically, ideologically; second, the actual thing happened what 
we tried to avoid". This was further expressed by Nehru in his writing to the 
Nawab of Bhopal on 9 July 1948, "partition came and we accepted it because 
we thought that perhaps that way, however, painful it was, we might have some 
peace to work along our own lines. Perhaps we acted wrongly. It is difficult to 
judge now, and yet the consequences of that partition have been so terrible that 
one is inclined to think that anything else would have been preferable. That 
partition has come, and it brought in its train other vast changes. There is no 
going back now to India as it was before the partition". 
Thus, the biggest political blunder that had ever been committed by 
Nehru was his acceptance of India's partition. But Nehru alone should not be 
blamed by the critics. As far as his own ideas and perception regarding 
secularism and communalism are concerned, he was very clear. Critics of 
Nehru's policy regarding India's partition should always keep in mind his own 
ideas and perception regarding Muslims and other communities and his efforts 
to maintain peace and communal harmony in the country. 
Nehru's own perspective was influenced by his cosmopolitan family 
background, his education in England, his social and cultural ambience in 
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Allahabad, and his long-standing friendship and political camaraderie with 
influential Congress Muslims, including Ansari, Azad, Syed Mahmud, 
Khaliquzzaman, Tassaduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani and Abdul Majeed Khwaja. 
He was a product of the cultural norms and intellectual background of the 
Urdu-speaking elites of the Indo-Gangetic belt and his sensibilities were 
influenced by them. He went to Harrow School and Trinity College, 
Cambridge, and interacted with Fabian socialists in London. Such interactions 
widened his intellectual horizon and enriched his appreciation of political and 
social transformative processes around the globe. He could thus locate in 
perspective the rapid changes, some of a revolutionary nature, taking place in 
countries like Egypt, Turkey and Iran. Discussions with Azad and other 
Muslim scholars gave him a better understanding of Indian Islam and medieval 
Indian history. In the Discovery of India he analysed late nineteenth century 
reformist currents, commended Syed Ahmad Khan's bold initiatives, 
commented on the nationalist stir among the young Muslim intelligentsia of 
north India, noted the 'sensation' created by Azad, 'this very youthful writer 
and journalist', and assessed Iqbal's impact on the younger generation of 
Muslim.^^ 
More than anything else, Nehru attributed the social, educational and 
economic backwardness of most Muslims-not, like his political comrades, to 
any innate failing but to concrete historical and sociological factors. He new, 
so he said more about their hunger and poverty than those who talked in terms 
of percentages and seats in Councils. He claimed to be in closer touch with 
them than most of their self-styled leaders. He had vast Muslim audiences in 
different parts of the country. They did not ask him about the communal 
problem or percentages or separate electorates. They were more interested in 
land revenue or rent, water rates, unemployment, and their many other burdens. 
How, then, could he accept the Muslim League's pretentious claims, and 
recognise him as the 'sole spokesmen'? The League leadership deliberately 
exploited religion in order to avoid discussing problems of the common man. 
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A simple fact that eluded most of Nehru's comrades was that India was 
not at any stage structured around religious solidarities or polarized along 
'communal' lines. Nehru's exceptionally eclectic mind grasped this reality. He 
believed that inter-community conflicts, as and when they occurred, were 
counter posed to the quiet, common place routines in which communities 
intermingled. Cross-community linkages rather than religious ties influenced 
the direction in which patronage, authority and economic relations flowed into 
everyday life. Consequently it was both possible and desirable to reinforce 
traditional linkages through 'mass contact' and a radical socio-economic 
blueprint. Moreover, it was feasible to blunt the impact of communal slogans 
by reducing class disparities, creating opportunities for upward mobility, and 
making the masses aware of their mutual interdependence, their shared 
historical experiences and their common concerns, interests and destiny. 
This was the impulse behind Nehru's brainchild, the Muslim Mass 
Contact Campaign, launched in March 1937.^ "^  The idea was to approach the 
Muslims not as a collective fraternity but as a segment of an impoverished 
population. The principal motivation was to convince them that they did not 
constitute a nation, and that their fortunes were not tied to their Muslim 
brethren per se but to fellow-artisans, peasants and workers in other 
communities. Nehru conducted dialogue with Jinnah on these lines, questioned 
the rationale of Muslim nationalism in a society traditionally anchored in 
cultural and religious pluralism, and criticised the creation of a Muslim identity 
in the garb of Islam. He tried in vain to delink issues of proportion and 
percentages of seats from the more basic contradictions between nationalism 
and colonialism. He expected Jinnah to draw his constituency into this just and 
legitimate struggle as co-citizens and not as a preferential religio-political 
collectivity. 
To Nehru the two-nation idea was anathema and no more than a 
reversion to some medieval theory. 'Why only two I do not know, for if 
nationality was based on religion, then there were many nations in India. Of 
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two brothers one may be a Hindu, another a Muslim; they would belong to two 
different nations. These two nations existed in varying proportions in most of 
the villages in India. They were nations which has no boundaries; they 
overlapped. A Bengali Muslim and a Bengali Hindu, living together, speaking 
the same language and having much the same traditions and customs, belong to 
different nations'.'' 
There was much ambiguity and fuzziness in nationalist thinking about 
the corporate identity of Muslims. Nehru removed some of it: 'there can be and 
should be religious or cultural solidarity. But when enter the political plane, the 
solidarity is national, not communal; when we enter the economic plane, the 
solidarity is economic'.^ In what way, he asked, were the interests of the 
Muslim peasant different from those of the Hindu peasant, or those of a 
Muslim labourer, artisan, merchant, landlord or manufacturer different from 
those of his Hindu counterparts? The ties that bound people were common 
economic interests and in the case of a subject country especially, a common 
national interest. If the country began to think and act on these lines, the 
'myth' of communalism would disappear along with pseudo-religious 
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mentality. Communalism was not, after all, the power it was made out to be; 
it was a creation of educated classes in search of office and employment. The 
problem was essentially one of protection of interests, and religion was merely 
a useful staking-horse for this purpose. The 'real conflict had nothing to do 
with religion, though religion often marked the issue, but was essentially 
between those who stood for a nationalist / democratic / socially revolutionary 
policy and those concerned with preserving the relics of a feudal regime. In a 
crisis the latter depended on foreign support which is interested in preserving 
the status quo'."^ *^  
The basic premise of Nehru's argument was valid. There was nothing 
wrong in arguing that religious solidarity should not be the basis for political 
activism, or that religious symbols of disunity be shurmed in public life. The 
alternative strategy, worked out by Tilak in Maharashtra or the swadeshi 
leaders in Bengal, had created fissures in the liberation straggle, offended 
Muslims in those regions, and enfeebled the intellectual underpinnings of 
secular goals set by the Congress. 
Nehm was not the sole champion of secular nationalism; yet he, more 
than anyone else, enriched its content. He provided depth to debates on 
secularism within the Congress, as also in left circles, by introducing complex 
but relevant historical and contemporary themes drawn from India and other 
societies. He did so not on the basis of abstract principles of Western 
democracy — a charge commonly levelled against him by his detractors — but 
because of his own acute understanding of the wider social and political 
processes in history. There is no reason to believe that his perceptions were 
flawed, or to doubt his motives or intentions. In sum, Nehm's ideas ran 
contrary to Jiimah's two-nation theory and to the thinking of some of his own 
Congress colleagues who decried his 'pro-Muslim' proclivities. 
It is evident from the above discussion that Nehru had no feeling of 
discrimination with respect to caste or religion. For him all people residing in 
India were the members of the same family, whatever be their caste or religion. 
It was because of this reason that when Jinnah demanded that Muslim League 
should be recognised as the most representative body of the Muslims, Nehru 
replied on April 6, 1938: "Obviously the Muslim League is an important 
communal organisation and we deal with it as such. But we have to deal with 
all organisations and individuals that come within our ken. We do not 
determine the measure of importance or distinction they possess". He also 
added, "...This importance does not come from outside recognition but from 
inherent strength"."*' 
Several rounds of invain talks between Nehru and Jinnah and Nehru and 
Liaquat Ali Khan were held but finally Jinnah succeeded in his propaganda of 
making a separate Islamic nation. And there was no option left for Indian 
leaders but to accept India's partition. It was Nehru's vacillation that let him 
down at the crucial moment in his life. How else can his behaviour be 
explained? Lincoln along with Gandhi had been his inspiration. As Shashi 
14 
Tharoor has revealed in his weekly column in the Indian Express, "On his desk, 
Jawaharlal Nehru kept two totems — a gold statuette of Mahatma Gandhi and a 
bronze cast of the hand of Abraham Lincoln which he would occasionally 
touch for comfort. The two objects reflected the range of his sources of 
inspiration: he often spoke of his wish to confront problems with the heart of 
the Mahatma and the hand of Lincoln". ^ In accepting partition, he let down 
both his mentors. 
Thus, everybody living in India irrespective of the age, profession, caste, 
and religion swallowed up the bitter fact that India was divided; 'the fact that 
territory and people that historically, geographically and economically were for 
centuries one country and one nation, was partitioned somewhat arbitrarily into 
two sovereign nation-states, and the circumstances of that partition and its 
consequences made inevitable a certain amount of disharmony between the two 
new States'.'^^ 
The partition had the violence which accompanied it, led to nearly six 
million refiigees pouring into India having lost their all. India was in the midst 
of a communal holocaust. There was senseless communal slaughter and a 
fratricidal war of unprecedented proportions. Unspeakable atrocities were 
perpetrated on the minorities in both India and Pakistan. In the span of a few 
months, nearly 500,000 people were killed and property worth thousands of 
millions of rupees was looted and destroyed. Communal violence threatened 
the very fabric of society. Even in Delhi, under the very nose of the central 
government, the looting and killing of Muslims lasted several days. In writing 
to Dr. Rajender Prashad, Nehru mentioned, "I must confess to you that recent 
happenings in the Punjab and in Delhi have shaken me greatly, ... shaking my 
faith in my own people. I could not conceive of the gross brutality and sadistic 
cruelty that people have indulged in.... There is a limit to killing and brutality 
and that limit has been passed during these days in North India.... Little 
children are butchered in the streets. The houses in many parts of Delhi are still 
full of corpses.... I am fairly thick-skinned, but I find these kinds of thing more 
than I can bear ... 50,000 or 100,000 people have been murdered".'*'* Despite 
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the fierce pressure of communal sentiment, which affected even some of the 
important Congress leaders, both at the Centre and in the States, it is to the 
credit of the national leadership and the people that they managed to maintain 
India's secular polity. This was no easy task and Nehru, particular, had to use 
the full force of his personality, including threats of resignation, to make this 
possible. The situation was brought under control within a few months through 
decisive political and administrative measures. 
Nehru always kept the window of friendship and cooperation opened to 
all nations of the world, especially to the neighbouring countries. This is 
evident from his message on August 15, 1947, "I want to say to all nation of 
the world, including our neighbour country that we stand for peace and 
friendship with them"."*^ This has been the main thrust of India's foreign policy 
for 50 years. In fact, Pakistan's Governor-General, and creator, M.A. Jinnah 
had also said, "we want to live peacefully and maintain cordial friendly 
relations with our immediate neighbour and with the world at large". But, 
what actually happened between India and Pakistan was conflict, discord and 
even wars. 
India has consistently sought peaceful, cordial and friendly relations 
with Pakistan, as with all other countries in the world. However, Pakistan 
leadership has been harping on threats from India, and the alleged Indian desire 
to swallow her. India has repeatedly said that it wishes to respect Pakistan's 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. India has made it clear time 
and again that it does not have any intention whatsoever to undo the partition, 
and that it sincerely desires to settle all outstanding problems and disputes 
between the two countries by peaceful means, without resort to force. In the 
past, India has made several offers of "no war pact" to Pakistan, but the latter 
has never responded favourably to Indian offer. Pakistan's policy towards India 
has been one of persistent hostility. Nehru had once described Pakistan's policy 
as that of "India-baiting". The leadership of Pakistan has persistently accused 
India of not having reconciled to India's partition, and planning to undo it. 
Thus, the basic problem between India and Pakistan is that while India wants 
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friendship with its neighbour, that country has nothing but hatred for and 
hostility towards India. 
In fact, inspite of many errors and weaknesses, the Government of 
India's record, and in particular Nehru's personal record, in dealing with the 
post-partition riots was exemplary. The government also succeeded in 
protecting the Muslim minority in the country, so that in the end forty-five 
million Muslims chose to remain in India. Communalism was thereby 
contained and weakened but not eliminated, for conditions were still favourable 
for its growth. For communalism to be eclipsed a consistent struggle against it 
would be needed for a prolonged period. More than anyone else, Nehru was 
aware of this. And so he never tired of stressing that communalism was a 
fundamental issue of Indian politics and that it posed the main threat to India's 
integrity. 'If allowed free play', he wrote in 1951, 'communalism would break 
up India'. ^ Portraying communalism as the Indian version of fascism, he said 
in October 1947, 'the wave of fascism which is gripping India now is the direct 
outcome of hatred for the non-Muslims which the Muslin League preached 
among its followers for years. The League accepted the ideology of fascism 
from the Nazis of Germany ... the ideas and methods of fascist organisation are 
now gaining popularity among the Hindu's also and the demand for the 
establishment of a Hindu State is its clear manifestation'.'*^ 
Nehru carried on a massive campaign against communalism to instill a 
sense of security in the minorities, through public speeches, radio broadcasts, 
speeches in parliament, private letters and epistles to chief ministers. He 
repeatedly declared: 'No State can be civilised except a secular State'."^^ On 
Gandhiji's birthday in 1951, he told a Delhi audience: 'if any person raises his 
hand to strike down another on the ground of religion, I shall fight him till the 
last breath of my life, both as the head of the government and from outside'.^° 
Democratic though he was, he even advocated a ban on political organisations 
based on religion and got the Constitution amended to enable the government 
to impose 'reasonable restrictions' on the right to free speech and expression in 
order to curb communal speeches and writings. 
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Though on almost all issues he believed in consensus and compromise, 
communalism was the exception, for as he said in 1950, any compromise on 
communalism 'can only mean a surrender of our principles and a betrayal of 
the cause of India's freedom'/' Keeping in view India's specific situation, 
Nehru defined secularism in the dual sense of keeping the State, politics and 
education separate from religion, making religion a private matter for the 
individual, and of showing equal respect for all faiths and providing equal 
opportunities for their followers. He defined communalism as the ideology 
which treated Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs or Christians as homogenous group in 
regard to political and economic matters, as 'politics under some religious grab, 
one religious group being incited to hate another religious group'. Nehru was 
one of the first to try to understand the socio-economic roots of communalism, 
and he came to believe that it was primarily a weapon of reaction, even though 
its social base was formed by the middle classes. Nehru also argued most 
convincingly that secularism had to be the sole basis for national unity in a 
multi-religious society and that communalism was, therefore, clearly a danger 
to national unity and was anti-national. 
There was, however, a major lacuna in Nehru's approach to the problem 
of communalism, which can be seen as a certain economistic, deterministic and 
reductionist bias. Believing that plarming and economic development and the 
spread of education, science and technology would automatically weaken 
communal thinking and help from a secular consciousness, he ignored the need 
for struggle against communalism as an ideology. As a result he paid little 
attention to the content of education or to the spread of science and scientific 
approach among the people. While very active himself, he failed to use the 
Congress as an organisation to take his own brilliant understanding of 
communalism to the people. He also compromised with his own stand when he 
permitted the Congress in Kerela to enter into an alliance with the Muslim 
League and Christian communal group in 1960. Further, he was unable to 
persuade the State governments to take strong administrative steps against the 
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instigators or perpetrators of communal violence. Sadly, sorrow over the large-
scale communal violence marked the last years of his life.^ ^ 
1.3 PROBLEMS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN RESULTING 
FROM THE PARTITION 
The two States of India and Pakistan were bom in August 1947, when 
India was partitioned at the end of British colonial rule. The country was 
divided, partitioned, and rather vivisected on the basis of the two-nation theory, 
theory on the basis of religion. The people who were supporters of partition 
belonged to hinterland. After partition most of such people appear to have 
reconciled with secular India and have stayed back. During the exchange of 
population, that is Hindus to India and Muslims to Pakistan most of the 
Muslims stayed back in India and their population, who left Pakistan for India, 
were primarily not received as Hindus but as Pakistani refugees. Similarly, the 
Muslims from India to Pakistan were, basically and primarily not received as 
Muslims but as Indian refugees (Mohajir), though the country was partitioned 
on the basis of two-nation theory Hindus and Muslims. 
When India was partitioned it was expected that the relations between 
India and Pakistan would be normal and cordial because the partition was 
affected with the consent of the leaders of the two areas. The people of the two 
areas had shared a common history for centuries and the economies of the two 
countries were complimentary to each other but unfortunately that did not 
happen. Two major reasons for constant conflict between the two States were 
identified as follows— '^^  
1. Partition was affected in haste without formulating suitable and detailed 
rules for the game. The result was mass exodus of population for each 
country, large-scale killings, abduction of women, forced conversions, 
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problem of recovery of evacuee property and many such other problems. 
This caused bad blood between the two countries and things could not be 
forgotten for long. 
2. Basis for the partition was not laid down in unambiguous terms. Pakistan's 
leader advocated and accepted partition on the basis of 'two-nation' theory. 
In contrast, while Indian leaders accepted partition, they never approved of 
two-nation theory. They accepted partition on the basis of some type of 
territorial self-determination and more on account of compulsions created 
by the prevailing situation of widespread riots and the unhealthy intentions 
of our British rulers. 
Our relations with Pakistan have been particularly unhappy. There have 
been constant threats of war. Between the two countries there are some major 
problems and disputes from partition. The following major issues and problems 
determined the nature of Indo-Pak relations :-
1.3.1 Transfer of population and problem of religious minorities 
1.3.2 Problem of recovery or compensation for abandoned property 
of refugees in India and Pakistan 
1.3.3 Division of State assets at the time of partition 
1.3.4 Canal-Water Disputes 
1.3.5 Boundary Disputes 
1.3.6 Issue of Integration of Princely States 
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1.3.1 Transfer of population and problem of religious minorities 
The price for Indian independence was very heavy in the form of mass 
killings, uprooting of lakhs of families and other brutalities. Following the 
decision to accept the partition, both India and Pakistan should have prepared a 
well articulated plan for the transfer of population. Regretfully, this aspect was 
completely ignored both by India and Pakistan. The communal madness which 
took place in forcing the Hindus and Sikhs out of Pakistan had an equal 
reaction in Punjab, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh in India. The communal frenzy 
reached such a State that it seemed that India and Pakistan were going to 
plunge into a civil war. An estimated twelve million people crossed the new 
international border from both the sides and moved to different destinations. It 
is also reported that approximately one million lives were lost.^ ^ 
Large transfer of population between India and Pakistan as a 
consequence of India's partition led to the worsening of internal situation in 
both the countries. The major problems faced by the Government of India were 
the restoration of normalcy in country and the creation of a social climate of 
secular existence. In addition, it had to make arrangements to house and feed 
millions of refugees, who had come from Pakistan, make long term plans for 
their rehabilitation, and their eventual absorption in the mainstream of Indian 
social life. 
From the above discussion it must not be thought that religious conflicts 
were settled by the transfer of population between the two countries. The 
problem of religious minorities remained unsolved in both the States. About 40 
million Muslims remained in India and 10 million Hindus in East Pakistan.^^ 
The fever of religious communalism was heightened by the unfortunate 
happenings of 1947. The legacy of the communalism of partition still 
sometimes leads to the occasional outbreak of communal riots. 
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After independence, while India sought to solve its minority problems 
by establishing a secular State, Pakistan decided to be an Islamic republic. The 
reports of maltreatment of minorities in either side started causing serious 
strains on bilateral relations of India and Pakistan. It was to arrive at a 
consensus regarding the treatment of minorities in the two States that Prime 
Minister Nehru and Pakistani Prime Minister Liquat Ali Khan held talks in 
en 
April, 1950 and Nehru-Liquat pact was concluded. This pact gave 
constitutional guarantees for minorities and promised the return transfer of 
refugees and recovery of abducted women. It also assured freedom of 
movement and protection in travel to the migrants. It provided for the setting 
up of minorities commission in East Bengal and West Bengal for carrying out 
the arrangements made in respect of the migrants. After the conclusion of this 
pact the refugee's migration suddenly dropped. However, it erupted again in 
1951 in particular, the influx of Hindus from East Pakistan to West Bengal 
registered a big increase. The migration problem become very acute but both 
the countries, having adopted different and opposed position on many 
international issues, failed to implement even the Nehru-Liaquat pact fully. 
Throughout the late fifties and early sixties the influx of refixgees from Pakistan 
to India continued to be a source of trouble for Indo-Pak relations. Even in 
1971, a large number of Hindus and Muslim reftjgees crossed over to India 
after a military crackdown and massacre was let loose in East Pakistan by the 
CO 
government of Pakistan. The influxes of refiigees become an important reason 
for the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan in December 1971. Thus, 
after partition the refugee problem came to be a source of big strain on Indo-
Pak relations. Even after sixty years of partition the problem of illegal 
migration of refugees from Sindh (Pakistan) into India continues to be there. 
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1.3.2 Problem of recovery or compensation for abandoned property 
of refugees in India and Paldstan 
Another irritant which arose out of the partition was that of evacuee 
property. The non-Muslims left properties worth Rs.5000 miUion in Pakistan 
while Muslims left property worth Rs.lOOO million in India/^ To solve the 
evacuee immovable property several meetings between the representatives of 
Indian and Pakistani Governments took place between 1947-1950 and 1953 but 
nothing came out of it. In 1958 a ministerial level meeting took place but it was 
also not very fhiitful.^^ Again in 1964, the attempts by the Government of India 
to solve the problem were turned down by Pakistan. No ftirther serious attempt 
were made in this direction. 
1.3.3 Division of State assets at the time of partition 
As regards the distribution of assets and liabilities of British India, it 
was decided in December 1947 that the Government of Pakistan would receive 
Rs 750 millions from India as its share of the balances. As an interim measure 
Rs 200 million was paid to Pakistan as an interim installment. In the meantime 
a clash between India and Pakistan took place over Kashmir. Sardar Patel 
threatened that the implementation of the agreement would depend upon the 
settlement of the Kashmir issue.^ ^ But owing to Mahatma Gandhi's fast against 
the delay the payment was made to Pakistan promptly. 
Also, at the time of partition, it was decided that India would take the 
entire responsibility of paying the foreign debts and Pakistan would pay its 
share to India in three equal installments. But the refusal of Pakistan to pay its 
share led the development of bad blood between the two countries. Similarly, 
the problem of division of military stores and delinking of banking services too 
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acted as irritants in Indo-Pak relations. The problem of establishing trade and 
economic relations also caused tensions. 
Areas that formed part of Pakistan were rich in wheat and cotton 
production which used to supply these commodities to other parts of India. 
Likewise, India after partition came to be the inheritor of rich sugarcane, coal 
and iron ore producing areas. The partition upset the complementarily of 
economic and trade relations. In 1947, both the countries signed a Standstill 
Agreement which permitted free flow of goods between the two countries. 
However, this arrangement failed to work smoothly because there arose 
disputes over the issue of sharing the export duty on jute and other taxes levied 
and collected on such goods. Consequently, a new trade agreement was signed 
in May 1948.^ ^ But this agreement too failed to resolve the trade tangle. The 
third agreement was signed on 24 June 1949, but the devaluation of Indian 
rupee and Pakistan's refiisal to do the same made the implementation of this 
agreement impossible.^'' Thus, the differences over trade relations to kept the 
Indo-Pak relations tense and strained during the period under review. 
1.3.4 Canal-Water Disputes 
Another matter which became a source of irritation between the two 
countries was the distribution of river waters. It became actually manifest after 
the partition. Pakistan's economy was mostly agricultural and its development 
was dependent on India's generosity to allow water into Pakistan. Five of the 
six rivers rise and flow through India. After partition, it became imperative that 
river waters should be distributed between the two countries in an equitable 
manner. 'No army with bombs and shellfire could be devastated by the simple 
expedient of India's permanently shutting off the sources of water that keep the 
fields and the people of Pakistan alive'.''^ After extensive negotiations, 
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Pt. Nehru and Field Marshal Ayub Khan signed the Indus-Water treaty at 
Karachi on September 19, 1960. The treaty divided the six rivers between India 
and Pakistan according to a formula. The water of Sutlej, Ravi, Beas were to go 
to India and the other three Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to Pakistan.^^ The treaty 
which was supposed to solve the water dispute between the two countries, 
however, did not do so and occasionally differences on the subject did erupt. 
1.3.5 Boundary Disputes 
After partition both the countries started in the right earnest the process 
of demarcating, on the basis of Radcliff Award, the boundaries between them. 
Through rational compromises reached through mutual negotiations, both the 
countries accomplished the gigantic task in approximately 25 years. The 
demarcation of East Punjab-Pakistan boundary was completed in June 1960 
and the Rajasthan-Pakistan boundary in 1963. 
However, the two sides failed to demarcate the Kutch-Sindh boundary. 
India was of the view that the Government of Bombay's resolution of 
February, 1914 had settled the matter finally. Pakistan did not accept the view 
and asserted that the issue was still in dispute and that Kutch-Sindh boundary 
had never been demarcated. In early 1964, Pakistan sent some of its troops to 
occupy Chhad Bet area of North Runn of Kutch. But these troops withdrew 
when Indian troops moved into the area. However, in April 1965, there 
developed a war between India and Pakistan over the issue of ownership of 
Runn of Kutch. In June 1965 both India and Pakistan agreed to a cease-fire 
which was to be effective with effect from T' July 1965. Afterwards, it was 
agreed to refer the dispute to a three Judge Arbitration Tribunal. Tribunal gave 
its award in February 1968 and decided against the Pakistani case that the 
International boundary of the Runn passed through its middle. Nevertheless, it 
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awarded to Pakistan some 350 sq. miles of the disputed area. India, though did 
not regard the decision as just, decided to accept it unconditionally because of 
the terms of the June 1965 agreement. The Pakistani invasion of Kutch was, 
however, really designed to test its army and guns for the future aggression 
against India, which came in September 1965.^ ^ 
1.3.6 Issue of Integration of Princely States 
The immediate problem faced by the Indian Government was the 
consolidation of Indian Princely States. In the British Act of Independence, the 
Princely States were given the option of either acceding to one of the two 
newly created countries or declaring themselves independent. The 
constitutional position of the States, upon the transfer of power to Indian hands, 
was clearly mentioned in paragraph 14 of Cabinet Mission Plan statement 
dated 16 May 1946: 'Paramountcy can neither be retained by the British crown 
nor transferred to the new government'. Section 7 of the Indian Independence 
Act of 1947 declared that 'the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States 
lapses'. The legal position, therefore, was that the States became completely 
mdependent, and were under no obligation to join India or Pakistan. 
By 15 August 1947 almost every one of the 565 ^^  Princely States, with 
three exceptions had acceded to either India or Pakistan, on the same basis as 
the principle underlying the partition of British India. The three, which stood 
out, were Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. Sardar Patel enabled India to 
consolidate and merge into India these States of varying size, socio-economic 
environment and at varying degree of feudal administration and an equally 
different degree of importance to this country. The determined effort of Sardar 
Patel to unite India as a nation-state has been the greatest contribution of any 
single person in making Indians think of themselves as belonging to one nation. 
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The issue of accession of these three States led to the development of tensions 
and strains in Indo-Pak relations. 
(i). Junagadh 
The Princely State of Junagadh was a Hindu majority State (more than 
80%) ruled by a Muslim ruler Sir Mahabat Khan Hussain. On 15 August 1947 
the Government of Junagadh announced that the State had acceded to Pakistan 
and subsequently after a month Pakistan accepted the accession. But this 
accession of Junagadh was not acceptable to Indian Government. The 
Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten, under the pressure of Indian 
leaders, telegraphed to Jinnah that Pakistan's acceptance of Junagadh's 
accession was 'in utter violation of principles on which partition of India was 
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agreed upon and effected'. On 17 September the Indian Cabinet decided to 
deploy troops around Junagadh 'with a view to insuring the security of the 
country and to maintaining law and order in Kathiawar'.''•' After the 
administration of the State had been taken over by India, a plebiscite was held 
on 20 February 1948 in Junagadh for setting its fiiture. Majority of people came 
in favour of India. Only 91 persons voted in favour of Pakistan. After this 
verdict, Junagadh became a part of India. Nevertheless, Pakistan took the 
complain to the Security Council where it still stands buried.^ "* 
(ii). Hyderabad 
The large-sized native State of Hyderabad presented a different problem. 
This State in South India was surrounded on all sides by Indian Territory-the 
then Provinces of Bombay, Madras, Central Provinces and the State of Mysore 
which had already merged with India. The ruler of Hyderabad, the Nizam, was 
one of the wealthiest individuals in the world. He was given the title of His 
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Exalted Highness by the British Government. The Nizam was dreaming of an 
independent Kingdom, though he had given the impression of his being in 
favour of Pakistan. The Nizam had given a loan of two crore rupees to 
Pakistan. Jinnah knew the Nizam too well. He told Indian Governor-General 
Lord Mountbatten that Hyderabad was the concern of the Nizam. Like 
Junagadh, vast majority of the people in Hyderabad were Hindus, though the 
ruler was Muslim. The Nizam was plarming to make his State a sovereign 
country, yet he was negotiating merger with India. Pakistan gave an indication 
that the Nizam could rely on that country in case of difficulty. 
Meanwhile, the Nizam's aide Qasim Rizvi established an organisation 
of Muslim fundamentalists. Its members, known as Razakars, were given 
training to fight for their community. The Razakars let loose a reign of terror in 
the State, killing and looting people, and in the process entire law and order 
machinery collapsed. People all over the country became restless and 
demanded use of force to settle the problem of Hyderabad and restore peace. 
Earlier, on four occasions, police action was planned but could not be taken. 
Finally, the fifth attempt or 'Operation Polo' was drafted and implemented 
under the direct control of Home Minister Sardar Patel. Even Prime Minister 
" 7 / : 
Nehru was not taken into confidence for fear of his disapproval. Indian army 
brought the situation under control within 24 hours, but the task was completed 
in five days. Accepting Nizam's formal request for accession, India agreed to 
pay Rs. 50 lakhs per year as privy purse to the Nizam. Pakistan termed Indian 
action as aggression, and raised the issue thrice (October, November and 
December 1948) in the United Nations. But, it could not muster much support 
except that of the United States.^^ 
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(iii). Kashmir Issue 
The most vexed issue between India and Pakistan which has brought a 
horrendous condition in Indo-Pak relations, the protracted nature of which has 
brought grave ramifications to the parties involved and adversely accentuated 
tensions in South Asia bringing momentous influence on global politics at large 
is the Kashmir issue. No other bilateral dispute has posed such alarming 
implications for the disputing parties as well as international politics as the 
dispute over Kashmir. All attempts to resolve the issue have failed. The 
problem further got aggravated with the rise of militancy in the valley. As 
rightly pointed out by Ratnesh Kishore Verma and Manju Mishra. "For past 
fifty years Kashmir is the major bone of contention between the two strange 
brothers, viz., India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan have own versions 
of looking at Kashmir issue, where there is no place for convergence; result is 
the derailment of peace process for past five decades. The major losers are the 
citizens of India and Pakistan because of lack of political, social and economic 
development in both these countries". The whole Kashmir issue arising out of 
India's partition shall be discussed in detail in Chapter-2. 
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CHAPTER-2 
ISSUE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND INDO-PAK 
RELATIONS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed earlier, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was a composite 
State. It was ruled by a Hindu ruler, but was inhabited by both Muslims and 
Hindus. While in Kashmir, the Muslims are in a majority, in Jammu the Hindus 
are dominant and in certain parts the Buddhists form a sizeable section of 
people. 
Thus, Kashmir has been the major issue and a bone of contention 
between India and Pakistan. The partition gave rise to many disputes and 
problems. All of these disputes, except the dispute over Kashmir were solved 
gradually through mutual negotiations, one through the mediation of World 
Bank and another through Arbitration.^ The issue of Kashmir, however, 
continues to remain unsettled. Despite a series of lengthy, tiring and patient 
attempts by many individuals, nations and organisations, a solution to the 
Kashmir issue acceptable to both India and Pakistan has yet to emerge. Since 
1947 it has been a major irritant in Indo-Pak relations. It has been pending with 
the Security Council of the United Nations and there appears to be almost no 
chance for a settlement through the Council. In 1965 it led to a war between the 
two countries. The Tashkent meeting of 1966 and the Shimla meeting of 1972 
failed to fill the gap between the positions adopted by the two countries in 
respect of Kashmir. India, since mid-fifties, has been maintaining that Kashmir 
is an integral part of Indian Union and its accession to India is full and final. 
For India Kashmir problem means the issue of securing the liberation of 
Pakistani Occupied Kashmir (PoK). Pakistan, however, still advocates that the 
future of Kashmir is yet to be settled in accordance with the wishes of the 
people of Kashmir. As such there are strong Indo-Pak differences over the 
issue and Kashmir still constitutes a determinant of the bilateral relations 
between these two South-Asian countries. A review of Indo-Pak relations since 
1947 can be complete only by reviewing the nature of history of Kashmir 
dispute between the two countries. This chapter is, therefore, confined with 
various issues of Indo-Pak dispute with respect to Jammu and Kashmir. 
2.2 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION AS A FACTOR IN INDO-PAK 
DISPUTE 
The Kashmir is situated in extreme north of the India-Pakistan sub-
continent and at the southern point of Central Asia. With an area of 86,000 
square miles, it is surrounded by four countries: China, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and India, with the narrow Wakhan strip (in Afghanistan) separating it from the 
Soviet Union."' 
The State of Jammu and Kashmir was the main point of dispute at 
the time of India's partition. One of the basic reasons of this dispute was its 
geographical location. "The geographical situation of the State was such that it 
would be bounded on all sides by the new Domination of Pakistan". Its only 
access to the outside world by road lay through the Jhelum valley and road 
which ran through Pakistan, via Rawalpindi. The only rail line connecting the 
State with the outside world lay through Sialkot in Pakistan. Its postal and 
telegraphic services operated through areas that were certain to belong to the 
domination of Pakistan. The State was dependent for all its imported supplies 
like salt, sugar, petrol and other necessities of life on their safe and continued 
transit through areas that would form part of Pakistan."^ 
Under the present de facto position of the State, Jammu, the Valley and 
Ladakh are in India. The Tribal areas are in Pakistan, and Hill Districts (mainly 
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Poonch) stand divided between India and Pakistan. Because of its strategic 
situation and geographical position Kashmir is intimately connected with the 
security of India. 
2.3 STANDSTILL AGREEMENT 
In August 1947, when the paramountcy of the British crown lapsed 
Kashmir became an independent State and under the partition settlement it had 
the option to accede either to India or Pakistan or to remain independent. The 
Maharaja of Kashmir, Mr. Hari Singh decided to maintain the independence of 
Kashmir and as such did not accept either of the two Instruments of Accession 
that were forwarded to him by the Governments of India and Pakistan. Three 
days before the partition (August 12, 1947) the Maharaja proposed a "Standstill 
Agreement" with India and Pakistan.^ 
The Standstill Agreement was not meant to re-impose paramountcy over 
Princely States; nor was it meant to secure the State's accession to the 
dominion concerned. It was only intended to ensure the continuity of certain 
existing arrangements. Under the Pakistan-Kashmir Standstill Agreement both 
parties were committed to continue the pre-partition arrangements concerning 
supplies and services such as post, telegraph and communications. 
But almost immediately after agreeing to a Standstill Agreement, 
Pakistan began to apply economic and other pressures against Kashmir in 
violation of this agreement. Along with supplies of food, salt, petrol and other 
essential commodities, the rail-link with the State was cut. Muslim citizens 
were incited to rise in revolt against the State Government, and Pakistani 
raiders and other hostiles were encouraged, armed and otherwise equipped and 
helped to cross the frontier into Kashmir. These incursions started towards the 
end of August and assumed serious proportions early in October 1947. By 22 
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October, they developed into a large-scale invasion. Raiders indulged in arson, 
plunder and rape, and caused considerable devastation in the valley. 
2.4 ACCESSION OF KASHMIR AND INDO-PAK RELATIONS 
Pakistani acceptance of the Standstill Agreement was only superficial 
and surfacial as within a month of the agreement it started harassing the people 
of Kashmir by stopping economic activities, food and fuel supplies from 
Pakistani side to Kashmir. This economic boycott appeared to be designed to 
force Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Maharaja, however, did not show any 
inclination to accede to Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan extended all its 
political and military pressure to include Kashmir to the newly formed Muslim 
State. After continuous pressure and attacks from Pakistan, Maharaja of 
Kashmir requested the Indian Government for its support and decided to 
accede to India, with a formal declaration on the Instrument of Accession of 
Kashmir to India. 
Based on the prevailing constitutional and legal provisions, as laid down 
by the British Parliament, the decision about accession lay entirely with the 
ruler. The Government of India Act, 1935, incorporated in the Indian 
Independence Act, 1947, clearly mentioned that an Indian State shall be 
deemed to have acceded to the dominion, if the Governor-General has signified 
its acceptance of the Instrument of Accession executed by the ruler thereof 
Thus, in the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the ruler forwarded an Instrument of 
Accession which was subsequently conditionally accepted by the Governor-
General of India. In his letter of acceptance to the Maharaja of Kashmir dated 
27 October 1947, Lord Mountbatten declared: 
consistent with their policy that, in the case of any State 
where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, 
the question of accession should be decided in accordance 
with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my 
government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been 
restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invaders, the 
question of the State should be settled by a reference to the 
people.^  
This Indian commitment clearly demonstrated the Government of 
India's trust in the people of Kashmir and exposed Pakistan's distrust of them. 
Earlier through this principle alone India annexed two other States: Hyderabad, 
whose ruler had declared independence, and Junagadh, where the ruler had 
proceeded to Pakistan. 
2.4.1 INDIAN PERSPECTIVE 
The Instrument of Accession executed by the ruler of Jammu and 
Kashmir was the same as the ones executed by nearly 560 other Princely States 
in India. Their accession has not been challenged and a different standard can 
not be applied to Jammu and Kashmir.^ Thus, once the Instrument of Accession 
was signed by the Maharaja and accepted by the Governor-General of India, 
the Kashmir became an integral part of India and "the legality of the accession 
is beyond doubt". 
2.4.2 PAKISTAN PERSPECTIVE 
The majority of Kashmiris are Muslims, therefore, Kashmir must 
become a part of Pakistan. The premise is that the religion of a given people 
determines its nationality and its political affiliation. Other factors, too, linked 
Kashmir closely with Pakistan. N.C. Chatterjee, a Hindu member of Indian 
38 
Parliament, pointed out that: "The geographical situation of the State was such 
that it would be bounded on all sides by the new Dominion of Pakistan". 
Similar views are also expressed by several other scholars. Ishtiaq H. 
Qureshi in his book 'Short History of Pakistan' states that "the economic 
interests, geographical nearness and cultural affinities demanded Kashmir's 
accession to Pakistan". 
Mustaq Ahmad had also expressed similar views in his book 'Pakistan's 
Foreign Policy'. He writes that "geographically, economically and culturally 
Kashmir was a part of Pakistan and would have naturally and inevitably 
acceded to it, if the people had been left free to make their own choice". 
This obsession with Kashmir led to a feeling in Pakistan that war would 
be necessary if negotiations did not able to persuade Maharaja to accede to 
Pakistan. 
The trust that Indian leadership expressed in the people and leadership 
of Kashmir and their unequivocal support to the Kashmir urge for freedom and 
their right of self-determination had baffled the leaders of Pakistan. In 
desperation they decided to settle the ftiture of Kashmir with the power of the 
gun. "Kashmir is in my pockef Jinnah had declared. And his impolitic 
decision to send tribal and irregulars to invade Kashmir was his undoing. 
Suspecting that the Maharaja was inclined to accede to India Jinnah 
decided to capture Jammu and Kashmir by force. His plan was to launch a 
clandestine invasion, without taking any help from British officers, by a force 
mainly composed of Pathan tribesmen, ex-servicemen and soldiers 'on leave'. 
Colonel Akbar Khan, Director of Weapons and Equipment at the Pakistan 
Army Headquarters, was put in charge of the operation under the guidance of 
Pakistan's Prime Minister, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali khan.'° 
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Initially, Pakistan sought to exploit a local agrarian uprising which had 
broken out in the Poonch area. But, this met with no more than modest success. 
This forced them to rapidly step up the level of infiltration. Large numbers of 
armed men were dispatched in, to carry out irregular warfare against the Dogra 
forces. The tribal raiders that Pakistan had sent to Kashmir overran the 
defences of the Dogra army led by Brigadier Rajender Singh, and reached the 
outskirts of Srinagar. Enroute they committed many atrocities on the people, 
irrespective of their religion. This course of events left the Kashmiri leadership 
and the Maharaja no option but to turn to India. An indent for military supplies 
was sent on 1^* October and this was soon followed by a request that Indian 
forces be stationed near the border, so that they could come to the State's 
rescue if the need arose.'' India took a prompt decision to assist the State with 
military supplies. But, this prompt decision of Indian political leadership was 
derailed by the British army officers, commanding the armed forces at that time 
and till 26 October, no final decision regarding the military supplies were taken 
by India. This matter was then discussed in the Defence Committee, which was 
presided by the Governor-General of India-Lord Mountbatten. It permitted 
Mountbatten, as Chairman of Defence Committee, to play a critical role in the 
policy-making for Kashmir. This was the strategic blunder on the part of 
political leadership of India. This allowed Mountbatten to play a role which far 
exceeding that of a constitutional head and which culminated, at the end of the 
year, in the decision to give conditional accession to Kashmir and also to refer 
this issue to the United Nations.'^ 
When the Governor-General refused assistance, the Prime Minister of 
J&K Mehar Chand Mahajan flew to Delhi on 26 October along with Shri V.P. 
Menon, an Indian officer sent to assess the exact situation in Kashmir by the 
Defence Committee. He conveyed to Nehru the Maharaja's willingness to 
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accede to India if "the Indian army must fly to Srinagar immediately" 
1 "^ 
otherwise he will "negotiate terms with Jinnah". This threatening request 
clearly indicates that the Maharaja had not closed the Pakistan option and he 
was using it as a bargaining chip. But, the deteriorating situation at Kashmir 
forced Maharaja to sign the Instrument of Accession with India which was then 
conditionally accepted by the Governor-General of India on 27 October. The 
Indian army was airlifted to Srinagar to clear the State from invaders. The 
accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, supported by the constitutional 
authority of the Maharaja and political and emotionally by the people of 
Kashmir was the greatest triumph of Indian nationalism after Independence. On 
the other hand, Pakistan had no justification for its wrong judgment. Initially, 
both Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah were eager to negotiate with the Pakistani 
leadership for accession. Mehar Chand was prepared to fly down to negotiate 
terms with Jinnah even on the day the Maharaja was seeking armed help from 
India. 
In his editorial to Sardar Patel's correspondence, Durga Das had very 
rightly observed, 'the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah shared and worked in 
their own way for a similar objective, namely independent Kashmir'. If they 
acceded to India, he adds, "it was because by invading Kashmir, Pakistan left 
them no other choice". '^* 
At this juncture, Pakistan pointed out that, the Maharaja had no authority 
left to execute the Instrument of Accession because his subjects had 
overthrown his government by a successful revolt and forced him to flee from 
the capital.'^ With regard to the Kashmir accession to India, Liaquat Ali Khan 
clearly stated it that Pakistan could never accept it because: 
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"accession was fraudulent in as much as it was 
achieved deliberately creating certain conditions, with 
the object of finding an excuse to stage the 
'accession'. It was based on violence because it 
furthered the plan of the Kashmir government to 
liquidate the Muslim population of the State. The 
accession was against the well-known will of an 
overwhelming majority of the population and could 
not be justified on any grounds whether moral or 
constitutional, geographical or economic, cultural or 
religious".^ 
In early November 1947, inspired by the initial success of the armed 
forces of India which was airlifted to Srinagar, Sheikh Abdullah felt that India 
should throw an ultimatum to Pakistan to withdraw the raiders from Kashmir 
and declare war on expiry of the ultimatum. But, Nehru was not agreed and he 
felt that this would be 'very injurious to Kashmir and to a lesser extent to 
India'. 
2.5 KASHMIR DISPUTE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
However, by early December, Nehru's views underwent a radical 
change after two rounds of negotiations with Pakistan with no results. Invaders 
operating from Pakistan had stepped up the scale of their operations and ample 
evidence was then available to prove that they were equipped and directed by 
the Pakistani authorities. By mid-December, it was clear that existing 
diplomatic and military approaches held out no promise of an early decisive 
victory. Therefore, Nehru felt that a political decision must be taken to conduct 
a limited strike into Pakistan. He also observed that this might mean Indian 
forces having to enter the districts of Sialkot, Gujarat and Jhelum in order to 
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deny the raiders the assistance they had been getting at their bases. From an 
operational angle, he advised the Chiefs of Staff to view Kashmir and West 
Punjab as a smgie area'. When Mountbatten, came to learn about this new 
development on his return from a tour on December 18, he was alarmed at the 
imminent prospect of open war between the two dominions, an event he had 
striven hard to avert. At this point, Mountbatten argued that the proper course 
to avoid war would be to refer the whole matter to the UN. But, Nehru had 
steadfastly resisted Mountbatten's attempt to involve the U.N. before the 
invaders had been expelled from Kashmir. When all the bilateral efforts to 
resolve the dispute had failed, the Government of India under the influence of 
Lord Mountbatten decided to refer this dispute to the Security Council in the 
hope that the United Nations would bring to bear the weight of world public 
opinion upon Pakistan and prevail upon it to discontinue its aggression in 
Kashmir. 
2.6 KASHMIR ISSUE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
The Government of India under Article 35 of the U.N. Charter lodged a 
complaint against Pakistan on 1^* January 1948. It was contended in the 
complaint that— 
i. the invaders were allowed transit across the frontiers by Pakistan; 
ii. they were allowed to use Pakistani territory as a base of operations; 
iii. they included Pakistani nationals; 
iv. they drew much of their military equipment, transportation and supplies 
including petrol from Pakistan; and 
V. Pakistani officers were training, guiding and otherwise actively helping 
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them. 
The Security Council was requested to ask the Government of Pakistan: 
1. to prevent Pakistani Government personnel, military and civil, participating 
in or assisting the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir State; 
2. to call upon other Pakistani nationals to desist from taking any part in the 
fighting in Jammu and Kashmir State; 
3. to deny to the invaders: 
a. access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir; 
b. military and other supplies; and 
c. all other kind of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.'^ 
2.7 PAKISTAN'S RESPONSE 
On 15 January 1948, Pakistan denied India's charges and lodged a 
counter-complaint with the Security Council. It listed ten charges against India, 
of which only one related to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It was stated, 
'India has obtained the accession of Kashmir through fraud and violence' and 
'large-scale massacre of Muslims there has been affected by the forces and 
nationals of India and the State'. Pakistan requested the Security Council to 
arrange for: 
a. the cessation of fighting in Jammu and Kashmir, 
b. the withdrawal of all outsiders, whether belonging to Pakistan or the Indian 
Union, 
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c. the return of and compensation for Muslims who had been compelled to 
leave Jammu and Kashmir, and 
d. the establishment of an impartial, independent and a representative 
administration in that State. 
Pakistan further requested that after these steps had been taken a 
plebiscite should be held to ascertain free and unfettered will of the people of 
State of Jammu and Kashmir in regard to its accession. Pakistan's allegations 
were denied and its demands resisted by India. On 17 January 1948, the 
Security Council called upon both governments 'to take immediately all 
measures within their power, including public appeals to their people, 
calculated to improve the situation and to refrain from making any statements 
and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might 
aggravate the situation'. It further requested each of these governments 'to 
inform the Council immediately of any material change in the situation which 
occurs or appears to either of them to be about to occur while the matter is 
under consideration by the council; and consult with the Council thereon'. 
Pakistan refiised to be responsive to the Security Council and continued 
pushing its regular forces in Kashmir territory. 
2.8 SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION ON KASHMIR 
After a carefiil consideration of the existing situation, the Security 
Council appointed a three-member Commission on January 20, 1948. The 
Commission had one nominee each of India and Pakistan and the third member 
was to be chosen by the two nominees. India nominated Czechoslovakia and 
Pakistan's nominee was Argentina. As the two failed to agree on a third 
member, the Security Council nominated the United States as the third 
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member. The commission was to investigate and mediate in the dispute. The 
Security Council added two more members, Belgium and Colombia, by a 
resolution of April 21, 1948. The Commission was then called the United 
Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).^^ The Security Council 
also resolved that Indian troops as well as tribesmen should be withdrawn, that 
an interim government, representing major political groups, be set up, and that 
the UNCIP should visit Jammu and Kashmir to exercise its good offices in 
helping the two countries restore peace and arrange a fair plebiscite. This 
resolution did not please either India or Pakistan. Joseph Korbel, a prominent 
Czechoslovakian diplomat and a member of the Commission, has written: 
the resolution of April 21 was of cardinal importance. It outlined the 
Security Council's stand on the Kashmir conflict, recommended the 
method of its solution, and became the principal term of reference for 
various United Nations representatives who ever since have been 
trying to bring about a peaceful and final settlement of the problem. " 
In order to make agree the governments of both the countries on the 
resolution of April 1948, the Commission members visited the two sub-
continental capitals in the late summer of 1948. The Commissioners received 
their initial shock in Karachi when the Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Sir Mohammed ZafruUah Khan, in an opening statement indicated that three 
Pakistani brigades had been involved in the hostilities since May of 1948. Sir 
ZafruUah defended this decision to send in regular Pakistani army formations 
on the grounds of self-defence: India, he argued, had territorial designs on 
Pakistan as well as Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. This revelation was greeted 
with some dismay on the part of the Commission, quite understandably, since it 
constituted a material change in the situation. '^* 
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The Commission's task did not prove to be any easier in New Delhi. 
Indian decision-makers were already upset with the Security Council's failure 
to expHcitly brand Pakistan as the aggressor State. Indian leaders consistently 
insisted that little progress could be made toward the resolution of the Kashmir 
question unless Pakistani's aggression was recognised and condemned. 
Following the consuhation and discussion with both the governments, 
the Commission drafted a second resolution at its fortieth meeting on 13 
August 1948. The resolution was in three parts; Part-I deal with the 
establishment of cease-fire, Part-II with the truce agreement, and Part-Ill with 
the determination of the future status of the State of J&K in accordance with 
the will of the people. 
By the summer of 1948, several thousand square miles of State territory 
was recovered by the Indian Army after which it was asked to stop operations, 
as the matter was being considered by the United Nations.^^ Meanwhile 
Pakistan had also managed to consolidate its position in its occupied areas and 
its troops were in control of the northern areas as much as of the Western. In 
such conditions the withdrawal of either forces would not be possible. Neither 
side was thus ready to comply with the clause of Part-I of the resolution which 
prohibited increase in military strength in Kashmir.^^ 
Part-II of the resolution proposed that both governments accept these 
principles as a basis for truce agreement. The proposed settlement plan was: 
i. that Pakistan shall withdraw from Kashmir its troops and shall try its best to 
secure the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals who were not 
the normal residents; 
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ii. that pending a final solution, the territory vacated by Pakistani troops shall 
be administered by local authorities under the supervision of the U.N. 
Commission; 
iii. that after the completion of the first step, the Commission shall notify the 
Government of India and thereafter India shall withdraw gradually the bulk 
of its troops fi-om Kashmir; 
iv. that Government of India would maintain, within those areas of Kashmir 
which were under its control at the moment of cease-fire, that minimum 
strength of its forces as shall be necessary for maintaining law and order; 
and 
V. that the fiiture status of J&K shall be determined in accordance with the 
wishes of the people of the State.^'' 
Significantly, Part-II of the resolution recognised "the presence of troops 
of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir".^^ Earlier 
Pakistan had consistently denied the presence of its armed personnel in Jammu 
and Kashmir. The Commission also recommended the withdrawal of Pakistani 
troops, tribesmen and other Pakistani nationals from the State. It was decided 
that the territory thus evacuated would be administered by the local authorities 
under the surveillance of the Commission. India accepted the resolution but 
Pakistan objected that it did not contained detailed guarantee for a free 
plebiscite. But, after the classifications, these proposals were acceptable to 
both India and Pakistan. The acceptance by India was communicated on 23 
O A 
December and by Pakistan on 25 December. Promptly the two governments 
ordered a "cease-fire" to take effect one minute before midnight on January 1, 
1949.^ ^ 
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2.9 CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS 
In this connection United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan 
proposed a cease-fire resolution which was unanimously passed by both the 
governments on 5 January 1949. The main provisions of the cease-fire 
arrangements, which were based on two resolution of 13 August 1948 and 5 
January 1949, are as follows: 
1. Hostilities should be stopped immediately. 
2. Pakistani forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be 
withdrawn. 
3. The Government of Pakistan should use its best endeavours to secure the 
withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and 
Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State 
for the purpose of fighting. 
4. Pending the final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops 
should be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of 
the UNCIP. 
5. On the withdrawal of the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals as well as of 
Pakistani forces, the bulk of the Indian forces should be withdrawn from 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir, in stages to be agreed upon with the 
Commission. 
6. The Indian Government should maintain within the lines existing at the 
moment of cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in 
agreement with the Commission were considered necessary to assist local 
authorities in the observance of law and order. 
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7. The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government 
of Jammu and Kashmir took all measures within its powers to make it 
publicly known the peace, law and order would be safeguarded and that all 
human and political rights would be guaranteed. 
8. A plebiscite to ascertain the will of the people should be held when it was 
found by the Commission that the cease-fire and truce arrangements (with 
regard to the withdrawal of Pakistani forces and Pakistani hostiles), set 
forth in Parts-I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, 
had been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite completed. 
9. The Plebiscite Administrator should be nominated by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, but was to be appointed formally to his 
office by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. He would derive 
necessary powers from it and would report the result of the plebiscite after 
its conclusion to the United Nations Commission and to the Government of 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
10. All citizens of the State who had left it on account of disturbances should 
be invited and would be free to return and to exercise all other rights as 
citizens at the time of plebiscite. For the purpose of facilitating repatriation, 
there should be appointed two commissions-one composed of nominees of 
India and the other of nominees of Pakistan. These commissions should 
operate under the direction of the Plebiscite Administrator. The 
Governments of India and Pakistan and all authorities within the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir should collaborate with the Plebiscite Administrators 
in putting this provision into effect. 
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11. The United Nations Commission should appoint mihtary observers who, 
under the authority of the Commission and with the cooperation of the 
military commands of India and Pakistan, would supervise observance of 
the cease-fire order. 
The Chairman of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan 
(UNCIP) conveyed to Pandit Nehru that the Commission agreed with him that 
the resolution should not be interpreted, or applied in practice, to envisage the 
creation of conditions, so as: 
a. to bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir 
government over the portion of their territory evacuated by Pakistani troops; 
b. to afford any recognition of the so called 'Azad Kashmir Government', or 
c. to enable this territory to be consolidated in anyway during the period of 
truce to the disadvantage of the State.^" With regard to this the Chairman, 
however, added that 'the local people of the evacuated territory will have 
freedom of legitimate political activity'. 
The Chairman of the Commission also agreed with Pandit Nehru that 
the paramount need for security against external aggression and internal 
disorders would also be a primary consideration for determining the minimum 
strength of Indian forces to be stationed in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, 
and that Pakistan would have no right under the resolution in regard to any 
matter concerning the internal administration of the State or the organisation 
and conduct of the plebiscite. 
These assurances formed part of the Reports of the Commission and 
were found in the official records of the Security Council. They were public 
and were known to Pakistan.'^ '* 
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The U.N. Commission resolutions, thus, recognised the sovereignty of 
Jammu and Kashmir government over the entire territory of the State did not 
question the validity of the accession of the State to the Indian Union and held 
the presence of Pakistani forces in the Kashmir territory to be unwarranted. 
This is obvious by the facts that while these agreements required Pakistan to 
withdraw its forces and raiders from Kashmir territory, the Government of 
India's obligation to retain such forces as were necessary for the security of the 
State and to assure to the people the protection of their rights was recognised. 
Plebiscite was to be conducted by an officer nominated by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and under the supervision of the United Nations 
Commission. But the plebiscite officer was to derive his authority from the 
Government of Jammu and Kashmir and to report the decision of the plebiscite 
to that government. Pakistan was not assigned any jurisdiction concerning the 
plebiscite. Its interest in the matter was limited to the appointment of a 
Commission to help the plebiscite officer in securing the repatriation of the 
citizens of the State of Jammu and Kashmir who had left that State during the 
conflict.^ ^ Plebiscite was to be held after the withdrawal of Pakistani raiders 
and Pakistani forces from the Kashmir territory had been completed, and a 
local authority independent of the Pakistan Government had been established in 
the territory evacuated by the Pakistani forces. 
In addition to this, the cease-fire line (now called the Line of Control) 
was drawn where the fighting ended. An agreement on cease-fire line was 
reached in Karachi on July 27, 1949.^ ^ It left 32,000 square miles of J&K 
territory in possession of Pakistan which is called Azad Kashmir by Pakistan. It 
had 7 Lakh (out of a total of 80 Lakh) populations. The UNCIP had 
recommended that disagreement between India and Pakistan over 
implementation of cease-fire agreement would be brought to the notice of the 
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Plebiscite Administrator, Admiral Chester Nimitz. India refused and the whole 
issue fell back on the Security Council.^^ As Nimitz could not ensure 
compliance of U.N. resolutions regarding withdrawal of Pakistan troops, he 
resigned. 
2.10 THE FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 
Thus, both India and Pakistan failed to implement this settlement. 
Pakistan persistently refused to withdraw its forces from Kashmir and thus, 
according to India made the resolution inoperative and ineffective. Pakistan 
wanted a synchronised withdrawal of troops of both the countries; and India 
insisted on the demilitarisation of the PoK as a condition preceding to 
plebiscite. The UNCIP failed to resolve the tangle. In August 1949 it suggested 
that the points of difference be submitted to arbitration. This proposal was 
accepted by Pakistan but rejected by India. By the end of 1949 the UNCIP 
accepted its failure and in its final report of 9 December 1949 suggested the 
appointment of a single mediator for replacing the Commission. 
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2.11 U.N. COMMISSIONS ON KASHMIR 
On the recommendation of the Commission, the Security Council 
appointed a number of mediators from time to time to look into the matter of 
Kashmir settlement and to suggest appropriate measures to resolve the issue. 
2.12 THE McNAUGHTON PLAN 
It became clear by the end of 1949 that Pakistan was not likely to pull 
out its troops from the occupied territory so as to facilitate the holding of 
plebiscite. In an attempt to break the initial logjam, the Commission appointed 
a single mediator, General McNaughton of Canada who was President of the 
Security Council in December 1949. He submitted a plan for the solution of 
Kashmir tangle. The plan prepared by McNaughton suggested withdrawal of 
both Pakistani and Indian troops from Kashmir. Thus, it proposed 
demilitarisation of Kashmir to prepare grounds for a plebiscite.'*^ This plan did 
not distinguish between the aggressor (Pakistan) and the victim (India). 
Whereas Pakistan had sponsored (and later directly supported) the aggression, 
Indian troops were sent on request of the then Maharaja, and that also only 
after the State's formal accession to India. This plan was, therefore, rejected by 
India. Commenting on the McNaughton Plan, India's representative B.N. Rao 
said: 
Today the position is that Pakistan which throughout 1948 denied giving 
aid either to the invader or to the Azad Kashmir forces, is now itself not only 
an invader but in actual occupation of nearly half the area of the State without 
any lawful authority from any source. This is naked aggression of which no one 
can approve, but there is no sign of disapproval in the McNaughton proposal.'^' 
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2.13 THE DIXON PROPOSAL | V 
When McNaughton's Plan to settle the Kastiftiit^ dispute failed/' 
completely, the Security Council appointed Sir Owen Dixon an Australian 
jurist on 12 April 1950 for securing demilitarisation of Kashmir by a resolution 
passed on 24 February 1950.^ *^  Mr. Dixon came up with a number of proposals, 
including the provision of a set of regional plebiscites. The report containing 
these proposals were submitted by Dixon on 15 September 1950. He suggested 
the partition of the State of Kashmir, with the valley going to Pakistan and the 
rest going to India. In this connection he observed: 
'When the frontier of the State of Jammu & Kashmir was 
crossed, on I believe 20 October 1947, by hostile elements, it 
was contrary to intemational law, and that when in May 
1948, as I believe, units of regular Pakistan forces moved into 
the territory of the State, that too, was inconsistent with the 
intemational law'.'* 
Like McNaughton, Dixon also failed to carry out his mission. His 
proposals regarding the plebiscite of Kashmir on region-by-region basis were 
rejected by both India and Pakistan. India rejected the proposal because it did 
not name Pakistan as the aggressor and equated India and Pakistan. Pakistan 
rejected it because it did not support the holding of a Ml plebiscite in Kashmir. 
The Western opinion, though shared Dixon's pragmatic view, did not agree 
with him in ruling out a foil plebiscite on political grounds. Thus, realising his 
failure to settle the Kashmir issue, Dixon asked the Security Council to relieve 
him and suggested direct negotiation between India and Pakistan. 
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2.14 THE GRAHAM MISSION 
After the failure of Dixon Mission, an attempt was made by the 
Commonwealth Conference held at London to find a solution to the Kashmir 
problem. It proposed demilitarisation followed by arbitration.'^ '* No such 
proposal was acceptable to India. Meanwhile, it was decided by Sheikh 
Abdullah Government to hold elections for a Constituent Assembly to frame a 
Constitution for Jammu and Kashmir. This decision disturbed Pakistan, which 
raised the Kashmir issue again in the Security Council in February 1951. The 
Security Council adopted a joint Anglo-American resolution seeking to appoint 
a new mediator (in place of Sir Owen Dixon) who would ensure withdrawal of 
troops and arrange plebiscite in Kashmir. Accordingly, Dr. Frank P. Graham of 
the United States was appointed to implement the decision. Graham had 
established his credentials as a skilled negotiator because of his earlier role in 
mediating the Indonesia-Netherlands dispute. Frank P. Graham initiated 
negotiations with both the countries in June 1951.^ *^  He presented a series of 
proposals aimed at demilitarisation of Jammu and Kashmir prior to holding the 
plebiscite. The Graham Mission lasted for two years and it coincided with 
many important events in the sub-continent e.g., the movement of Indian troops 
to the borders with Pakistan in July 1951, the assassination of Prime Minister 
Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan and the convening of the Kashmir's Constituent 
Assembly. 
Nevertheless, working with great patience Graham succeeded in 
reducing the areas of disagreement between India and Pakistan. But his five 
reports and the two Security Council resolutions made during this period did 
not meet all the vital demands of either side and hence were rejected by both 
India and Pakistan.'*'' Thus, under the circumstances the Graham Mission also 
failed to solve the Kashmir dispute. Admitting his failure in February 1953, 
Graham, like his predecessor, suggested direct negodation between the two 
countries. 
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2.15 BILATERAL INDO-PAK NEGOTIATIONS OVER KASHMIR 
In the summer of 1953 India and Pakistan initiated bilateral talks for 
settling the Kashmir dispute. The bilateral talks, first held at the Queen's 
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Coronation in June 1953, continued in Karachi and Delhi in July and August. 
The talks began in an atmosphere of goodwill but soon these became clouded 
because of certain negative developments. On August 9, 1953, Sheikh 
Abdullah was dismissed and detained by the Government of India on charges 
of anti-national activities. In February 1954, Kashmir's Constituent Assembly 
unanimously ratified the State's accession to India. Both these developments 
made the atmosphere heavy and suspicious. Further damage was done to the 
talks when the American decision to provide large quantities of military aid and 
the Pakistani decision to join the Western Military Alliances were announced 
in 1954. Despite the efforts made by Pakistani Governor-General Guiam 
Mohammad and the decision of India to reciprocate the goodwill, no progress 
could be registered towards an agreement over Kashmir. The Pakistani decision 
to join American sponsored military alliances was interpreted by India as a 
device for pressuring India. Consequently, Indian stand over Kashmir came to 
be stated as "the inviolability of Kashmir's accession to India". The change of 
government in Pakistan in 1956 and Prime Minister Choudhri Mohammad 
All's decision to resume the struggle at the United Nations, obviously with the 
help of Pakistan's new allies, gave an end to the era of bilateral talks. The 
Indian stand on Kashmir now rejected the demand for plebiscite on the ground 
that the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir already has ratified Kashmir's 
accession to India and the Constitution of Kashmir under Art. Ill, which stated: 
'The State of J&K shall be an integral part of the Union of India'.'^ ^ This further 
hardened the Pakistani attitude. Consequently, India and Pakistan once again 
became engaged in sharp interactions over Kashmir in the Security Council. 
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2.16 REVIVAL OF KASHMIR ISSUE AT THE UNITED NATIONS 
The beginning of 1957 came with sharp Indo-Pak exchanges in the 
Security Council over the question of Kashmir's accession to India. Pakistan, 
through its Foreign Minister Feroze Khan Noon, challenged the J&K 
Constituent Assembly's ratification and the Constitution of J&K as illegal acts. 
Mr. Noon argued, "Since the future of Kashmir was still to be settled and a 
plebiscite was still to be held, there could be no legal justification for such 
acts".^° He further questioned Indian role in Kashmir and called upon the 
Security Council to direct India to implement the 1948 and 1949 Security 
Council resolutions. He even demanded the induction of a U.N. force into 
Kashmir. India on the other hand strongly refuted the allegations levelled and 
the points raised by Pakistan. It strongly defended the accession of Kashmir to 
India and its ratification by the Constituent Assembly of J&K and by Art. Ill of 
the Constitution. India's representative, Mr. Krishna Menon argued that the 
Constitution of J&K was only a declaratory act and that it only restated the fact 
Kashmir's accession to India. 
2.17 THE PROPOSAL FOR ARBITRATION OVER KASHMIR 
AND ITS REJECTION 
In 1957 the Security Council, after the famous Four Power Resolution 
(moved by Australia, Cuba, U.K. and U.S.A) had been vetoed by the Soviet 
Union, adopted an amended resolution and called upon its President Gunnar 
Jarring of Sweden (U.N. representative) to discuss with India and Pakistani 
governments any proposal which they deemed fit for the settlement of Kashmir 
issue having regard to the previous resolution of the UN. He reported to the 
Security Council after a visit to India and Pakistan that the plebiscite resolution 
of 1948 had been so much overtaken by events that its implementation was not 
possible. He reminded the Security Council of "the fact that the implementation 
of an international agreement of adhoc character, which has not been achieved 
fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation 
with which they were to cope has tended to change".^^ Thus, Gunnar observed 
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that if a plebiscite would be held "grave problems might arise". He seemed to 
favour status quo but proposed that through arbitration it should be determined 
"whether the two sides had met the terms of the first resolution, which specified 
preliminary steps to a truce and a plebiscite. India rejected the suggestion for 
arbitration and thus ended the Jarring Mission. So even after nearly five 
decades the U.N. has not been able to secure withdrawal of Pakistani troops, 
which was the first condition of cease-fire agreement. 
2.18 SECOND GRAHAM MISSION 
Pressed by Pakistan, the Western powers in September 1957, requested 
the Security Council to reappoint Frank P. Graham as its representative and 
entrust him the task of making recommendation to the parties for further 
appropriate action for the implementation of the U.N. resolutions on Kashmir. 
Graham visited India and Pakistan in January 1958 and after holding 
discussions with the Government of India and Pakistan, Graham submitted his 
report in March 1958." Little in his proposals was especially new, except that 
he called for a conference of the two Prime Ministers to discuss the modalities 
of a plebiscite. Pakistan accepted the proposals and India rejected them. In a 
now-familiar vein, the Indians argued that Graham's call for a Prime Minister's 
conference placed the two sides on an equal footing and overlooked India's 
position that it was the aggrieved party. Graham's recommendations came to 
naught. The United Nations took no action on it and in fact did not take up the 
Kashmir issue again until 1962.^ "* 
It was only in 1962 when on the requests of Pakistan; the Security 
Council took up the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, debated it and passed a 
resolution, which went in favour of bilateral talks between the two 
governments. 
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2.19 CHINESE AGGRESSION AND ITS IMPACT 
Kashmir issue was further compHcated by Communist China's hostile 
designs in Ladakh. Pakistan was expected to be in no way less exercised over 
the matter, as Ladakh was an integral part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
to which Pakistan preferred claims. When Pakistan realised that India would 
not surrender to its unreasonable demands, and balance of power in the sub-
continent was in favour of India, Pakistan sought artificial strength by her 
alliance with America and through SEATO and the Baghdad Pact.^ ^ When 
Pakistan fiirther realised in early 1960's that the Western alliance alone would 
not serve its purpose, it began to seek friendly relations with the Soviet Union. 
The USSR also encouraged Pakistan to believe that the latter had a friend and 
well-wisher in the Soviet Union. But Pakistan overreacted itself by trying to 
wean the Soviet Union away from India. It did not succeed. Having failed in its 
plan Pakistan sought friendship with China. The relations between India and 
China had considerably deteriorated as the Chinese had occupied several 
thousand square miles of the territory of Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
Pakistan entered into negotiations with China in a manner highly 
prejudicial to the interest of Kashmir. These negotiations were started by 
Pakistan as early as 1960, a few months after China's intrusion in Ladakh in 
1959. On 3 May 1962, Pakistan issued with China a joint communique, 
wherein it was affirmed that 'the boundary between Chinese Sinkiang and the 
contiguous area, the defence of which is under the control of Pakistan, has 
never been formally delimited and demarcated in history'." It was further 
declared therein that the States had agreed 'to conduct negotiations so as to 
reach an agreed understanding on the location and alignment of this boundary 
and to sign an agreement of a provisional nature on this basis'. 
During Chinese aggression on India in 1962 Pakistan fully supported its 
newly acquired friend and tried to prove that India was in the wrong. When 
Britain and the U.S. offered armaments to India, Pakistan openly opposed this 
assistance. In continuation of her parleys with China, Pakistan concluded the 
Sino-Pakistan Trade Agreement in January 1963 and Boundary Agreement in 
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March 1963.^^ By this agreement, over 2,000 square miles of the Kashmir 
territory were handed over to China. Thereafter, Pakistan's Foreign Minister 
Bhutto feh confident that 'war between India and Pakistan would involve the 
territorial integrity and security of the largest State in Asia'. And in December 
1963, the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, Nan Hanchen, then on a 
visit to Pakistan said: "If ever there is a war between India and Pakistan, China 
will surely support Pakistan and not India".^^ In February 1964, Marshal Chen 
Yi, Chinese Foreign Minister, said in Lahore: 'China and Pakistan will 
continue to be friends even after you get Kashmir and we take Taiwan' .^ ° 
India, despite Pakistan's opposition, did receive considerable moral and 
military support not only fi*om the West but also from the Soviet Union. This 
frustrated Pakistan. Pakistan President Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who had 
established his dictatorship in 1958, appealed to President Kennedy and Prime 
Minister Macmillan of Britain not to give any assistance to India. In a letter 
dated November 5, 1962 Ayub Khan said that the critical situation prevailing in 
the sub-continent was the direct outcome of the foreign policy of Nehru and his 
supporters. He argued that Nehru's foreign policy was largely directed towards 
the following four points: 
a. to please the Communists; 
b. to raise the banner of non-alignment in order to conftjse the non-Communist 
countries and to please the socialist nations; 
c. to threaten the Pakistan, to politically isolate and economically weaken her; 
and 
d. to criticise the Western countries particularly the United States, even when 
there was no occasion for such criticism. 
A joint statement was issued on November 29, 1962 by Prime Minister 
Nehru and President Ayub Khan, which said that the two leaders would initiate 
negotiations to fmd a solution to Indo-Pak disputes.^^ A ministerial level 
meeting held in December 1962 and February 1963 decided that an Indo-Pak 
Summit would be held at Calcutta in March 1963. But on the eve of Calcutta 
meeting Pakistan and China concluded an agreement whereby Pakistan agreed 
61 
to transfer to China certain Indian territories in Kashmir, which had been under 
Pakistan occupation since 1949. Pakistan had no legal right whatsoever to 
conclude the so called border settlement with China at the cost of Indian 
Territory in Kashmir.^^ 
The Government of India strongly condemned and rejected as illegal the 
Sino-Pak Border Agreement of 2 March 1963. It was described by India as a 
mischievous agreement signed by Pakistan for pressurising India and for 
securing Chinese support for Pakistani stand on Kashmir. Pakistan on the other 
hand, defended the agreement and challenged Indian stand over Kashmir. 
Under the circumstances the six rounds of Indo-Pak talks failed to produce any 
result except that the Indo-Pak differences and all the possible solutions of 
Kashmir issue became more widely known. 
The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 had been nothing short of a 
complete rout of the Indian armed forces. Questions still persist about India's 
failure to use its superior air power to dislodge and hurry the Chinese troops 
along the Himalayan frontier during the war.^ "^  This failure to use air power 
and, more importantly, the Indian's utter military unpreparedness cost them 
dearly: India lost several thousand troops and some 14,000 square miles of 
territory. 
In the aftermath of this conflict, India embarked on a dramatic and much 
needed programme of military modernisation. Specially, it sought to create a 
45-squadron air force equipped with supersonic aircraft and a million-man 
army with ten new mountain divisions equipped and trained for high altitude 
warfare. Simultaneously, it also drew up plans for the modernisation of the 
Indian navy. These new commitments for men and equipment were reflected in 
the sharp growth of the Indian defence budget: the budgetary outlays for 
defence rose from 2.1 per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP) in 1961-62 
to 3.0 per cent of the GNP in 1962-63 and 4.5 per cent of the GNP in 1964-
65.'^ 
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2.20 1964 SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION 
The National Conference leader of Kashmir Sheikh Abdullah, who had 
been under detention since 1953, was released in May 1964. The Sheikh who 
was the architect of Kashmir's close links with the rest of India now turned 
hostile, and demanded the right of self-determination for the people of 
Kashmir. He was openly supported by Pakistan. He met Nehru and went to 
Pakistan to meet Ayub Khan. He argued that Kashmir dispute could be solved 
only if relations between India and Pakistan were normalised. ^ Soon 
afterwards Nehru died, and nothing further was heard of the efforts of 
Abdullah. 
In 1964, Pakistan once again appealed to the Security Council for 
discussing the Kashmir issue. After two fruitless debates the Security Council, 
on 18 May 1964, passed a resolution proposing that Kashmir dispute should be 
solved through mutual negotiations between India and Pakistan. This can be 
described as the last resolution passed by the Security Council over the 
Kashmir issue. Commenting upon the Security Council debates on Kashmir, 
Charles Heimsath has well observed, "The debates provided both Indian and 
Pakistani Governments with opportunities to plebiscite their uncompromising 
positions to test the responses of the great powers and to dramatise to their own 
people their skill and persistence in furthering national interest. Nothing more 
was expected or accomplished". 
2.21 THE DISPUTE OF RUNN OF KUTCH 
It was on May 4, 1948 that the Kutch State merged into India by signing 
the Instrument of Accession. Pakistan had raised questions regarding the 
exact location of the Kutch (India) and Sindh (Pakistan) border. After six years, 
Pakistan again raised the matter in 1954 and claimed that the Runn of Kutch 
should be regarded, as an inland sea and therefore, the border between the 
Kutch and Sindh should be recognised in the middle of the Runn, which 
Pakistan calls the 24 Parallel Line. In this way, Pakistan advanced her claim 
over 3,500 square miles out of 7,000 square miles of the Runn of Kutch.''° India 
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rejected Pakistan's claim on May 9, 1955. In spite of this rejection, parleys 
started between Sardar Swaran Singh on behalf of India and Lt. General A.M. 
Sheikh on behalf of Pakistan in October 1959 at Dhaka and at New Delhi, in 
which India agreed to discuss the Kutch-Sindh border with Pakistan, thereby 
inadvertently accepting Pakistan's claim that the Kutch-Sindh border was 
unsettled and negotiable. Not only that, but also in a joint communique signed 
and issued after the talk on October 24, 1959. 
An armed clash occurred in April 1965 when two divisions of the 
Pakistan army crossed the border and occupied parts of the Rurm of Kutch. 
India had not anticipated this aggression. Fighting went on till the end of June. 
As a result of the mediation by British Prime Minister Wilson, cease-fire took 
place and it was agreed that both the armies would go back to the position of 
January 1, 1965.^ ^ It was also decided to refer the dispute to a tribunal 
comprising three arbitrators. The award of the tribunal came in 1968. About 90 
percent of the Runn of Kutch was allotted to India and the remaining about 300 
square miles went to Pakistan. The award was strongly criticised in India but in 
view of the commitment made in 1965, India agreed to the implementation of 
the award. During the Pakistani attack on Runn of Kutch the arms were 
supplied to Pakistan by the United States, the SEATO and CENTO were freely 
used against India.^ "* When Pakistan was made to agree to cease-fire it felt 
frustrated and decided on one more gamble. This time the target was Kashmir. 
2.22 PAKISTAN'S 1965 INVASION 
By mid 1964, Pakistan came to realise the futility of raising Kashmir 
issue in the Security Council. The failure to encase the alliance relationship 
with the West for securing Kashmir, the disgust over the failure of its attempts 
in the Security Council, the strong dissatisfaction with the new role of Sheikh 
Abdullah in India, the feeling that Indian leadership after Nehru's death was 
weak, the growing military power of India after October 1962 Sino-Indian war, 
the friendship with India's enemy-China, the belief in superior military power 
of Pakistan and the Chinese assurance of help against India, impelled the 
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Pakistan rulers to attempt a forcible annexation of Kashmir. They initiated the 
process of creating tensions along the Indian borders, particularly along the 
cease-fire line in Kashmir. A military probing operation was launched in 
March-April 1965 in the Runn of Kutch and a scheme was prepared for 
creating trouble in Kashmir by sending armed Pakistani infiltrators into 
Kashmu*. They were directed to create trouble through acts of sabotage in the 
Indian side of Kashmir. The attempt for the implementation of this scheme on 
the part of Pakistan led to the outbreak of a war between India and Pakistan in 
August-September 1965. 
The war between India and Pakistan in September 1965 proved that 
India was superior in many respects. The Soviet Union had adopted neutral 
attitude durmg the crisis in Runn of Kutch. For the first time after 18 years, 
President of Pakistan was invited to pay a visit to the Soviet Union. Ayub Khan 
told the Soviet leaders that there was similarity between the U.S. and the Soviet 
policies towards India, which were encouraging India's expansionist 
adventures.''^ The Soviet Prime Minister Koysgin tried to win Pakistan over. He 
said that the main cause of Indo-Pakistan conflict was not the supply of 
armaments, but the policy of imperiahsm of the west.^^ 
Indian leadership was naturally disturbed. The Soviet attitude towards 
Pakistan was now more friendly, and USSR was contemplating supply of 
armaments to Islamabad. Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri undertook a visit 
to the Soviet Union. He tried to explain the actual position of South Asia and 
sought continued Soviet support to India. But, the Soviet leadership said that 
their improving and friendly relations with Pakistan would not adversely affect 
the traditional Indo-Soviet friendship.^^ Shastri's Moscow visit was not a big 
diplomatic success. It was in the background that Pakistan put into operation 
the plan to disturb peace and wage a war. 
On August 5, 1965, Pakistan sent a large number of infiltrators into the 
Indian side of Kashmir for instigating Kashmiris against India and for 
formenting trouble in J&K through acts of sabotage. Through them Pakistan 
was able to create some problem.''^ As soon as infiltrators entered Kashmir, 
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Radio Pakistan announced that the people of Kashmir had revolted on a large 
scale, the Srinagar Radio Station and the Airport had been captured by the 
Mujahiddins, and that Srinagar itself was about to fall. These were lies except 
the fact that infiltrators were indulging in inciting violence. 
The insurgents were dressed as local inhabitants and carried mostly 
small arms, grenades, plastic explosives and radio equipment. Lt. General 
Harbaksh Singh, the commanding officer of Indian's western front during the 
war, nicely summarises the entry and activities of the intruders in Indian-
controlled Kashmir: 
The intruders set about their task with a missionary zeal, confident of 
spontaneous cooperation from the masses whom they had come to 
'liberate'.... The period of the infiltration campaign was 
characterised by intense, hectic activity throughout the [Jammu and 
Kashmir] theatre with special emphasis in the Valley. The raiders 
and [our] own forces marched and counter-marched all over the 
inhospitable terrain in a vast grim game of hide and seek. Several 
times during the day the opponents met, clashed and reeled apart in a 
series of bloody actions, weaving a confused pattern hard to 
unravel. ^ ° 
But the quick and efficient Indian action led to the capturing of a large 
number of infiltrators and the sealing of the borders of Kashmir. The Indian 
authorities moved with dispatch to seal the border and started vigorously to 
hunt down those infiltrators who had already penetrated the Valley. Disturbed 
by this development, Pakistani troops launched an attract on the Indian post in 
the Chhamb Sector. India appealed to the Security Council for directing 
Pakistan to withdraw the aggression but got disgusted with the partial attitude 
of the Security Council, which under Western pressures refused to name 
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Pakistan as the aggressor. The Pakistani political-military leadership persisted 
with the initial plan. On August 14, a significant infiltration took place in 
Jammu near the 'Azad Kashmir' town of Bhimbar. According to Indian 
sources, Pakistan used its regular forces in this operation.^^ Irritated by all this 
66 
partial attitude, India decided to take military action against the aggressor. On 
15 August 1965, after crossing the cease-fire line in Kashmir, Indian forces 
went into action and captured the strategically important posts in Kargil, 
Tithwal, Hajipir and Uri-Punch from where Pakistani infiltrators were being 
sent. This capturing blocked all entry points of Pakistani infiltrators. General 
Nimmo, the chief military observer of the United Nations reported all the 
developments to the Secretary General. When India requested the U.N. 
Secretary-General U. Thant to ensure withdrawal of Pakistani infiltrators, Pak 
Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto denied that his government was in any way 
concerned with the infiltrators. 
Despite the denial by Z.A. Bhutto of any kind of infiltration in India, 
attacks and infiltrations of Pakistan continued. On September 1, 1965, Pakistan 
launched a massive attack on India across the international frontier in the 
Chhamb Sector of South West J&K towards Akhnoor. Indian forces met the 
attack but felt that for relieving Pakistani pressure on Chhamb, it was essential 
to open the Western front against Pakistan. India made it clear to the United 
Nations that peace was not possible until Pakistan withdrew its regular army as 
well as the infiltrators. On September 5, 1965, India, therefore, launched a 
three-pronged attack in the Lahore Sector and a day later in the Sialkot Sector. 
This produced the desired effect and the Pakistani pressure on Chhamb and its 
strength in positions in PoK got reduced. The result, however, was the outbreak 
of a fiill but undeclared war between India and Pakistan.^^ 
Throughout the period of India-Pakistan war the Security Council was 
seized of the crisis. A number of proposals were considered, resolutions were 
passed and efforts were made by Secretary-General U. Thant who visited 
Pakistan and then come to India.^^ Pakistan's conditions for cease-fire 
included— 
a. the troops of India as well as Pakistan would be withdrawn from the entire 
Kashmir after the cease-fire; 
b. an Afro-Asian peace keeping force would be stationed in Kashmir till 
plebiscite was held; 
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c. the plebiscite would be held within three months. 
India rejected these three conditions. India's representative M.C. Chagla 
asked the Security Council to first decide who was the aggressor. He pointed 
out that the U.N. observers had clearly indicated that Pakistani infiltrators had 
on 
entered on August 5. Meanwhile, China expressed its solidarity with Pakistan 
and gave an ultimatum to India to close down its military bases on Tibet-
Sikkim border. This ultimatum was meant to boost the Pakistani morale. 
Mr. Chagla made it clear that India opposed the deployment of any foreign 
forces in Kashmir. India also rejected the plea for plebiscite, as the accession 
had already been confirmed by the elected Constituent Assembly of Kashmir. 
A resolution was adopted by the Security Council on September 20, 
1965 calling upon India and Pakistan to cease-fire and withdraw all their 
"armed personnel" back to the position held by the two countries before 5 
August 1965.'^ '* This was the date when Pakistan had sent its infiltrators. As 
Indian troops were pushing the Pakistanis back to their territory, Pakistan was 
forced to accept the cease-fire, which became effective on September 23, 1965 
at 3:10 am.^ ^ 
The 18 days war came to an end on 23 September 1965 through the 
agreement to observe a cease-fire. India accepted the Security Council 
resolution for cease-fire but expressedly rejected the resolution relating to 
Kashmir. The failure to achieve success, the failure to secure Chinese 
involvement, the stoppage of American and British arms sales to both India and 
Pakistan and the heavy losses it suffered compelled Pakistan to accept the 
cease-fire. India accepted the cease-fire also because war was seriously taxing 
its economic resources and was considered to be highly harmful to future 
security interests of India vis-a-vis China.*^ ^ Thus, the war proved superiority of 
Indian might and the morale of the army went high. 
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2.23 THE TASHKENT MEETING BETWEEN INDIA AND 
PAKISTAN 
During the Indo-Pak war, efforts for peace were made by both the super 
powers in the context of their respective national interests. China had openly 
supported Pakistan and even given ultimatum to India, but did not intervene in 
the war for fear of Soviet reaction. Even after cease-fire became effective, 
tension prevailed. Britain and the United States were trying to pressurise India. 
The United States, which had made concerted if somewhat partisan attempts to 
resole the dispute over Kashmir, evinced no interest in a post-war settlement.^' 
The American unwillingness to devote further resources to the 
resolution of the Indo-Pakistani dispute enabled the Soviets to step into the 
breach after having remained mostly neutral during the conflict. Soviet Prime 
Minister Alexei Kosygin, in an attempt to expand Soviet influence in South 
Asia and limit Chinese influence in Pakistan, invited Shastri and Ayub to the 
Soviet Central Asian city of Tashkent to forge a post-war settlement. This 
Soviet move was designed to secure rapprochement between India and 
Pakistan. The Soviet leadership felt that Indo-Pak differences were on the one 
hand, strengthening China and on the other hand, helping the Western powers 
to maintain and increase their influence in South Asia. To check this, the Soviet 
Prime Minister had taken initiative in early September when the war had just 
begun. It was repeated on 13 September. The Soviet Prime Minister had 
expressed that, if desired by both sides, he could also take part in this meeting, 
which could be held in Tashkent or any other city in the Soviet Union. The 
invitation was accepted in principle by Shastri, but Pakistan felt that no useful 
purpose was likely to be served. Ayub was expecting U.S. intervention, which 
never occurred because the then American President Johnson did not show any 
enthusiasm in view of China's growing friendship with Pakistan. 
It was on 25 November 1965 that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, 
Mr. Z.A. Bhutto declared at a press conference in Moscow that President Ayub 
Khan would be willing to discuss with the Indian Prime Minister Lai Bahadur 
Shastri, "the whole gamut of Indo-Pak relations".^'^ The Soviet Prime Minister 
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had personally extended all the assistance that might be required by both the 
heads. Both India and Pakistan had made their objectives and expectations 
clear before Shastri and Ayub Khan went to Tashkent. The President of 
Pakistan had repeatedly announced that he would agree to a "just" settlement of 
the Kashmir dispute. India's Prime Minister had, however, made it clear that 
Kashmir's accession was not negotiable and that it was an integral part of 
India. Indian Prime Minister had hoped that in future force would not be used 
between India and Pakistan. He had also reiterated "we unreservedly accept 
Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity".^^ 
The Tashkent meeting was unusual because it was for the first time that 
Soviet Union had taken initiative for the settlement of a conflict between two 
non-communist countries. The Soviet effort was blessed by all major powers 
including the United States. In fact, the whole world, except China, desired 
success at the Tashkent Summit. Consequent upon these efforts and blessings 
by major powers, Shastri and Ayub Khan met at Tashkent on 4 January 1966. 
In the meeting both countries stood by their rigid positions. There was no 
progress for six days. Finally, after strenuous negotiations, which were often on 
the verge of collapse, the Tashkent Declaration was signed by the two countries 
in the hope and promise of a peaceful future. It was signed by Shastri and Ayub 
in the presence of Sjoviet Prime Minister on 10 January 1966.^ ^ Within a few 
hours, Shastri died of a massive heart attack. 
2.23.1 THE TASHKENT DECLARATION 
The Tashkent Conference between India and Pakistan was held from 4 
January to 10 January 1966. It was after a series of meetings involving 
protracted and hard negotiations that the leaders of the two countries were in a 
position to agree upon certain issues, which together formed the Tashkent 
Declaration. "Pakistan" writes T.N. Kaul, "was being deliberately difficult in 
order to pressurise India. But, Shastri was a tough negotiator".^^ The 
conference experienced the greatest difficulty while negotiating for the return 
of territories captured by both the sides, particularly, on the issue of return of 
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Hajipir in exchange for Chhamb. India expressed willingness for the return of 
Hajipir to Pakistan in exchange of Chhamb, but at the same time wanted 
Pakistan to renounce the use of force. Prime Minister Shastri compromised his 
stand on No War Pact and the return of areas captured in Kashmir and 
President Ayub Khan, overruling Bhutto, compromised Pakistani stand and 
agreed to Shastri's proposal. ^ The result was the signing of the Tashkent 
Declaration in the afternoon of 10 January in an atmosphere of goodwill and 
with the hope that India and Pakistan would begin to talk directly and resolve 
the problems bilaterally. 
The nine-point Tashkent Declaration was described by Prime Minister 
Shastri as "a unique international diplomacy between a Socialist Government 
and a Government aligned with two military blocs".^^ President Ayub Khan 
hailed it as a victory for common people. The Soviet Premier Mr. Kosygin 
remarked: "it makes a new stage in the development of relations between India 
and Pakistan"."'*^ The nine-point Tashkent Declaration contained the resolve by 
India and Pakistan to restore normal and peaceful relations between themselves 
and to promote friendly relations between their peoples. With these objectives 
in view, the following provisions of Tashkent Declaration were agreed upon: 
1. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both 
sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations and reaffirm 
their obligations under the U.N. charter not to have recourse to force and to 
settle their disputes through peaceful means. 
2. That all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later 
than 25 February 1966 to positions they held prior to 5 August 1965 and 
both sides shall observe cease-fire terms on cease-fire line. 
3. That bilateral relations between the two countries shall be based upon the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. 
4. That each side shall discourage any propaganda directed against the other 
country. 
5. That the High Commissioners of both the countries shall return to their 
posts and restore the normal diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
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6. That the two countries shall consider measures for the restoration of 
economic and trade relations, communications and cultural exchanges and 
shall implement the existing agreements. 
7. That instructions shall be issued to the respective authorities for carrying 
out the exchange of the Prisoners of War. 
8. That both sides shall take steps to prevent the exodus of people and shall 
continue to hold discussions on the problem of refugees and eviction of 
illegal immigrants. They would further discuss the return of property and 
assets taken over by either side in cormection with the conflict. 
9. That both sides agree that they will continue to meet both at highest and 
other levels on matters of direct concern to each other.'°^ 
Alongwith these provisions both the sides recorded their feelings of 
deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders and government of the then 
Soviet Union. 
2.23.2 REACTIONS TO THE TASHKENT DECLARATION 
The Tashkent Declaration was warmly welcomed by various countries. 
China was the only country, which refrained from hailing it. It was hailed by 
many others as "an important landmark in the relations of India and 
Pakistan".^ '^ ^ The German leader Konard Adenauer, a critic of USSR, 
welcomed the Soviet initiative for normalisation of Indo-Pak relations. The 
new Prime Minister of Israel Abba Aaban hoped that Tashkent principles and 
attitudes would be applied to Arab-Israel conflict also. Meanwhile, for the 
Soviet Union this was a moment of unmitigated triumph. The Declaration was 
an achievement of great significance for that country. To the United States and 
its bloc, it meant, as Rajan wrote, "the end of their monopolistic influence and 
role in the settlement of international disputes". It was described as a big boss 
to Britain. Its political influence, through the Commonwealth, and otherwise, 
had already been tried. China was another loser. "That a rival Communist State 
with which it has a running ideological dispute and whom it had stubbornly 
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refused to recognise as an Asian Power should have arranged a meeting 
between two Asian States... must be highly galling to China". ^ 
2.23.3 REACTIONS IN INDIA 
Public in India generally welcomed the Tashkent Agreement in the hope 
that it would lead to normalisation of relations between the two countries. 
Prime Minister Shastri remarked, after signing the Declaration that, it was a 
unique experiment in the international diplomacy.'* '^* The death of Shastri, who 
was fast getting recognised as the builder of post-Nehru India came as a big 
blow and serious loss to India and it dampened the spirit of Tashkent. G.L. 
Nanda, who temporarily succeeded Shastri as Prime Minister, promptly 
declared that Indian Government would stand by the declaration and implement 
it fully and faithfully. It was also welcomed by all the leaders of Congress 
Party. However, it was criticised by the leaders of Janasangh and PSP mainly 
because it involved the provision for the withdrawal of Indian troops from 
Hajipir and Tithwal. Mr. A.B. Vajpayee even declared that Indian leaders had 
lost in peace and what the jawans had won on the battlefield. Rajagopalachari 
observed, "a beginning has been made by way of relaxation of rigidities on 
both sides". ^ ^^  Government of India strongly defended the declaration in the 
Parliament. It was commended as an important step towards securing peace and 
acceptance of peaceful means against the use of war. However, it was criticised 
by the critics as being "far away fi^om a no war declaration". 
2.23.4 REACTIONS IN PAKISTAN 
In Pakistan, there was a sharp reaction against the declaration. The 
general feeling was that it constituted 'a sell out'. The students at Lahore 
described it as 'the great betrayal'. The Bar Association of Pakistan described it 
as disappointing. Miss Fatima Jinnah declared, "The Tashkent Declaration 
betrays lack of sagacity, wisdom, forbearance and vision in the minds of those 
who accepted, signed, sealed and delivered it on behalf of Pakistan".'°^ The 
exception was the National Awami Party whose General Secretary, 
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Mr. Mohmood-ul-Haq Usmani described it as a "triumph of sanity, reason and 
forces of peace". The Government of Pakistan defended it. But President Ayub 
Khan had to clarify that Pakistan would not accept it as a No War Pact and 
would continue to support "the inalienable right of the people of Kashmir to 
decide their own future". To pacify the public opinion in Pakistan, he added, 
"the basic cause is the dispute concerning J&K and unless this is settled there 
can be no peace between India and Pakistan". Gradually, the Pakistani rulers 
and press started expressing doubts about the implementation of the Tashkent 
Declaration in practice. In an interview on 15 November 1966 President Ayub 
Khan observed, "It settled nothing. All it did was to enable the two countries to 
disengage their armies from each other".^°^ Pakistan Foreign Minister could not 
reconcile to the fact that an agreement was signed with India before the 
settlement of "Kashmir dispute". Ayub Khan told his people that obligations 
under the U.N. Charter did not mean no war at all. It only meant not to resort to 
force so long as avenues of peace were open. However, within a weak, steps 
were taken for restoration of full diplomatic relations. But, the "Tashkent 
Spirit" began to evaporate fairly soon.^ *^ ^ From the above, it seems clear that 
Tashkent Declaration in Pakistan was less admired than criticised. 
2.23.5 FOLLOW UP OF TASHKENT DECLARATION 
The Tashkent Declaration was indeed a historic document. For the first 
time it was hoped that India and Pakistan might turn away from the path of 
conflict, and strive to live in peace. But these hopes were soon belied. Pakistan 
kept on arming itself and making violent anti-India propaganda. Z.A. Bhutto 
made an outburst. He said that "Hindu culture" was determined to "devour" 
Islamic culture, and that "all the imperialist powers are backing India".''° India 
continued to work hard to implement the Tashkent Agreement. While its 
provisions regarding withdrawal of troops and repatriation of prisoners of war 
were implemented, the efforts for friendship, cooperation and understanding 
did not bear fruits. India wanted the two countries to discard the use of force, 
but Pakistan's only objective was to obtain Kashmir. 
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Thus, in reality only those parts of the declaration, which related to 
troops withdrawal, exchange of PoWs and restoration of diplomatic links were 
implemented. These provisions were speedily implemented and these tasks 
were completed by 25 February 1966. The rest of the provisions were kept non-
operative. The strong reaction in Pakistan against the Tashkent Declaration, the 
refusal of Pakistan to accept it as a no war declaration, the lack of clear cut and 
specific provisions regarding its implementation, the absence of provisions 
regarding a machmery for setting the controversies and differences in respect 
of the interpretation of the provisions, and the failure to effect any change in 
regard to the respective views of India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, 
made the implementation of the Tashkent Declaration difficult. The death of 
Prime Minister Shastri soon after the signing of the declaration, the failure of 
Pakistan to reciprocate the offers of No War Pact and a joint machinery for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes as were made by Prime Minister Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi in 1966 and 1968, further impeded the attempts at normalisations that 
could have been made in the post-Tashkent period of Indo-Pak relations. 
The Indian opposition to the supply of Soviet arms to Pakistan and to 
the resumption of anti-India propaganda by Pakistani press further reduced the 
chances of implementation of Tashkent Declaration. Renewed Pakistani 
attempts to raise the Kashmir issue at the U.N. and the failure to accept the 
responsibility towards the infiltrators made it difficult to operationalise the 
normalisation provisions of the Tashkent Declaration. Even the first ministerial 
level conference held on T' March and 2 March 1966 failed to make any 
headway. India's unilateral decision to end the trade restrictions too failed to 
get positive response from Pakistan. In July 1966 India announced its decisions 
to release all non-military Pakistani cargo seized during war. This time, 
Pakistan also reciprocated and ordered the release of India-bound goods seized 
by it. In 1967 and 1968 some limited progress was achieved towards the 
restoration of telecommunication links between the two countries. The Army 
Chiefs of India and Pakistan met in Rawalpindi on 24 October 1967 and agreed 
to take steps for preventing border violations.''^ 
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Pakistan began improving relations with the Soviet Union. The idea 
being to create a wedge between India and USSR, Ayub Khan invited Kosygin 
to visit Pakistan in 1968. The Soviet Union's interest was to reduce Pakistan's 
dependence on the United States and China. As V.P. Dutt wrote, by this time 
"The Tashkent edifice lay in shambles. The promise was aborted. The issues 
were too intractable, the standpoints too opposite, the gulf of suspicion and 
jealously and rivalry too wide.... to make any lasting breakthrough 
possible". During 1966-69 Pakistan made several moves towards USSR. It 
held out the bait that if Moscow would show greater regard for Pakistan's 
concerns, Pakistan would stop depending on the West. This objective was 
partially fulfilled when in April 1968, Soviet Prime Minister agreed to supply 
non-lethal weapons to Pakistan. But, contrary to Soviet expectations its move, 
instead of bringing of India and Pakistan closer, created new tensions in their 
relations. 
There was a marked deterioration during 1966-69. India believed that 
Soviet Union's economic assistance and military supplies to Pakistan were 
responsible for Islamabad's hardened attitude. Pakistan held the view that 
peace in the sub-continent was possible only if Kashmir issue was solved (to its 
satisfaction) or if that country became militarily superior to India. A number of 
other issues were also responsible for increasing tension.^ "^^  Firstly, Pakistan's 
agreement with China to open the road between Gilgit and Sinkiang was not 
only an unfriendly act, but also an illegal decision because the concerned 
Indian territory was under unlawful occupation of Pakistan. Secondly, Pakistan 
continued to seek the help of the United States, Soviet Union and China to 
pressurise India to concede to its demands on Kashmir. Thirdly, there was 
tension regarding utilisation of Ganga waters and the Farakka barrage being 
constructed by India. Pakistan's objection was that the barrage, if constructed, 
would leave East Bengal 'dry and desolate'. India once again suggested a No 
War Pact, which was, as usual, turned down by Pakistan. Ayub called 
Mrs. Gandhi's offer as an attempt to hoodwink the world. India released 
photocopies of a number of documents, which were evidence of Pakistan's aid 
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to Mizo and Naga rebels for insurgency in North-EasI Ii^dia: Meanwhile, i| 
Pakistan succeeded in getting additional weapons suppl^ ,^ imm the United,; 
S t a t e s . " ' " ••••--::,;^ ^ ' I ^ , 
In July 1969, India released 16,000 tonnes out of 21,530 tonnes of 
Pakistani cargo of all types. It took several steps to secure an implementation of 
the Declaration but failed due to the negative and cold attitude of Pakistan. 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi's offer of 15 August 1968 to sign a No War Pact with 
Pakistan was ridiculed and described as an exercise in hypocrisy by the 
Pakistani press. The same Pakistani press now strongly advocated the 
hypocrisy of No War Pact as the necessary and ideal condition of good-
neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan. Similarly, Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi's proposal to Pakistan for the creation of joint machinery for going into 
various Indo-Pak issues was rejected by Pakistan, "as nothing but a new 
propaganda campaign". Against India's desire for implementing the 
Tashkent Declaration, Pakistan preferred to criticise the Declaration and to 
observe an anti-Tashkent day on the occasion of its first anniversary. Even 
President Ayub Khan in his message to Premier Kosygin on this eve observed, 
"without the solution of Kashmir problem the Declaration could not be 
implemented". This was much against the message sent by Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi in which she affirmed her faith in the Declaration. However, a 
change in Pakistani leadership took place, in the meantime, with anti-Ayub 
propaganda and movement, which made it essential for President Ayub Khan 
to quit and handover the regime to General Yahya Khan. Though President 
Yahya Khan lost no time in expressing the desire to live in peace and happiness 
with India yet he took little interest in initiating steps for normalising the ties 
with India. The India-Pakistan relations reached an all time low in 1971 with 
the emergence of crisis in East Pakistan resulting in a civil war in that country. 
There was an exodus of millions of people from East Pakistan to India, and 
finally a war took place between India and Pakistan in December 1971 leading 
to the defeat of Pakistan and its disintegration resulting in the creation of 
independent State of Bangladesh."^ This 1971 war was two-weeks war but its 
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results were far reaching and its impact on the power structure and politics in 
the sub-continent was indeed very big. It gave India a decisive victory over 
Pakistan. It made Pakistan realise the futility of attempting power equilibrium 
with India. It made India and Pakistan more conscious towards their bilateral 
relations and both concluded the famous Shimla Agreement, which was 
designed to serve as the basis for Indo-Pak detente in the post-1971 period. 
Having achieved two major objectives, repatriation of the PoWs without 
trial and getting back 5000 square miles of territory, Bhutto reverted to anti-
India tirade and recurrent demand for resolution of Kashmir problem in 
accordance with the resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly. This was 
against the Shimla spirit according to India. Bhutto did not relent and continued 
raising the Kashmir issue for propaganda purposes and also for legitimising the 
very basis of 'two-nation theory'. In one of his Beijing visit he reiterated the 
same sentiments and said that 'normalisation of relations to peaceful co-
existence between India and Pakistan, could be achieved only after a settlement 
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of Jammu and Kashmir dispute'. 
After the 1971 Indo-Pak war and the break up of Pakistan through the 
creation of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan enjoyed a period of "Cold Peace" 
implying no new— found trust,'^^ but an understanding not to interfere in each 
other's internal affairs. Indeed, the first event to shake the relative calm of post 
war Indo-Pakistani relations was the explosion of a nuclear device by India in 
May 1974. Although denominated a "peaceful nuclear explosion" by New 
Delhi, it unambiguously established India's possession of a nuclear weapons 
capability. During the mid-seventies both India and Pakistan experienced 
serious domestic political crises. Facing growing opposition to her leadership 
and charges of corruption, on June 25, 1975, Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi imposed emergency rule in India. Also in 1977, Pakistani President 
Bhutto was ousted by the military, in a coup that reinstated martial law and 
brought the Army Chief-of-Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq, to power. Meanwhile in 
Kashmir, on 13 November 1974 an accord was signed between Abdullah and 
Indian Government. The new accord accepted the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
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as a part of the Union of India, whicli was to continue to be governed by 
Article 370 of the Constitution of India and have residuary powers of 
legislation. The Government of India agreed to "sympathetically consider 
amendment or repeal of some category of central laws extended to the State 
after 1953 as the State legislature decides".^ ^"^ This accord did not please many 
Kashmiris as it offered much less autonomy to the State than it enjoyed in 
1953. 
2.24 ZIA'S REGIME 
With the coming in power of General Zia in Pakistan, the Indo-Pak 
relations got new dimension. He was conscious of the fact that both Ayub and 
Yahya Khan had lost their Presidency when they fought a war with India. He 
immediately realised that militarily Pakistan could not defeat India and, 
therefore, no military solution in Kashmir was possible. As the liberation of the 
Kashmir continued to be the national objective of Pakistan, he, therefore, 
decided that a low intensity conflict with India should be initiated to wear 
down India. ^ ^^  At the same time, he also realised that to consolidate his regime 
it was imperative to keep the Kashmir crisis on the boil so that the public 
opinion was developed in his favour. 
Zia's consolidation of power in Pakistan coincided with the fall of the 
Shah of Iran. The rise of Saudi Arabia as power in the Middle East, and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. All these developments concurred to give 
Pakistan a place in the U.S. policy to contain Soviet expansion and protect 
western sources of oil. These vital interests placed a higher priority on the 
stability of Zia government in Pakistan that on the suspension of the rule of law 
and the erosion of democracy that were taking place under his rule.'^^ 
During the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, the Jamat-i-Islami (JI) of 
Pakistan received extensive encouragement for propagating the regime's 
ideology and for mobilising the people. The energies of the indoctrinated youth 
were directed towards undertaking "Jehad" in Afghanistan, and later in other 
areas, including Bosnia, Central Asia and Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian 
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Union. This attracted volunteers from countries such as Algeria, Egypt, 
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Chechnya, Sudan, Turkmenistan, apart from Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
Although, violent subversive activity by militant groups has been a 
feature in the Kashmir Valley of the State of Jammu and Kashmir well before 
the present militancy started in 1988. But, by 1988, terrorism in Kashmir had 
grown to its peak levels. By that time, I SI has succeeded in alienating the local 
Muslim Kashmiri population who became active supporters of the terrorists. 
Pakistan had also established training camps in so called Azad Kashmir. The 
youth amongst the Kashmir were being taken for training there and infiltrated 
back into the valley under the flag of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Gen. Zia's plan for 
Kashmir, code named 'Operation Topac', was prepared painstakingly with the 
help of ISI and was to be implemented in three phases. In his view: It would 
take a lot of time for Kashmiri Muslims to rise in armed revolt against India as 
they have no martial tradition, but they can "through their cuiming, subvert 
Indian polity in Kashmir. Attention should be concentrated on winning over 
Muslim bureaucrats and police force and dry up all intelligence sources. Once 
it is done, rest can be left to PoK forces".'^^ The cuh of the Kalashnikov 
changed the entire complexion of the militant movement in 1988-89 with the 
extremists getting more and more defiant with every passing day. Meanwhile, a 
plethora of militant groups cropped up, varying in hues but united in their 
determination to "Liberate" Kashmir from India and following a well-planned 
strategy of creating terror and anarchy. 
On the other hand, frictions arose in the northern areas of Siachen 
Glacier in the 1980s. Experts in India and Pakistan are quite convinced of their 
respective cases, and charge the other side with violating earlier agreements 
with regards to this area.'^" Indians refer to the Karachi agreement of 1949 in 
which the line upto the point NJ 9842 was accepted, after which the watershed 
principle to be applied to such terrains, would extend it up North to the Glacier, 
and not to the Karakorams, which would link it to the Chinese territory 
Sinkiang, as believed by Pakistani expert. ^ •^ ' Thus, the extension of LoC 
beyond NJ 9842 is designated the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) by 
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India. This meets the International Boundary (IB) west of the Karakoram Pass. 
Further east, the IB gives way to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between 
India and China in Ladakh. The Siachen area is strategically important to India, 
Pakistan and China. Pakistan is trying to annex the area by force. Pakistan was 
coordinating its military activities with China in a bid to establish sovereignty 
over the strategic Siachen Glacier in the Ladakh region. Pakistan wanted to 
take advantageous position in this area to secure common border with China to 
facilitate closer military link-up in the event of a war with India. The Siachen 
issue was blown out of proportions when it got politicised in Pakistan. 
Although Gen. Zia had dismissed it, as an area where no blade of grass grew. It 
was felt by some experts that the complex Siachen Glacier issue will remain 
unresolved without higher level political direction and commitment on the two 
sides. The solution of this dispute may not serve as a turning point in the 
conflict, ridden relations between the two neighbours, but it would certainly 
help to reduce tension and provide an impetus to normalisation of relations 
between the two countries. 
In order to solve the problem of Kashmir, India offered Comprehensive 
Friendship Treaty with Pakistan in 1985. Pakistan expressed objections on two 
points (i) Islamabad will not raise the Kashmir issue outside Indo-Pakistan 
Forums and (ii) it will not offer bases to any foreign power.^ ^ India considered 
these two factors as major areas of tensions between Indo-Pak relations. From 
the India's point of view, unless Pakistan agrees to avoid raising Kashmir issue 
at international forums and desists from giving foreign military bases on 
Pakistan's soil, there would be no improvement in Indo-Pak relations. 
After the death of Zia in an air-crash in August 1988, ISI carried on 
'Operation Topac' in India on the ground, which had been well prepared by 
Zia. There was not much difficulty for ISI to carry on this operation as it had 
met successfully guerilla warfare in Afghanistan. To carry out all such 
operations, armed forces of Pakistan extended all possible support to ISI on the 
guidelines given by General Zia. Meanwhile, Benazir Bhutto came into power 
as the Prime Minister of Pakistan but she agreed not to interfere with the 
81 
activities of armed forces and ISI.'^ '* Moreover, she had agreed to accept the 
impositions of the army to safeguard her political survival. These impositions 
included the following: 
1. No change in Pakistan's Afghan policy. 
2. No reduction in the defence budget. 
3. No action against the army personnel. 
4. No change in the appointment of COAS. 
5. No change in the appointment of DG ISI and fixll implementation of the 
phase-I of Zia's plan in Kashmir. 
It is clear from the above that Benazir from the first day of her Prime 
Ministership favoured the activities of terrorism in India generated by ISI. To 
support these activities of ISI, she donated Rs. 10 crore to the Kashmir frind to 
set-up the militancy in Kashmir. During this period, the militancy showed new 
indications of a well-planned effort to target the security forces instead of 
Kashmiri people. It is the bleeding of the forces, which would ultimately 
culminate in a successful insurgency. ^  
She had, however, another face to show to India and to the rest of the 
world in order to gain mercy and popularity amongs the people who loved 
peace and harmony. She agreed to determine new mechanisms to settle the 
Kashmir issue and also agreed to keep others informed of their nuclear 
installations and not to attack each others nuclear facilities. Even liberalising 
travel and expanding bilateral trade had also been agreed upon. 
An effort was also made by India to find a solution to the Kashmir 
problem on the basis of the Shimla Agreement to convert the Line of Control 
into the international border. But Benazir responded to India's effort negatively 
by saying that the circumstances that were prevailing at the time of Shimla 
Agreement had undergone a drastic change since then; much water had flown 
down the Jhelum and the Ganges. Thus, she advocated fresh solution to the 
Kashmir problem keeping in mind the changed scenario.^" Meanwhile, ISI had 
convinced Benazir to generate fresh violence, terrorism and insurgency in 
Kashmir. Consequent upon this situation militancy on a large scale was 
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generated in Jammu and Kashmir in the form of a proxy war. These terrorists 
were financed with necessary funds and equipped with sufficient weapons by 
ISI and to add to them, many people were hired from Afghanistan who started 
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infiltrating in Kashmir. 
This was the situation in Kashmir, which Nawaz Sharif inherited from 
Benazir Bhutto. The position of Nawaz Sharif was very weak because he was 
the creation of the army and the ISI and it was feh that he could be manipulated 
easily to remain subservient. By the time Nawaz Sharif consolidated his 
position, V.P. Singh government in India had fallen and Chandra Shekhar had 
taken over as the Prime Minister of India. His tenure saw some high level 
bilateral dialogues between the two countries resulted in some agreements: 
exchange of information regarding the deployment of forces and information 
on the dates, timings and places of military exercises. They also agreed to 
establish a hot line between India and Pakistan as also to continue Foreign 
Secretary level dialogue. But as far as Kashmir problem was concern, he 
emphatically told India that neither the government nor public opinion in 
Pakistan could accept a solution on the basis of Line of Control. 
During the Prime Ministership of Narasimha Rao Indo-Pak relations 
improved and surprisingly, the two Heads of State had met six times over a 
period of just two years to discuss various issues. However, Kashmir issue 
became unaffected by the improvement in the relations of the two States. 
Nawaz Sharif had clearly told the Indian Government the solution of Kashmir 
on the basis of the Line of Control could not be accepted either by the Pakistani 
Government or by its people. The militancy and insurgency as enhanced by ISI 
had expanded in South of Pir Panjal range in Jammu and Kashmir, Rajauri and 
Poonch areas. Along with the political offensive a diplomatic offensive had 
also been launched to embarrass India on the human rights issue, in order to 
internationalise the Kashmir issue. 
Benazir again came into power when Nawaz Sharif was dismissed by 
the President of Pakistan. Ruling out the possibility of dialogue, Benazir put an 
end on Indo-Pak bilateral talks. As a result, Indo-Pak relations, which seemed 
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to be on the mend, at least cosmetically under Nawaz Sharif, reverted back to 
open hostility.'''° During this tenure, Benazir was aware of the nexus between 
the ISI, military and the President. Dr. Mubashir Hussan, founder Secretary 
General of PPP categorically mentioned, "... at present the political system is 
the outcome of manipulation at the top and the rulers had become helpless 
before the intelligence agencies". '^^  
Under this volatile situation in Kashmir Deve Gowda took the charge as 
the Prime Minister of India in May 1996 and appointed I.K. Gujral as his 
Foreign Minister, who accepted the challenge to improve Indo-Pak relations 
with great zeal. I.K. Gujral was thus, successful to some extent in restoring 
dialogues with Pakistan. The main objective of the Gujral's foreign policy also 
known as "Gujral Doctrine" was to establish and maintain good and stable 
relations with all the neighbouring countries of India. Thus, under Gujral's 
doctrine, bilateral dialogue with Pakistan was revived. However, all these 
efforts of Gujral could not produce any change in the policy of Pakistan 
towards India. Like in the past, Pakistan once again, made it clear that any 
improvement in economic, commercial, technological and people to people 
relations would follow after the Kashmir resolved.''^^ 
Elections were held in Pakistan in early 1997 and Nawaz Sharif came 
back to power with more than two-third majority. This time, Nawaz Sharif, for 
his political survival, introduced Islamisation bill in the Senate with the tacit 
approval of the Army and open support from fiindamentalist.''^'' The intensity 
of the proxy war was again increased and termed as jehad. The basic reason to 
divert the attention of the people of Pakistan from the shortcomings of his 
government and to appease the army became during his earlier tenure the 
fundamentalist elements and religious fanaticism of the Pakistan Army did not 
appreciate Nawaz Sharif endeavours of improving Indo-Pak relations. 
During this period, Pakistan had opted for a parallel policy of 
undertaking military operations against India in Jammu and Kashmir, while at 
the same time making policy statements aimed at eroding the sanctity of LoC. 
They felt that the situation in Kashmir was ripe for separation from Indian 
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Republic from 1989 onwards and that the Indian State did not have the political 
will or the stamina to sustain Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India. 
The large-scale military aggression launched by Pakistan across the Line of 
Control in Kargil in the summer of 1999 was an operational expression of 
this.^ ^^ 
2.25 A NEW DIMENSION IN INDO-PAK RELATIONS 
Pokharan-I explosion on May 18, 1974 inaugurated a new phase in 
relationship with nuclear dimension. From this date to May 11, 1998, Pakistan 
was in search for an Islamic bomb. And on May 28, 1998, it conducted its 
nuclear tests. India since the first Pokharan test in 1974 adopted the policy of 
nuclear abstinence though had been critical of the nuclear apartheid regime, an 
exclusive club of white nations with China as a non-white entrant. India after 
the first Pokharan test in 1974 found U.S.A. stopping the fuel for Tarapure 
reactor and after both the nations doing multiple tests in May 1998, sanctions 
and withholding of aid was the end result.'"*^ 
The U.S. administration had been long working for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and since 1960's had been trying to get nations sign Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and 
Fissile Material Cut-off Agreement. But it has not been very successfiil. Iraq 
and North Korea for example who had signed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
are in the docks. 
After the nuclear test, India genuinely started the Confidence Building 
Measures (CBMs) in order to start a composite dialogue process between the 
two countries. Both, Atal Behari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif issued a joint 
statement on September 23, 1998, in which they spoke of the need for a 
peacefiil settlement of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir for 
creating an environment of durable peace and security.''*^ Despite India's 
sincere efforts to improve the bilateral relationship, Pakistan's main effort after 
the nuclear tests was to focus on Kashmir as the "core issue" in the bilateral 
relationship. 
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In the background of several rounds of Foreign Secretary level talks 
between the two countries, in February 1999, Prime Minister Atal Behari 
Vajpayee visited Lahore at the invitation of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif in a bid to normalise relations and begin a new era of bilateral relations 
with the inaugural run of Delhi-Lahore bus service. On February 21, 1999 
Lahore Declaration was signed by the two Prime Ministers in which both the 
sides agreed to "intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue 
of Jammu and Kashmir", and also reaffirmed their "condenmation of terrorism 
in all its forms an manifestations..." the Lahore Declaration also reiterated the 
determination of both parties to implement the "Shimla Agreement" in letter 
and spirit. 
But, Pakistani Military and the ISI did not want Indo-Pak dialogue to be 
successful. They orchestrated firing along the LoC and increased militant 
activity elsewhere in Jammu and Kashmir State in order to project to the world 
the unstable situation. In fact the bogey of a flash point situation continued to 
be projected. In Doda and Kargil sector, the entire operational command was 
handed over to the foreign mercenaries from Afghanistan, Sudan, Turkey and 
some Kashmiri militants purely as guides to fiirther destabilise the region. 
Although at Lahore, Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif announced a number of 
confidence building measures; prevention of conflict, condemnation of 
terrorism, determination to combat terrorism, advance warning for the conduct 
of ballistic missile flight tests, minimise the potential of freak nuclear 
accidents, abide moratorium on nuclear testing etc. The Kargil intrusion 
constituted a cynical breach of the trust on which the Lahore process was 
posited. 
India had defeated Pakistan in Kargil war both militarily and politically, 
isolating it diplomatically. This defeat of Pakistan created furore in the country 
and had also put a question mark on the ability of Pakistani army again. The 
acrimony between the two powers was again visible clearly and had been 
reflected in the bloodless coup of 12 October 1999. For the fourth time the 
military under the leadership of General Pervez Musharraf had taken over the 
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charge of Pakistan and under his dictatorship new possibilities of proxy war 
between the two countries had increased. ^ "^^ 
The miUtancy in J&K was intensified which was followed by the 
hijacking drama of the Indian Airlines plane IC 814. The terrorist activity 
sponsored by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir was given a new term 'jehad' 
and Musharraf had formed legitimacy for jehadis and their deeds through Holy 
Quran. Armed with sophisticated weapons, motivated through religious 
indoctrination and convinced about their dedication to the cause of Islam and 
their ultimate victory, this new breed of Islamic jehadis emerged as a new tool 
to execute the foreign policy objectives of Pakistan.'^° 
Under the growing situation of increased militancy when there was 
hardly any possibility of Indo-Pak dialogues, Vajpayee the then Prime Minister 
of India again reiterated the commitment of Shimla and Lahore and started 
finding new ways to improve Indo-Pak relations. While speaking at a reception 
hosted by the Indian-American community on bilateralism he said, "we are 
continuously told to talk to Pakistan. Even here I was told that India should 
show its neighbours that democracy is about dialogue. OK, I say, lets talk, but 
what will we say to Pakistan? Will we say, 'How is the weather' or will we say, 
'How are your wife and children'?"^^' The government is thus content to repeat 
its line, articulated often by MEA that a "proper environment" needs to be 
created and the "ground realities in Kashmir" need to be improve before talks 
can resume. 
Under the international and political pressure, the Indian Government 
invited Musharraf for a summit at Agra to discuss several pending issues 
including Jammu and Kashmir solution. President of Pakistan arrived at New 
Delhi on 14 July 2001 where he was hosted by the President and Prime 
Minister of India. Several rounds of talks took place between Vajpayee and 
Musharraf during 15-16 July 2001 at Agra. But President Musharraf like the 
previous meetings continued laying his whole emphasis on the single point 
agenda i.e. Jammu and Kashmir. That it did so was no surprise and that is why 
India's unconditional invitafion to President Musharraf was analysed as a 
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policy blunder, because, the Pakistani Government opines that other 
contentious issues like CBMs are secondary to the Indo-Pak relations, but for a 
real improvement in the relations of the two nations, the issue of J&K should 
be given the top most priority in any summit or official level talks. 
India sees Kashmir as an integral part of its territory, central to its 
civilisational identity, whose fate is inextricably linked to the secular structure 
of the Indian polity. Therefore, India needs to come out unambiguously and 
forcefiilly that Kashmir is non-negotiable and that it is neither a dispute nor an 
issue. Pakistan, however, sees itself as incomplete without control over the 
whole of the Muslim part of Kashmir. For India, religion cannot be the sole 
basis of a modem State. If that were so, there would be only six nation States 
(each based on Christian, Islamic, Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu and Sikh religions) 
not more than 200 nation States in the world. ^ ^^  
For India, the Agra summit has been a failure and on that score there 
should be no doubt. Both sides could not arrive at a mutually agreed joint 
declaration with their irreconcilable positions. The summit can neither be 
realistically termed as the beginning of a process of negotiation as the stand of 
both the countries was non-negotiable. On the other hand, the Agra Summit 
sees Pakistan's President Musharraf in Pakistan's perception as a victor. He 
stood upto India and maintained its stand on J&K and proxy war as non-
negotiable. His standing (as a Mohajir) in Pakistan's army is reinforced and his 
image as a political leader further consolidated.'^'' Over a period of time 
Pakistan has been emphasising third party mediation by arguing that from the 
last more than fifty years bilateral negotiations has failed to resolve the issue. 
Its continuous articulation on Kashmir issue in several international fora also 
indicates that Pakistan is still not believed in resolving the issue bilaterally. 
Some observers feel that Pakistan is not keen to solve this problem and also. 
interested to keep the issue alive. One of the Pakistan army officer clearly 
mentioned, "to keep the issue alive, Kashmir must hit the headlines in the press 
and electronics media in the West... My suggestion is that we should project 
India as a usurper of human rights... India should be portrayed as an 
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occupation force, a country which is holding Kashmir against their will. We 
should portray India hurting minorities. Kashmiris are suffering because they 
happen to be Muslims in a Hindu State".'^^ On the other hand, some observers 
felt that Kashmir issue had always been a symbol, not a root cause of Indo-Pak 
conflict. The Pakistan Army Chiefs recent admission that even a settlement of 
the Kashmir issue will not usher in peace in the region, has confirmed that the 
roots of Pakistan's hostility are in history, religion, civilisation and the politics 
of revenge. The gulf between the two is too wide to be bridged in the 
foreseeable future without major geostrategic or radical policy changes in the 
region. 
After 11 September and 13 December incidents of terrorism, it would be 
difficult for Pakistan to sustain its Kashmir policy for a very long period. A lot 
would depend on America's approach towards Pakistan. In their own interest, 
Americans are pressurising Pakistan to stop infiltration inside the Kashmir and 
from being just a self-confessed facilitator, they had started to resemble more 
an arbiter in the raging dispute between India and Pakistan. ^ ^^  
Though General Musharraf cautioned the radical groups in his January 
12 speech, "No organisation will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name 
of Kashmiri", but the same time he also reiterated "Kashmir runs in our blood, 
no Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. We will never budge an 
inch from our principled stand on Kashmir". While maintaining the ambiguity 
he underlines the need to resolve the issue by "dialogue and peaceful means in 
accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people and the U.N. 
resolutions".'^^ 
At the moment, the priority before the two countries is to diffuse the 
tension as early as possible and by any means. This can only be achieved by 
stopping infiltration across the Line of Control from the Pakistani side. 
Therefore, the ball is in Pakistani court. To achieve this objective, apart from 
Pakistani commitment, Pakistan should also establish their credibility towards 
their commitments, which they had lost 30 years ago after Shimla Agreement. 
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But, Pakistan has always portrayed Kashmir as an unsettled issue. Pakistan's 
1 C O 
objectives can be summerised as follows: 
1. It considers the acquisition of Jammu and Kashmir the unfinished part of 
partition; 
2. Its claim to Kashmir is firmly rooted in the two-nation theory; 
3. It desires to invalidate the provisions of the Indian Independence Act and 
the Instrument of Accession which the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmsir 
signed, acceding the State to India. 
4. It also questions the decision taken by Sheikh Abdullah to make Jammu and 
Kashmir a part of India; 
5. It is of the view that continuing cross-border terrorism and violent 
intervention, including sending mercenaries and non-Kashmiri cadres to 
create a conflict situation in Jammu and Kashmir, will achieve the above 
objectives. 
In order to fulfill these objectives, both the governments have to make a 
joint effort to purify the atmosphere from the pollution of terrorism. On India's 
part, it has to strengthen the democracy in the State of Jammu and Kashmir by 
providing the State with meaningful autonomy. On the part of Pakistan it 
should try to stop the infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir and ensure peace in 
both the countries should be educated to contribute to the friendly atmosphere. 
In addition, LoC should be converted into a permanent border. If the Indo-Pak 
relations move in the direction stated above, Pakistan will get legal title of PoK 
and the people in Jammu and Kashmir would be able to enjoy both the 
countries. These efforts will be welcomed internationally. The regional 
cooperation, with which the settlement of J&K associated, receives greater 
scope with the emergence of SAFTA and South Asian Communit}'.^^^ 
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CHAPTER - 3 
DIVISION OF PAKISTAN-CREATION OF BANGLADESH 
3.1 INTRODUTION 
Bangladesh is ranked as the eighth country in the world in respect of the 
size of population. Its area is 1,39,523 sq. kilometres.' The birth of Bangladesh 
in December 1971 was a direct outcome of the Indo-Pakistan war in which 
Pakistani troops surrendered unconditionally in erstwhile East Pakistan. 
It was culmination of revolt of Bangladeshis against tyrannical Pakistani 
regime. The revolt had begun in March 1971, when the most popular leader of 
Awami League Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was arrested and taken to a West 
Pakistani Jail. India had full sympathy with the people of East Pakistan in their 
struggle for independence. Interim Government of Bangladesh had been 
constituted as early as in March 1971 but India had refrained from giving 
recognition to it for fear of provoking Pakistan into a war. But, when 
eventually the war did begin on December 3, 1971 India decided to go ahead 
and recognition was granted to Bangladesh on December 6, 1971. Pakistani 
surrender took place on December 16, 1971. During that 13-days war in the 
winter of 1971 nearly 20,000 Indian soldiers laid down their lives. The 
emergence of Bangladesh was described as an event of major importance in the 
sub-continent, "For the people of Bangladesh it was the end of a nightmare of 
terror and torture, a reassertion of their individuality and personality. For India 
it was a major victory of democratic socialism".'^ 
The crisis in India-Pakistan relations over the upsurge in East Pakistan 
and the emergence of Bangladesh has been described as the most critical crisis. 
The background of the crisis was essentially an internal matter of Pakistan, but 
its consequences became vital for Indo-Pak relations. The origins of the 1971 
war were markedly different from those of the two previous Indo-Pakistani 
conflicts. Whereas Pakistan initiated the first two wars, India began the third. 
Pakistan's decision to resort to war on the first two occasions stemmed from 
false optimism and perceived windows of opportunity. The origins of the 1971 
war, however, were more complex.^ 
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to study the emergence of 
Bangladesh as a division of Pakistan, the factors underlying this division and 
the aftermaths of 1971 war. With the aforesaid introduction the following 
section (3.2) identifies the causes, which laid to the division of Pakistan in 
1971 in the historical perspective. It also sums up some important events, 
which preceded the war. Section 3.3 discusses the 1971 war between India and 
Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh alongwith some important events, 
which preceded the war. Finally section 3.4 examines the Shimla Agreement 
following 1971 war and its impact on Indo-Pak relations. 
3.2 FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EMERGENCE OF 
BANGLADESH - A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
3.2.1 SITUATION TILL 1947 
The emergence of East Bengal as an independent State of Bangladesh 
was not a sudden and disjointed event but was the outcome of historical 
process. The ground was prepared, manure was applied, seed was sown, 
watered and nourished before it ultimately bloomed into a flower. The myopic 
attitude of the leaders and bureaucrats of West Pakistan was responsible for 
hastening the process, ultimately leading to complete severance of connection 
with Pakistan.^ In what follows we shall discuss how all this happened. 
The unwieldy Province of Bengal, which included within its boundaries 
the areas comprising the Provinces of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and Assam, posed 
serious administrative problems. For some time before 1905 the solution of 
administrative problems by partitioning the Province was under active 
consideration of Bengal Government. The Bengal Presidency had long 
presented difficult problem to administration. But the problems of Bengal 
administration, maintenance of its population etc have received step motherly 
treatment by the policy-makers. By 1900, the problem compounded. The 
population numbered 78 million; the isolation and difficult communication of 
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East Bengal resulted in neglect, which sharply contrasted with the prosperity 
and progressive outlook of West Bengal. West Bengal being mainly Hindu and 
East Bengal Muslim the contrast was more striking.^ 
There had long been pressing need to lighten the duties of the 
Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, his charge having grown to be burden beyond 
the capabilities of any single man to bear. The population of the Province was 
seventy-eight millions, almost twice that of United Kingdom. One result of the 
impossible pressure of work upon the Lieutenant-Governor had been the 
unavoidable isolation of the districts of the Province that lay east of Ganges. 
That part of Bengal had been sadly neglected and formed a stagnant backwater 
in relation to the broad well channelled river of British administration. The 
peasants suffered from the exactions of absentee landlords, and the police 
system was even worse than in other parts of India. Internal communications, 
in a country intersected with broad estuaries, were bad. 
Several schemes for solution of administrative problems of the unwieldy 
Province of Bengal were considered and finally, 'The new Province would now 
consist of the Chief Commissioner's Province of Assam and of Eastern and 
Northern Bengal, the districts of Chittagong. Dhaka and Rajshahi Divisions, 
excluding Darjeeling but including Hill Tippera and the district of Malda, 
which hitherto formed part of Bhagalpur Division. This would comprise an 
area of 1,06,540 square miles and a population of 31 million of whom 18 
million would be Muslims and 12 million Hindus. Against this loss of territory, 
Bengal would gain on the West Sambalpur and five Oriya States from the 
Central Province surrendering to it in return five Hindi speaking States. Bengal 
thus reconstituted would be left with an area of 1,41,580 square miles and a 
population of 54 million, Hindus numbering 42 million and the Muslims 9 
million. The newly constituted Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam would 
have clearly defined characteristics. Moreover, it would concentrate within its 
bounds majority of Muslim population of Bengal, and city of Dhaka would 
become its natural capital with subsidiary headquarters at Chittagong. Again 
the proposed division would bring the whole of the tea industry (with the 
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exception of Darjeeling) and the greater portion of the Jute growing areas under 
single administration. The administrative set up of the new Province would 
consist of a Legislative Council and a Board of Revenue of two members; the 
jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court would be left undisturbed'.^ 
The schemes of provincial settlement to resolve the key socio-economic 
and administrative issues did not, however, prove a great success in achieving 
the desired goals. 
In recommending the revised scheme to the Govenmient of India, the 
Bengal Government had correctly stated that the interest of these hitherto 
neglected districts-should obtain greater attention, which they require and 
deserve. The complaint of officers and people of these districts about the 
neglect and indifference of the government were well grounded. The condition 
of the peasants under the exactions of the oppressive agents of absentee 
landlords was miserable; public administration was weak, inadequate and 
ineffective; crime was rife; education of the people was neglected and 
communication system was hopelessly bad. The attention and energies of the 
Government of Bengal had hitherto been concentrated on Calcutta and the 
neighbouring districts, and the public works cess, to cite only example, realised 
from Dhaka and the Eastern districts was ahnost wholly spent for the 
improvement of other parts of Bengal. 
In the areas not under permanent settlement the land revenue 
administration was grossly neglected; even in the permanently settled areas the 
rights of the cultivators were not properly recorded, and as such they were left 
to the tender mercies of the agents of the landlords and were being constantly 
harassed and persecuted. Agriculture received little or no attention and 
curiously enough experiments for improvement of quality of Jute were 
undertaken in Burdwan in West Bengal and not in the great Jute growing 
districts of East Bengal or Assam. The system of communication was equally 
neglected; the port of Chittagong was not properly linked with commercial 
centres of the Province, the great and mighty rivers were not utilised as 
navigable channels for large ships for commercial and economic purposes. The 
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excessive and disproportionate attention paid to the growth and development of 
Calcutta, though through which British Indian trade in the Gangetic valley 
passed, crippled the development of the rest of Bengal. The railways and all 
other means of communications had been developed with main object of 
linking Calcutta with other important cities and centres of trade in North and 
West India...The administrative set up of East Bengal districts also betrayed 
the same neglect, the staff, in number and quality, was neither adequate nor 
satisfactory.^^ 
According to Fraser, 'no other provincial administration in India was a 
large charge and it was completed by obstacles to rapid travel'. A dispatch 
written at that time state that, if Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal spent the whole 
of available season of the year in touring, he could only succeed during his 
term of office in visiting a portion of his vast Province'. According to Calcutta 
review, partition of the unwieldy Province of Bengal was long a crying 
administrative necessity admitted by all those who knew anything about the 
difficulty of officials.'^ 
This scheme was sanctioned by the Indian Secretary, Broderick with 
number of minor amendments one of which related to the name of the 
Province. Curzon had proposed that it should be christened the North Eastern 
Province but Broderick urged the change to Eastern Bengal and Assam 
suggesting that it was undesirable to delete the name of Assam so widely 
associated with In'dian tea from the list of Indian Provinces. 
The scheme as prepared by the Government of India was with minor 
modifications, approved by the Secretary of State and partition was put into 
effect on 16 October 1905.^ '^  
The newly created Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam included 
Assam and following districts of old Bengal and Assam: (1) Dhaka, 
(2) Mymensing, (3) Faridpur, (4) Bakergunj, (5) Tippera, (6) Noakhali, 
(7) Chittagong, (8) Chittagong Hill Tracts, (9) Rajshahi, (10) Dinajpur, 
(11) Jalpaiguri, (12) Rangpur, (13) Bogra, (14) Pabna, and (15) Malda.'^ 
102 
On the face of it, the scheme of partition had been conceived in the 
interest of administrative efficiency though plausible arguments could be 
advanced that the motives were political. The Muslims had not demanded it 
nevertheless were agreeably surprised to learn that its administration would end 
the attitude of indifference to their well-being. It was hard for them not to value 
this well deserved though unexpected boon.^ ^ 
The partition was immediately made an occasion for unprecedented 
agitation by the Hindus, mostly those of West Bengal. Curzon, in having the 
boundaries modified, was charged with ulterior motives; to favour the Muslims 
by giving them a new Province; to 'vivisect' the Bengali homeland and strike a 
deadly blow to Bengali 'nationality' and to injure and weaken the 'nationalist' 
and 'patriotic' movement and spirit of the people of India which had its 
strongest centre in Bengal. 
Curzon had displeased the Hindus by refusing to recognise Indian 
National Congress officially. He had also annoyed the Bengali Hindus by his 
reform in the administration of Calcutta University. When he modified the 
boundaries of Bengal, his erstwhile enemies were provided with clear cut issue 
on which they could attack the Viceroy. The so called partition of Bengal was 
thus made pretext for giving vent to all the bitterness and hatred the Hindus had 
been nourishing for so long.^ ^ 
There was violent agitation against partition of Bengal from the Hindus 
of Bengal and Indian National Congress took up the cause of the Hindus and 
became a popular organisation. 
The reason given above against partition of Bengal was not the real fact. 
There was other motives too, less ingenious. Lawyers in Calcutta feared 
competition of the new law courts to be set up in Dhaka, and businessmen also 
disliked the prospect of competition from the new enterprises that might spring 
1 Q 
Up the new Province. 
The real reasons for the agitation against partition of Bengal was, "The 
Bengali Hindus had whole of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Assam, and even U.P. for 
their pasture. They had captured the Civil Services in all the Provinces. The 
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partition of Bengal meant domination in the areas of this pasture. It meant that 
Bengali Hindu was to be ousted from Eastern Bengal to make room for the 
Bengali Mussalman who had so far no place in the Civil Service of Bengal. 
The opposition to partition of Bengal on the part of the Bengali Hindus, was 
due principally to their desire not to allow the Bengali Mussalman to take their 
place in Eastern Bengal". 
This was proved by the fact that it was Bengali Hindus who voted for 
partition of Bengal in 1947 without caring to keep Bengali speaking people 
under one administration though Bengali Muslims wanted to have Independent 
Bengal outside India and Pakistan. Perhaps they thought that they would not 
have exclusive pasture for them in Independent Bengal. They would have to 
shares the pasture with others. 
The Hindus opposed tooth and nail to undo the partition of Bengal and 
mounted countrywide violent agitation and even resorting to terrorist activities. 
The partition of Bengal was annulled in 1911 by the British who yielded to the 
Hindus.^^ 
The Muslims of Bengal in their bid to retain the new Province in which 
they were in a majority got little support from the Muslims of other Provinces 
who remained callous and indifferent to the hopes and aspirations of Bengali 
Muslims. Though the Muslim League was formed at Dhaka in 1906, it did not 
take any active step against agitation to undo partition of Bengal. The Muslims 
of Bengal got the first taste of apathy and step-motherliness from the Muslims 
of other Provinces of India. Had the Muslims of other Provinces came to the 
help of their brothers in Bengal and mounted counter agitation against the 
Hindu agitation for annulment of partition of Bengal, the new Muslim Province 
of Eastern Bengal and Assam would not have been united again with Bengal to 
the suffering of Muslims of Bengal. 
The Bengali Muslims smarted under grievances at the treatment meted 
out to them by the Muslims of other Provinces. 
The Congress at its Madras session passed a resolution condemning 
partition of Bengal and asked for its annulment. 
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In view of the utterances of Dr. Rash Bihari Ghosh and the action of the 
Madras Congress in passing a resolution against partition of Bengal, the 
League felt that it was necessary to inform the government and the public of 
the Mohommedan attitude in the matter, and unanimously a strongly worded 
resolution in favour of partition was adopted. A very large number of members 
of the League, hailing from all parts of the country, supported the resolution 
moved by Syed Nawab Ali Choudhury. 
Though Pirzada mentions in his book, 'Foundation of Pakistan' that 
unanimous resolution was passed at the Amritsar session of the Muslim League 
in 1908, neither his book nor G. AUana's book 'Pakistan Movement-Historic 
document' nor Jafri's book 'Rare Document' gives the text of the Resolution. 
Had it been passed it would have surely found recorded in one of the above-
mentioned books.'^ '* 
Muslims of Bengal became politically conscious when Bengal was 
partitioned by Lord Curzon and the Hindus started vigorous agitation to undo 
measure. The setting up of the new Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 
where Muslims would be in majority, stirred hopes and new political life 
started. 
With the annulment of partition of Bengal and reversion of the Province 
of Eastern Bengal to Province of Bengal and of Assam to its previous status of 
Chief Commissioner's Province, development and progress made in so long 
neglected areas during six years of existence of a separate Province was halted 
and people of Eastern Bengal and Assam were relegated to their previous status 
of neglect upto partition of India in 1947. 
This division of one Province into two, which is known as in Indian 
history as the partition of Bengal, was an attempt to create a Muslim State in 
Eastern Bengal and Assam was, barring parts of Assam, a predominantly 
Muslim area.^ ^ But the interest of the Muslims in India could not be protected 
socially, economically and politically. It is interesting to note that even All 
India Muslim League serve the interest of the British rulers (as Congress did) 
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and was not concerned with the progress and welfare of the community for 
which it was established. 
The idea of Muslim State in the North-West part of India within or 
without British Empire sown by Iqbal at the session of Muslim League held at 
Allahabad in 1930 found fertile soil in the minds of some Muslims who were 
opposed to All India Federation. They at first tried to sell the idea of such a 
State to the Muslim delegates at the Round Table Conference in 1930 in 
London. The Muslim delegates did not give any importance to the idea and 
considered the same to be 'chimerical and impracticable'.^^ Choudhuri Rahmat 
Ali, a Punjabi Muslim young man then residing in England gave the movement 
a shape and form. He, as founder of Pakistan National Movement published a 
pamphlet "Now or Never" and sent the same to different persons in January 
1933. It proposed a scheme for separate State of Muslim (i.e. the partition of 
India). There also Bengal was excluded in this scheme. The scheme intended to 
build two Muslim federations. One in the East comprising Bengal and Assam 
and the other in North Western India composed of Sind, Punjab and the North 
Western Frontier Province. 
The scheme of Muslim homeland made by Choudhuri Rahmat Ali was 
for a federation of Muslim majority Provinces in the North-West India. It did 
not include Muslim majority Province of Bengal. His scheme of Pakistan or 
federation of Pakistan as distinct from Indian federation was Muslim homeland 
in the North-West India. In this pamphlet he left Muslim minority Provinces 
and even Muslim majority Province of Bengal was out of his scheme of 
Pakistan. Subsequently he proposed two more Muslim States, which he called 
Bangassam of Eastern India comprising Bengal and Assam and Osmanistan 
comprising Hyderabad and Berar. Upto the last he did not include Muslim 
majority Province of Bengal in the federation of Pakistan as he did not think 
such an idea feasible or even practicable.^^ 
In his statement of 20 February 1947, six months before the final 
transfer of power, the then Prime Minister Attele spoke of transfer of power to 
existing Provincial Governments meaning Provincial Government of Bengal, 
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Provincial Government of the Punjab, Provincial Government of Sind and 
Provincial Government of N.W.F.P. which were Muslim majority Provinces. 
The only Province where Muslim League government would have got power 
was Bengal and Bengal only and no other Muslim majority Province. There 
was no Muslim League ministry in other Muslim majority Provinces. Bengal 
would have been an independent and sovereign State as per Attele's statement 
had not Muslim League betrayed MusHms of Bengal. 
On 14 August 1947, a new dominion of Pakistan came into existence 
under Indian Independence Act of 1947 comprising the whole of the Province 
of Sind, the whole of the Province of North West Frontier, the whole of British 
Baluchistan, major portion of the Province of the Punjab, on the Westem side, 
and two third of the Province of Bengal on the Eastern side with part of district 
of Sylhet of the Province of Assam. The Westem part of Punjab, which came to 
Pakistan, was named West Punjab and eastern part of Bengal and part of Sylhet 
district which came to Pakistan was named East Bengal. Though afterwards 
West Punjab Province was named Punjab, East Bengal Province was not 
named Bengal.^° 
At partition, the aspect of Pakistan which caused most sceptic among 
foreign observers was viability of its Eastern Province, which had been created 
out of Eastern areas of Bengal and Sylhet district of Assam. Separated by 
thousand miles from West Pakistan, overpopulated and with no local industry, 
its commerce, administration and communications centralised in the port of 
Calcutta, with a different language, press, diet and way of life from the Western 
Provinces. It was rumoured to be likely very soon to secede quietly from 
unnatural union with Pakistan and merge once more with West Bengal as a unit 
of Indian dominion. 
They (Muslims of Bengal) did not forget, when they agitated stridently 
for Pakistan in the 'forties', from 1905 to 1912 East Bengal had been 
constituted as a separate Province, and that superior political organisation of 
the Hindus had persuaded the British to annul the Bengal partition.^^ 
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3.2.2 WHY BENGALI MUSLIMS SUPPORTED THE SCHEME 
OF PAKISTAN: BENGALI HINDU DOMINATION 
The Bengali Muslims were concerned not only for Pakistan as a 
homeland for the Indian Muslims of which they were a part but they were 
equally concerned for establishing their own homeland which will bring them 
economic independence from the Bengali Hindus. They joined the call of the 
Muslim League to form Pakistan not solely on the ground of Muslim 
brotherhood but also to liberate themselves from the superiority and dominance 
of the Bengali Hindus. After Bangladesh became an independent country, the 
question had been raised whether the Bengali Muslims wholeheartedly gave 
their support for the implementation of the two-nation theory. The truth had 
been reiterated by J.N. Dixit in these words: "understanding this predicament 
of Muslims of Bengal (change of position from the rulers to the subservient to 
the Bengali Hindus) is necessary to comprehend why a major portion of them 
became advocates of the two-nation theory and of the partition of India".^" On 
the eve of the independence of India, the Bengali Muslims realised that the 
achievement of Pakistan would mean the elimination of Hindu landlords, 
Hindus money-lenders and Hindu trading classes who had been exploiting 
them since the beginning of the British rule. ^ '^ During the Pakistan Movement, 
an overwhelming Bengali Muslims joined the Muslim League and supported 
the plan of the partition of India in order to free themselves from the all-round 
domination of the Bengali Hindus. In 1947, the impoverished Bengali 
Muslims of rural background, who were lagging far behind the Bengali Hindus 
in all respects, willingly launched a forceful campaign for the establishment of 
Pakistan. 
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3.2.3 BASIC PRINCIPLES COMMITTEE (BPC) REPORT: THE 
CLASH BETWEEN EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN 
The prolonged period in framing a new Constitution for the country was 
due to the fact that no precise social or economic aims or objectives in the post-
independence period were advanced during the Pakistan movement before the 
partition of India except the liberation of the Indian Muslims from the 
domination of the Hindus.^^ The Objectives Resolution adopted by the 
Constituent Assembly in March 1949 gave the character of the Constitution as 
Islamic in principle.^^ One may recall that Jinnah conceived of Pakistan as a 
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State "where principles of Islamic justice could find free play". On 7 March 
speaking on the objectives of the Constitution, Liaquat Ali Khan said that it 
was "dictated by geography" and that "it would be idle to think of a unitary 
form of government when the two parts of our country are separated by more 
than 1000 miles".^^ But as time passed by, the Central Government deviated 
from this pragmatic path and imposed a strong unitary government upon the 
country betraying the aspirations of the people of the eastern wing. The Basic 
Principles Committee (BPC) was set up by the Constituent Assembly on 12 
March 1949 to recommend the main principles on which the future 
Constitution of Pakistan should be framed. On 28 September 1950 the first 
interim report of the BPC on the Constitution was published which created 
severe repercussions in East Bengal. Demonstrations and public meetings took 
place all over East Bengal attacking the Report as designedly framed to cripple 
East Bengal. The Report recommended that the official language of the State 
would be Urdu. The Central Government was invested with excessive powers 
like declaring proclamation of emergency and suspension of the Constitution. 
The Federal Legislature would consist of the House of Units (indirectly elected 
by the Provincial Legislature) and the House of the People (directly elected). 
The two House would have equal powers and all the Provinces would have 
equal representation in the House of Units. The agitation in East Bengal 
comprised two basic issues, full Provincial Autonomy and the recognition of 
Bengali as one of the State languages of the country."*^ 
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In October 1950, a Committee of Action for Democratic Federation was 
formed. The convenors of the committee, Ataur Rahman Khan and Kamruddin 
Ahmad toured the interiors of East Bengal to educate and alert people against 
the serious consequences of the BPC Report upon the interests of the Bengalis. 
The Committee organised a Grand National Convention in November 1950, 
which was presided over by Ataur Rahman Khan and produced a number of 
constitutional proposals,'*^ highlighting the full Provincial Autonomy for East 
Bengal and the recognition of Bengal as one of the State languages. The East 
Bengal Muslim League Working Committee also held a meeting on 29 October 
1950, in which it protested against the measures of the BPC Report affecting 
East Bengal adversely and suggested remedial steps. On 2 November the 
Constituent Assembly resolved that Paiiistan should be made an Islamic 
Republic.''^ 
3.2.4 GENERAL ELECTION OF 1954 
Fazlul Huq, Bhashani and Suhrawardy forgot their rivalry for the time 
and formulated a 21-point programme of their United Front to bring down 
Muslim League party from power. The 21-point programme included, among 
others, the following: -
1. To make Bengali one of the State languages of Pakistan. 
19. In accordance with the historic Lahore Resolution, to secure full and 
complete autonomy to bring all subjects under the jurisdiction of East 
Pakistan, leaving only Defence, Foreign Affairs and Currency under the 
jurisdiction of the Centre. Even in the matter of Defence, arrangement 
shall be such as to have headquarters of the Army in West Pakistan and 
headquarters of the Navy in East Pakistan and to establish ordinance 
factories in East Pakistan with a view to make East Pakistan self sufficient 
in the matter of defence, and convert the present 'Ansars' into full fledged 
militia."^ ^ 
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The most important point of the 21-point programme was point no. 19 
which asked for fulfillment of the desire expressed in the Muslim League 
Lahore Resolution of 1940-magnacarta of Muslims of India envisaging two 
separate independent Muslim States, one in the North-Western India and 
another in Eastern India. It was not possible for the United Front to ask for 
complete independence of East Bengal in terms of Lahore Resolution then, as 
such demand had the danger of United Front being branded as traitor and 
banned. Hence the demand for full and complete autonomy short of 
independence as per Lahore Resolution. 
On the basis of 21-point programmme. United Front fought the election 
and got absolute majority in the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly. The Front 
secured 218 seats in a House of 310 seats (including the Speaker) and out of 
237 Muslim seats. The rest were 72 non-Muslim seats. Of the remaining 
Muslim seats 9 went to Muslim League, 1 to Khilafat Rabbani and 10 to 
independents. Chief Minister Nurul Amin himself was defeated by a young 
man of 25 years in his home constituency. The verdict of the people was 
against the Muslim League shape of things and was a voice of protest and no 
confidence. The election was referendum on Lahore Resolution and showed 
clearly and unmistakably that people of East Bengal wanted fullest and 
complete autonomy as per Lahore Resolution.'*'* 
Muslim League government inspite of exerting fullest influence through 
government machinery could not change the verdict of the people. Even the 
exhortations of a high police officer to his subordinates to work in favour of the 
Muslim League candidates were received with contempt it deserved. An agent 
of a Muslim League candidate who was a sitting minister, voted against the 
candidate. The Muslim League government was mad with power and did allow 
Fazlul Huq, leader of the United Front to occupy Circuit House while on 
election tour of different districts.'*^ 
The victory of the United Front at the general election unnerved the 
Muslim League and vested interests of Western wing who wanted rule of the 
country by minority government. The verdict of the people of East Bengal was 
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not taken with magnanimity by the Pakistan Government. As such they tried all 
possible tactics not to allow the United Front ministry to function for the term 
for which they were elected. Full ministry was sworn in on 15 May 1954. 
Before the ministry could function effectively riots were engineered by the 
agents of the central ruling clique in collaboration with West Pakistan vested 
interests, Fazlul Huq ministry was threatened with imposition of Governor's 
rule under section 92A of Government of India Act 1935 (as amend) to take 
away power of the ministry. 
The Central Government made capital out of casual remark said to have 
been made by Fazlul Huq while in Calcutta, as reported by New York Times 
that 'Independence will be one of the first things to be taken up by his 
Ministry'. The Central Govenmient themselves gave wide publicity in the 
country and abroad and implanted the idea of independence of East Bengal in 
the minds of the people of East Bengal. Had not the Central Government made 
capital out of it, the remark, if any, would have gone unnoticed in Pakistan and 
elsewhere. It is known to all, that banned or prescribed books or pamphlets are 
the most read. 
Even if Fazlul Huq had made such remark it was in line with his 
thinking as a man who moved the Lahore Resolution of 1940 at the Muslim 
League session envisaging two independent Muslim States in India of which 
one was to be in Bengal area. 
Inspite of his denial, Fazlul Huq was branded as a traitor to Pakistan by 
the Central Government. It is a fact of history that without the help of Fazlul 
Huq the Muslim League could not have held the session at Lahore in March 
1940 at a time when Lahore was surcharged with agitation against the Punjab 
Government for killing some Ahrars, not to speak of passing the Resolution. 
The Central Government took over the administration of East Bengal 
under section 92A of Government of India Act 1935 and appointed Iskender 
Mirza as Governor in place of Choudhury Khaliquzzaman and N.M. Khan as 
Chief Secretary in place of H.M. Ishaque by declaring emergency on 30 May 
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1954. The verdict of the people of East Bengal was nullified within a few days 
of United Front Ministry's taking over power. 
As the Central Government did not allow the United Front Ministry to 
fulfill its election programme including point no. 19 regarding full and complete 
autonomy on the basis of which United Front was voted to poAver, there could 
be no other alternative but to ask for or strive for complete independence of 
East Bengal on the basis of Lahore Resolution of 1940. 
Fazlul Huq, who formed Muslim League Ministry in Bengal, who made 
Muslim League popular in Bengal, who moved the Lahore Resolution was 
branded as a traitor by the ruling clique of Central Government, which was not 
representative of the people. The men posing to represent the people did not 
dare to seek election for mandate from the people. Just think of a traitor being 
appointed as minister of interior in the Central Cabinet within one year, in 1955 
and Governor of East Bengal in 1956. Had Pakistan Government accepted the 
verdict of the people of East Bengal who constituted majority of the population 
of Pakistan, the turn of events would have been different. But the destiny of the 
new country born out of betrayal of Muslims of Bengal was some where else 
and nor as a United Pakistan. 
Imposition of Governor's rule in East Bengal in 1954 after the 
resounding victory at the general election of that year routing the Muslim 
League, was considered by Dr. Mahmud Hussain ex-minister and ex-Vice 
Chancellor of Dhaka University and a Muslim League member of the 
Constituent Assembly as a wrong step. He said that root cause of the trouble in 
East Bengal was not Communism but 'hatred between East and West 
Pakistan'.^^ 
Inspite of unconstitutional actions of the Central Government, the 
United Front could not remain united. It would be travesty of truth if it is not 
admitted that much of the difficulties faced by the Muslims of Bengal in 
asserting themselves was due to constant quarrel between Fazlul Huq and 
Shaheed Suhrawardy whom the vested interests of West Pakistan, specially of 
West Punjab, played one against the other and they fell willing prey to that 
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game and helped to deny the MusUms of Bengal. Their rightful place in the 
governance of Pakistan. Had the Muslims of the Bengal remained united, they 
could have ignored the ascendancy of West Punjab and helped other Provinces 
who were groaning under the domination of the Punjabis. The leaders of East 
Bengal failed them miserably and with disastrous result in the end. 
3.2.5 DEMAND FOR FULL AUTONOMY OF EAST PAKISTAN 
On 3 April 1957, East Pakistan Assembly passed the following 
unanimous resolution on the issue of full autonomy. "This Assembly was of the 
opinion that Government of East Pakistan should represent to the Government 
of Pakistan for taking suitable steps for providing foil regional autonomy for 
East Pakistan, leaving the following subjects only to the concern of the Centre: 
Currency, Foreign Affairs and Defence".'*^ The motion was moved by Muzaffar 
Ahmed and supported by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League and 
Abu Hossain Sarkar of the Krishak Sramik Party. 
3.2.6 POLITICAL CRISIS IN EAST PAKISTAN 
The growing conflicts in East Pakistan reflected the interests of various 
political parties then existed to take the credit. They indulged in internal 
disputes regarding the division of Pakistan. The situation became precarious 
and a political crisis emerged in East Pakistan on 31 March 1958. Governor 
Fazlul Huq turned down a request from Chief Minister Ataur Rahman Khan to 
prorogue the East Pakistan Assembly, dismissed his cabinet and appointed Abu 
Hossain Sarkar as the Chief Minister. Suhrawardy put a threat that he would 
withdraw his support from the central coalition government of Firoz Khan 
Noon. Within less than twenty-four hours, Governor Fazlul Huq found himself 
dismissed by President Iskandar Mirza and replaced by Hamid Ali, the Chief 
Secretary of the Government of West Pakistan.^ *^ The Acting Governor Hamid 
Ali dismissed Abu Hossain Sarkar and reinstated the Cabinet of Ataur Rahman 
Khan. A new crisis broke out when the East Pakistan Assembly opened after 
the adjournment. The NAP (Nation Awami Party) threatened that it would 
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withdraw its supports from the Awami League cabinet unless it was willing to 
sign the NAP's 5-point programme.^^ As a result, on 18 June Ataur Rahman 
suffered a vote of no confidence in the East Pakistan Assembly when the NAP 
played a neutral role. On 20 June Abu Hossain Sarkar formed a new 
government. The East Pakistan Awami League decided to ignore Suhrawardy's 
directives regarding One Unit and foreign policy and came to an understanding 
with the NAP and as a result they forced Abu Hossain Sarkar to resign on the 
ground of no confidence after holding office only for 72 hours. 
In East Pakistan it became difficult for the political parties to form a 
clear majority. As a result, the Central Government once again imposed the 
Governor's rule on 24 June prorogued the East Pakistan Assembly for two 
months and appointed Sultanuddin Ahmed as the Governor. Ataur Rahman 
Khan with the support of Suhrawardy formed a new government on 25 August. 
The East Pakistan Assembly declared the pro-KSP speaker Abdul Hakim 'of 
unsound mind'. When a fight broke out in the East Pakistan Assembly on 21 
September, Abdul Hakim escaped serious injuries but was forced to leave the 
Chamber. On 23 September the police prevented Abdul Hakim to enter the 
Chamber, During a scuffle between the Government and the Opposition 
parties, Shahed Ali, the pro-Awami League Deputy Speaker was seriously 
injured and later died in hospital. Several opposition members including Abu 
Hossain Sarkar were arrested on 24 September. President Iskandar Mirza 
dissolved the East Pakistan Assembly, dismissed the Awami League 
government and later declared martial law in the country.^^ 
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3.2.7 SIX-POINT PROGRAMME LAUNCHED BY SHEIKH 
MUJIBUR RAHMAN 
In a series of attempts made for the regional autonomy of East Pakistan, 
the six-point programme launched by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in February or 
March 1966 is worth mentioning (the date of launching six-point programme 
by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is differently stated by different authors). This six-
point programme was launched before an All-Party meeting in Lahore, the city 
where Sher-e-Bangla Fazlul Huq moved the Pakistan Resolution in 1940 for a 
confederation of independent Muslim States. Here it is interesting to note that 
the Bengali Muslims always objected to the 1946 amendment of the Lahore 
Resolution, which changed the political concept of Pakistan from 'Independent 
States' to a single State. 
The source of the inspiration of the six-point programme lies on the 
original concept of Pakistan that it would consist of "Independent Muslim 
States". In 1942 Sir Hassan Suhrawardy said: "Mr. Jinnah envisages the course 
followed in the evolution of the Union of the Commonwealth of Australia and 
the Dominion of Canada. The Muslim States will first function as separate and 
independent units in the British Commonwealth of Nations, and, if and when 
found feasible, confederate as equal partners by mutual consent with other parts 
of India and with other Dominions".^'' On the eve of the partition of India, even 
the British authorities believed that the units of Pakistan would be 
administratively and financially autonomous. On 5 February 1946, Sir D 
Monteath (Permanent under-Secretary of State for India) worked to Lord 
Pethick-Lawrence: as would seem more probable, Western and Eastern 
Pakistan exist as separate Units, administratively and financially, but united by 
something like a treaty arrangement for policy purposes. 
Since the creation of Pakistan, the Bengali's were demanding full 
autonomy for East Bengal. In 1950, the Working Committee of the East Bengal 
Muslim League stated that it was "strongly of the opinion...in setting up the 
actual federal structure the geographical position of East Pakistan, its 
detachment and distance from other units and also from the federal capital itself 
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has to be seriously considered and provisions made in the Constitution to 
accord maximum autonomy to East Pakistan and to that effect it is essential 
that a separate list of subjects to be administered by East Pakistan be 
incorporated in the Constitution and the residuary powers should rest in the 
units". The committee further stated, "that since the railways and navigation 
system of the eastern wing were separate from those of the west", 
communications "can not and should not be a central subject". It also declared 
"that so far as the export and import trade of East Pakistan is concerned 
adequate provision should be made subject to the least possible control of the 
Centre for the administration of this subject by the Government of East 
Pakistan".^^ It should be noted that the famous 21-point programme launched 
by the United Front in 1954 included the Point no. 19, which stated: "East 
Bengal will get complete autonomy according to the Lahore Resolution. Our 
defence, currency and foreign policy will be joint subjects with the Centre. 
Army Headquarters will be in West Pakistan and Naval Headquarters are to be 
set up in East Pakistan, so that this wing can become strong to safeguard her 
freedom. The Ansar will be equipped with arms". 
The points of the six-point programme were as follows: -^ ^ 
1. The character of the government shall be federal and parliamentary in 
which the election to the federal and legislature and to the legislatures of the 
federating units shall be direct and on the basis of universal adult franchise. 
The representation in the federal legislature shall be on the basis of 
population. Thus, trivially, this point itself consists of the following 
ingredients. 
a. Pakistan shall be a federation, 
b. It shall be based on Lahore Resolution, 
c. Its government shall be of Parliamentary form, 
d. It must be responsible to the legislature, 
e. The legislature, must be supreme, 
f. It must be directly elected and 
g. Election must be on the basis of universal adult franchise. 
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2. Under this point, federal government shall deal with only two subjects, viz; 
Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other residuary subjects shall vest in 
the federating states. 
3. This point states that there shall be two separate, freely convertible 
currencies for the two wings of the country or in the alternative a single 
currency, subject to the establishment of a federal reserve system in which 
there will be regional federal reserve banks which shall devise measures to 
prevent the transfer of resources and flight of capital from one region to 
another. 
4. Fiscal Policy shall be the responsibility of, and the power of taxation shall 
vest in, the federating units. The federal government shall be provided with 
requisite revenue resources for meeting the requirements of defence and 
foreign affairs, which revenue resources would be automatically 
appropriable by the federal government in the manner provided and on the 
basis of the ratio to be determined by the procedure laid down in the 
Constitution. Such constitutional provisions would ensure that the federal 
government's revenue requirements are met consistently with the objective 
of ensuring control over the fiscal policy by the governments of the 
federating units. 
5. In this point it is recommended that: 
a. there shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earning of the two 
wings, 
b. foreign exchange of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East 
Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan under the control of West 
Pakistan Government, 
c. foreign exchange requirement of the federal government shall be met by the 
two wings either equally or in ratio to be fixed, 
d. indigenous products shall move free of duty between two wings, 
e. the Constitution shall empower the unit governments to establish trade and 
commercial relations with, set up trade missions in and enter into 
agreements with foreign countries. 
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6. The governments of the federating units shall be empowered to maintain a 
militia or para-military force in order to contribute effectively towards 
national security. 
3.2.8 IMMEDIATE REACTIONS OF LAUNCHING OF THE SIX-
POINT PROGRAMME 
Soon after launching of this programme, it caught the imagination of the 
people of East Pakistan and transformed it to a political battle cry for making 
East Pakistan free from all exploitation and domination by West Pakistan and 
achieving fiill autonomy. The programme movement proved to be a radical 
departure forms the simple autonomy demand of the past. The programme 
aimed towards a confederation, instead of a federation. The demand of foil 
control on raising taxes and expenditures along with the freely convertible 
currencies and the power to enter into foreign trade relationships, keeping 
foreign exchange earnings separate, was too much for the Central Government 
to accommodate, so that it castigated the movement as a clear secessionists 
movement. As the main thrust of the programme was to benefit East Pakistan 
from the ruthless political and economic oppression of West Pakistan, 
Nasrullah Khan (the national President of the Awami League) severely 
criticised the programme. 
In May 1967, five opposition parties, the Awami League, the Council 
Muslim League, the Jamat-i-Islam, the KSP and the Nizam-i-Islam formed a 
political organisation in the name of Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM). 
In order to diffuse the appeal of the six-point programme launched by Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, Bhutto wanted to influence Maulana Bhashani behind 
Mujib's back. He impressed upon the Maulana that the six-point programme 
had the backing of the American authorities in order to lessen the growing 
friendship between Pakistan and China. 
In March 1966 Ayub Khan came to East Pakistan to launch his attack 
against the six-point programme when he said that it "would spell disaster for 
the country and turn the people of East Pakistan into slaves".^^ On 20 March he 
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denounced the programme, stating that it aimed towards the unification of East 
Pakistan and West Bengal as an independent State and added that the country 
would accept the challenge of a civil war if one were forced upon it.^ ^ On 9 
May, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested under the Public Safety Act. A 
general strike erupted in the main cities of East Pakistan, when police firing 
killed 10 people and a large number injured. Ayub Khan called Sheikh Mujib a 
'secessionist' and threatened to use the 'language of weapons'.^° In June, the 
government banned the leading Bengali newspaper the Daily Ittefaq and 
arrested its editor, Tafazzal Hossain (Manik Mia). The government also 
forfeited the property of the paper. 
The Constitution provided that the Speaker of the National Assembly 
would discharge the functions of the President when he is not capable due to 
his illness. But this normal formality was conspicuously absent when Ayub 
Khan became seriously ill at the end of 1967, presumably because Abdul 
Jabbar Khan, a Bengali, was the Speaker at that time.^' In 1968, agitation 
against the Ayub regime started in West Pakistan but it soon spread to East 
Pakistan. Although, some economic improvements were made in East Pakistan 
during the regime of Ayub khan but the disparity was still growing at a slower 
rate compared with the first decade of independence.^^ Ayub Khan showed his 
total indifference and contempt towards the political representations of the 
Bengalis when he appointed some discredited politicians who lost their 
elections in the popular election of 1954. Of the two Bengali Governors of 
East Pakistan under Ayub's regime, one was a police officer, Zakir Hussain '^^  
and another a discredited Muslim League politician, Monaem Khan who lost in 
the 1954 election. After about 21 months of detention, on 18 January 1968, 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was released but the military personnel took him 
forcibly from the jail gate and confined him in the Dhaka Cantonment. 
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3.2.9 AGARTALA CONSPIRACY CASE AGAINST SHEIKH 
MUJIB 
On 6 January 1968, the Ayub regime threw a political bombshell when it 
issued a statement that 28 people had been arrested on the charge of conspiring 
to secede East Pakistan from Pakistan. The people arrested included a naval 
officer, three senior civil servants and a number of junior military personnel. 
The statement alleged that the persons engaged in conspiracy met Mr. P.N. 
Ojha (First Secretary of the Indian High Commission in Dhaka) and visited 
Agartala in India to discuss plans with two Indian officers. The government 
initiated the Agartala Conspiracy Case against 35 persons, which included 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for an alleged conspiracy to bring about the secession 
of East Pakistan with the help of India. The trial started on 19 June 1968 before 
a Special Tribunal inside the Dhaka cantonment and kept it open to the press. 
The Tribunal consisted of Justice S.A. Rahman (former Chief Justice of 
Pakistan), Justice M.R. Khan and Justice Maqsumul Hakim. The government 
engaged Manzur Qadir (former Foreign Minister), an eminent lawyer as the 
Public Prosecutor. The supporters of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman arranged a 
renowned Queen's Counsel of the English bar, Thomas Williams (later Sir 
Thomas), to defend Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. As the defendants were accused 
of "plottmg to deprive Pakistan of its sovereignty over a part of its territory by 
an armed revolt with weapons, ammunitions, and fiinds provided by India", 
they all pleaded "not guilty". "But no solid evidence of a Mujib-Indian 
conspiracy that had an independent Bangladesh as its objective has yet 
emerged, even in the post-1971 period, during which Pakistan could have 
produced such proof without any serious political consequences, domestic or 
international". ^ The Agartala Conspiracy Case was a sheer foolhardy on the 
part of Ayub Khan as it made Sheik Mujib overnight a hero in East Pakistan.^^ 
Ayub Khan made an announcement that he would not contest the next 
Presidential election. The agitation against the Agartala Conspiracy Case was 
very severe. On 10 August 1968, a strike was called throughout East Pakistan 
against the recommendations of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report on 
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Education. The celebrations of 'A Decade of Reforms' launched by the 
supporters of Ayub Khan came to an end in October 1968. From 8 November, 
there had been strikes and riots, which had serious effects upon the public 
services, education, commerce and industry. Economically 1968 proved to be a 
bad year for East Pakistan as it lost 1,000,000 tons of rice by floods and 
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registered an absolute decline in the Province's per capita income. On 26 
November 1968, S.M. Murshed (Former Chief Justice of East Pakistan) joined 
the movement against Ayub Khan, as Air-Marshal Asghar Khan started in 
West Pakistan. At a public meeting in Dhaka on 15 December 1968, both 
Justice Murshed and Air-Marshal Asghar Khan announced their fiill support for 
the legitimate interests of both East and West Pakistan. The demonstrations, 
which had been confined so far to West Pakistan, spread to East Pakistan when 
the NAP called a general strike in Dhaka. 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman extended his support for the All-Party Students 
Eleven-Point Programme,^^ which was a compromise solution of all the 
demands of secular and leftist political parties. The programme was accepted 
by all the political parties in East Pakistan. On 8 January 1969 at a meeting in 
Dhaka the leaders of the eight opposition parties formed the Democratic Action 
Committee (DAC), with a view to replacing the "one-man dictatorship", which 
"brought degradation and ruin to the country", with the parliamentary 
democracy. Nawabzada NasruUah Khan became the President of the 
Democratic Action Committee. On 14 January, Maulana Bhashani demanded 
the implementation of the Lahore Resolution and on 30 January he was arrested 
with over 1000 members of his party. Due to the widespread riots throughout 
the country calling for constitutional reforms, Ayub Khan lifted the State of 
emergency on 17 February, which had been introduced during the war with 
India in 1965. On 14 February, the Democratic Action Committee (DAC) 
called a general strike. A large public meeting held in Dhaka was addressed by 
Tajuddin Ahmed, the General Secretary of the Awami League and Muzaffar 
Ahmed, President of the NAP (pro-Moscow). An angry mob in Lahore set on 
fire the premises of the Oxford University Press for the apparent reason of 
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publishing recently Ayub Khan's book, Friends and not Masters. Tofail Ahmad 
came into prominence during the movement against the Ayub regime when he 
was the Vice President of the Dhaka University Central Students Union. There 
was outburst of public anger when Sergeant Zahurul Huq, one of the accused in 
the Agartala Conspiracy Case was shot dead on 15 February 1969, while he 
was in military escort. On 16 February Ayub BQian bowed down to the public 
demand that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman should be allowed to attend the Round 
Table Conference. On 18 February Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Maulana 
Bhashani, Bhutto and Air-Marshal Asghar Khan all rejected invitations to 
attend talks between President Ayub Khan and the Democratic Action 
Committee. On that day Dr. Shams-uz-Zuha was killed due to indiscriminate 
firing at the Rajshahi University campus. The house in which Justice S.A. 
Rahman (Chairman of the Agartala Conspiracy Case) was residing was set on 
fire by angry mob. Both Justice Rahman and Manzur Qadir (Prosecutor of the 
case) had to flee for the safety of their lives. On 21 February 1969, Ayub Khan 
announced that he would not stand for re-election as the President. In the 
broadcast he said: "people want direct elections on the basis of adult 
franchise...People in East Pakistan feel that in the present system they are not 
equal partners, and also that they do not have full control over the affairs of 
their Province". 
On 22 February at a rally of 100,000 students in Dhaka an ultimatum 
was given to the members of the National Assembly and the Basic Democrats 
(who formed both the Electoral College and the members of the Local 
Authorities) to resign by 3 March or "face the consequences". Most of the 
Basic Democrats opted for resignation while two of them were killed. The 
political unrest was accompanied by mass strikes in the form of gherao tactics 
where the disgruntled employees locked the employers demanding increase in 
wages. The whole system of the local government collapsed due to the 
resignation of the Basic Democrats. The highly unpopular Governor Abdul 
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Monaem Khan kept himself confined in his residence for several weeks and 
on 21 March he was replaced by Dr. M.N. Huda (former Finance Minister of 
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East Pakistan) who commanded respect from students so that police were 
visible on the Dhaka streets after three weeks. Tafazzal Hossain (Manik Mia), 
the editor of the Daily Ittefaq played an important role in voicing the repressive 
policies of the Ayub regime. He was prosecuted by the Martial Law regime but 
acquitted due to ineptitude of the prosecuting authorities. 
It was the so called Conspiracy Case, which sowed the seed of complete 
independence from Pakistan in the minds of East Bengal people in place of 
regional autonomy. 
Pakistan Government dominated and controlled by the leaders and 
officers of West Pakistan entirely forgot that Muslims of Bengal did not want 
to come with Pakistan in 1947 upto the last minute but was forced by 
circumstances, to do so, as such there was nothing wrong in trying to get out of 
it. 
Had not Pakistan Government instituted the Conspiracy Case and given 
wide publicity, the idea of conspiring for independence from Pakistan, as a last 
resort, would not have cropped up in the minds of people of East Bengal for 
many years to come and not so soon. The trial of that case, however, did add to 
the feelings against the government. 
3.2.10 ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE: CALLED BY AYUB 
KHAN 
With a view to ease the political situation in the country, Ayub Khan 
called a Round Table Conference on 10 March 1969, inviting the political 
leaders of the country. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman reftised to join this conference 
on parole. The Awami League announced that it would not join the conference 
until the charges were withdrawn against all the accused in the Agartala 
Conspiracy Case. On 22 February, the government withdrew all the charges 
against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and 33 other accused in the Agartala 
Conspiracy Case, which enabled Sheikh Mujib to attend the conference on 26 
February with his head high as a victor.^^ The conference was attended by 
Hamidul Huq Choudhury from the Krishak Sramik Party and Justice Murshed. 
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Neither Maulana Bhashani nor Bhutto attended the conference. At the 
conference Sheikh Mujib placed his six-point programme for regional 
autonomy for East Pakistan. He also put forward the demand that the federal 
capital should be transferred from Islamabad to Dhaka. The demands put 
forward from East Pakistan were opposed by Maulana Mawdudi (leader of the 
Jamaat-i-Islami). At the conference, Ayub Khan's statement that weapons were 
being smuggled into East Pakistan was seriously questioned by Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman. Air-Marshal Asghar Khan alleged that "certain vested interests in the 
Government and the Administration" were creating confusion to find pretext to 
crush the movement for democracy. 
Bhutto branded the conference as "a clear conspiracy against the people 
of Pakistan...because it was the game of Ayub Khan to remain in power by 
conceding the principle of parliamentary form of government". On 10 March 
Maulana Bhashani and Butto entered into a political alliance not to enter into 
any political negotiations with Ayub Khan. At a large meeting held in Dhaka, 
Sheikh Mujib reaffirmed his pledge for the implementation of the six-point 
programme. Sheikh Mujib lost confidence in the Ayub Government, which 
simply wanted to play with delaying tactics.^ "* 
Sheikh Mujib was released from the Agartala Conspiracy Case and 
invited to the Round Table Conference in Rawalpindi. On 11 March 1969, he 
attended the conference and demanded the implementation of the six-point 
programme. But the conference reached a deadlock when Sheikh Mujib 
demanded the full autonomy and the introduction of separate currency, which 
seemed to the West Pakistani leaders as virtual break-up of Pakistan. On 13 
March 1969, Ayub Khan announced that he would accept the principle of 
parliamentary form of government and direct elections but refused to consider 
the autonomy for East Pakistan or to restore the four Provinces in West 
Pakistan.^^ 
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3.2.11 GENERAL ELECTION OF 1970 AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Ayub Khan transferred power, after countrywide agitation against him, 
illegally and unconstitutionally to Yahya Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army, on 25 March 1969. He did not handover the Presidency to the Speaker 
of the National Assembly as per the Constitution of his own making and 
allowed Yahya Khan to declare Martial Law in the country for the second time, 
and abrogate the Constitution of 1962. 
Yahya Khan announced the Legal Frame Work (LFW) on 30 March 
1970 which, among others, provided for the following:^ ^ 
1. One Unit in West Pakistan would be dissolved and Provinces would return 
to their original position as before the establishment of One Unit. 
2. National Assembly will have representation according to population and 
members would be elected on universal adult franchise. National Assembly 
would consist of 300 members and 13 women members as follows: -
a. East Pakistan 169 members including 7 women members. 
b. Punjab 85 members including 3 women members. 
c. Sind 28 members including 1 woman member. 
d. Baluchistan 5 members including 1 woman member. 
e. North West Frontier Province 18 members. 
f. Tribal areas 7 members. 
North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Tribal areas would together 
elect 1 woman member. 
3. National Assembly would initially sit as a Constitution making body. The 
Constitution should have to be framed within 120 days from the first sitting 
of the Assembly failing which the National Assembly would be dissolved 
and a new Assembly would be elected. 
4. Each of the Provinces of East Pakistan, Punjab, Sind, North West Frontier 
and Baluchistan would have Provincial Assemblies with members 
according to their population. 
5. When members would be elected by the members of the National and 
Provincial Assemblies as per quota fixed for the Province by the members 
of that Province. 
6. The Constitution to be made by the National Assembly should be of federal 
type with large measure of autonomy for the Provinces. 
7. The Constitution so framed would require the assent of the President before 
it comes into force. 
8. General election for National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies was 
fixed for October 1970 (Actually held in December 1970 except elections in 
9 National Assembly seats and 21 Provincial Assembly seats in cyclone 
affected areas in East Bengal which were held in January 1971). 
In the general election held in December 1970, Awami League led by 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman secured 160 seats out of 162 seats allotted to East 
Bengal in the National Assembly. Other two seats of East Bengal were secured 
by Pakistan Democratic Party and by Independent candidate subsequently East 
Bengal members elected 7 women members belonging to Awami League for 
the National Assembly. The People's Party led by Zulfiquer Ali Bhutto secured 
83 seats out of 138 seats allotted to different Provinces in Western Pakistan in 
National Assembly. Muslim League (Qayum group) secured 9 seats, Muslim 
League (Council) 7 seats, Muslim League (Convention) 2 seats, National 
Awami Party (Wali Khan) 7 seats, Jamat-i-Islami 4 seats, Jamat-e-ulamai Islam 
(Hazarvi) 7, Markazi Jamat-e-ulamai Islam (Thanvi) 7, and independents 13 
seats in the National Assembly from different Provinces in West Pakistan. Of 
the 6 women seats in the National Assembly allotted for West Pakistan 
Provinces 5 went to People's Party and 1 to National Awami Party (Wali 
Khan). In the National Assembly Awami League secured 167 seats and 
People's Party secured 88 seats. Absolute majority of seats totaling 167 in a 
house of 313 seats was secured by Awami League. Awami League could not 
secure any seat in any Province of West Pakistan and People's Party could not 
secure any seat in East Bengal. 
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Awami League fought the election on the basis of six-point formula for 
full regional autonomy. Before election Awami League declared that the party 
would consider the election to be referendum on six-point formula and got the 
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verdict in their favour. 
Yahya IChan thought fit to give the country general election, first ever in 
Pakistan, on universal adult fi^anchise in 1970. Subsequent events showed that 
it was not out of love for democratic principles, institutions and practices nor 
for transferring power to the representatives of the people, which actuated 
Yahya Khan to give people Parliamentary democracy. It was to keep people 
calm for some time to allow his regime to consolidate its position. Even after 
announcement of date of general election people in East Bengal were not sure 
if there would be election specially because young Army officers were not in 
favour of parting with power so soon. It was thought that Awami League would 
have absolute majority of seats from East Bengal quota in the National 
Assembly. It was also believed that with forty percent of seats of East Bengal 
members from West Pakistan Provinces in the National Assembly would be 
able to form government at the Centre and thus there would be no change in the 
power of West Pakistan and West Pakistan leaders and officials would be able 
to run the affairs of the State, as before. This writer heard a West Pakistani 
Army officer saying that as per his calculation, Awami League would get 
utmost sixty percent of East Bengal seats in the National Assembly. But all 
their calculations fell through. Awami League came out successfiil in such a 
big way that even a die-hard optimist could not dream of. 
Mujib's Awami League captured 167 seats out of 169 seats allotted to 
the East in the 313 members National Assembly giving it a clear majority. The 
victory meant that Mujib, as leader of the majority party, would be Prime 
Minister of all Pakistan. 
It was something that Yahya had simply not anticipated. He and his 
fellow Generals expected that Mujib would capture not more than 60% of the 
East Pakistan seats and that smaller parties in the East would form a coalition 
with West Pakistani parties, leaving the real power in Islamabad, Mujib feared 
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some sort of double cross: If the polls are frustrated, he declared in a statement 
that proved horribly prophetic, the people of East Pakistan will owe it the 
million who have died in the cyclone to make the supreme sacrifice of another 
million lives, if need be so that we can live as free people. 
Bhutto could not take the outstanding victory of the Awami League in 
good grace. "Bhutto reiterated that his party would resist any intrigue or 
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conspiracy to make it (PPP) sit in the opposition". 
Yahya Khan came to East Pakistan after the general election and 
congratulated Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, as future Prime Minister of Pakistan. 
Yahya Khan met Sheikh Mujib at Dhaka alone but on return to Karachi he 
went to meet Bhutto at Larkana with some topmost Generals. Subsequent 
events showed what transpired at the secret meeting at Larkana. It was there 
that plan to deny East Bengal's rightful place in the governance of Pakistan 
was hatched. 
Chafing after decades of subjugation, the Bengalis responded with 
frenzied enthusiasm when their fiery, leonine hero Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 
led them to the polls in December in Pakistan's free election after twelve years 
of military rule. Spurred on by the flamboyant oratory of Mujib (as his 
worshipftil followers call him), the Bengalis voted in such numbers that Mujib 
and his Awami League won an absolute majority of seats in the country's new 
National Assembly. Suddenly it seemed that Bengali's time had come. But it 
turned out, Mujib's platform of economic and diplomatic autonomy for the 
East was too great a threat to be endured by the Punjabi leaders. Unwilling to 
play second fiddle to Mujib, West Pakistan's most popular left wing leader 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, refused to participate in the new Parliament. And in the 
end President Yahya abruptly postponed the opening of the Assembly 
on 
indefinitely. 
Yahya Khan, against the wishes of the majority party leader and without 
consulting his fixed 3 March 1971 for the inaugural session of the National 
Assembly at Dhaka. Again without consulting majority leader, Yahya Khan 
postponed the inaugural session, on 1^ ' March 1971 over the radio. 
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There was sharp and instant protest against the postponement of the 
inaugural session, in Dhaka and throughout East Bengal. The postponement of 
the session obviously at the behest of Bhutto, was highly impolitic, injudicious 
and to the say the least, arbitrary. It showed plainly and nakedly to the people 
of East Bengal that even if they had got all the seats through election, in the 
National Assembly, they would not be allowed to take the reigns of 
government and they were destined to be ruled by the people of West Pakistan 
as a colony for the purpose of exploitation. 
Some members of the National Assembly started arriving in Dhaka on 
1"' March 1971 for the inaugural session to be held on 3 March 1971. On T' 
March 1971 at Lahore, Bhutto threatened to launch a mass movement by his 
party in West Pakistan if National Assembly was allowed to meet without its 
participation. He said that Pakistan People's Party expected the people of 
Pakistan to take revenge on those who chose to attend the Assembly session, on 
their return from Dhaka. He also said that if any member of his party attended 
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the session, the party workers would liquidate him. 
On 1^^ March 1971, Admiral S.M. Ahsan Governor of East Pakistan was 
relieved of his duties and Lt. General Yaqub Khan was asked to take over 
charge of civil administration in addition to his duties as Martial Law 
Administrator of East Pakistan. The changes foretold the shape of things to 
come. Admiral Ahsan was removed as he was somewhat liberal and was not 
considered suitable for taking the bloody measures contemplated. 
Yahya Khan gave no reason for postponement of the session of the 
National Assembly. There was spontaneous demonstration and protest against 
the postponement of the session and the people came out on the streets 
throughout East Bengal. The peoples were lathi charged, tear gassed and fired 
upon by the military and the police. On 2 March 1971 curfew was imposed 
from 7 pm. to 7 am. in Dhaka city and in important towns. Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, on 2 March 1971, announced his programme of action which was as 
follows: -^ ^ 
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a. Province wide hartal to be observed on each day from 3 March 1971 to 6 
March 1971 from 6 am. to 2 pm. in all spheres including Government 
Offices, Secretariat, High Court and other Courts, Semi Government and 
Autonomous Corporations, P.I.A., Railways and other communication 
services, transport, private and public, all mills, factories, industrial and 
commercial establishments and markets. Exemptions were to be extended to 
ambulances, press cars, hospitals. All persons were urged to observe hartal 
in a peaceful and discipline maimer and to ensure that no untoward incident 
such as looting, burning etc., took place. 
b. March 3, which was to have been the day for sitting of the National 
Assembly should be observed as a day of National mourning, on which 
occasion a procession would be led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from Paltan 
maidan at 4 pm. immediately after the conclusion of the meeting being held 
by the Student's League. 
c. In the event of radio, television and newspapers failing to cover our version 
of event or our statements, all Bengalis serving in these agencies, should 
refuse to cooperate, with such gagging of voice of seventy milUon people of 
East Bengal. 
d. On 7 March 1971 at 2 pm. Sheikh Mujib would address a mass rally at the 
Race Course maidan, when fiirther directives will be issued. 
e. He urged the people to continue the common struggle in a peaceful and 
disciplined manner. 
People followed the directives meticulously. Not at any time before, the 
people of East Bengal rose like one man in such a manner, in defence of their 
rights to live as majority people of Pakistan. 
On 3 March 1971 Yahya Khan gave his explanation for the 
postponement of inaugural session of National Assembly and asked all party 
leaders to attend a conference on 10 March 1971 at Dhaka, which was refused 
by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and by Nurul Amin and, also by some leaders of 
West Pakistan. On 6 March 1971 Yahya Khan in his broadcast called inaugural 
session of the National Assembly to be held on 25 March 1971. Sheikh 
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Mujibur Rahman demanded that following steps should be taken before he 
consider whether Awami League would attend the session of the National 
Assembly called by the President: -^ ^ 
a. Immediate withdrawal of military personnel to their barracks; 
b. Immediate cessation of firing upon civilians; 
c. Immediate cessation of the military build up and heavy inflow of military 
personnel from the western wing; 
d. Non-interference of military authorities in the different branches of the 
government functioning in Bangladesh and direction to desist from 
victimisation of government officers and employees; 
e. Maintenances of law and order to be left exclusively to the police and 
Bengali E.P.R. assisted wherever necessary, by Awami League volunteers; 
f. Immediate withdrawal of martial law; and 
g. Immediate transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. 
In the public meeting attended by several lakhs of people at the Dhaka 
Race Course maidan on 7 March 1971, as promised, Sheik Mubjibur Rahman 
announced the following programme of action for the people to follow in non-
violent non-cooperation movement starting from 8 March 1971: -
1. No tax campaign to continue, 
2. The Secretariat, Government and Semi Government Offices, High Court 
and other Courts throughout Bangladesh shall observe hartal. Appropriate 
exemptions shall be announced from time to time, 
3. Railway and Ports may fiinction but railway workers and port workers shall 
not cooperate if Railway and Ports are used for mobilisation of forces for 
carrying out repression against the people, Radio, Television and 
Newspaper shall give complete version of our statements and shall not 
suppress news about people's movement otherwise Bengalis working in 
those establishments shall not cooperate. 
4. Only local and inter district telephone shall function, 
5. All educational institutions shall remain closed. 
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6. Banks shall not effect remittance to Western wing either through the State 
Bank or otherwise. 
7. Black flag shall be hoisted on all buildings everyday, 
8. Hartal is withdrawn in all other spheres but complete or partial hartal may 
be declared at any time depending upon the situation. 
9. A samgram parishad should be organised in such union, Mohalla, Thana, 
Subdivision, and District under the leadership of local Awami League units. 
There was great expectation that Sheikh Mujib, as leader of majority 
party in the National Assembly, would declare independence of East Bengal in 
the public meeting on 7 March 1971. People were sorely disappointed. The 
leader of the party having absolute majority in the National Assembly did not 
want to break away from Pakistan though he was being incited by indiscreet 
utterance made by Bhutto. Instead, Sheikh Mujib declared that 'our struggle 
this time is a struggle for independence'. 
Yahya Khan, inspite of mounting unrest in East Bengal, did not care to 
visit East Bengal. He did not take the path of negotiation, presumably on the 
advice of Bhutto, but secretly prepared for a show down. On the very day when 
Sheikh Mujib was addressing a mammoth public meeting, on 7 March 1971, 
Yahya Khan sent Lt. General Tikka Khan, known for his toughness and 
brutality, as Governor of East Bengal. 
On 14 March 1971 at a public meeting in Karachi Bhutto came out with 
a fantastic suggestion that power should be transferred to the Awami League 
and the PPP (Pakistan People's Party), the two majority parties in the two 
wings. ^ ^ 
When confronted with uncomfortable question that there is no West 
Pakistan but four Provinces Bhutto said 'that rule of majority does not apply in 
Pakistan and PPP can not be ignored in the country's governance'.^^ 
People's Party led by Bhutto secured majority of seats in Punjab and 
Sind but not in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. 
There was stand protest from most of the parties in Western region as 
they maintained that there was Province of West Pakistan as such there could 
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not be one majority party in Western wing. They also maintained tliat as 
Pakistan is one country there could not be two major parties in Pakistan. 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, as leader of the majority party in the National 
Assembly, had no alternative but to start non-violent non-cooperation 
movement as Yahya Khan did not give any importance to the leader of the 
party, which got confidence of people of Pakistan or even consulted him on 
important national issues. Moreover Yahya Khan did not care to visit East 
Bengal to solve the crisis facing the nation. 
Sheikh Mujib issued as many as thirty five directives to run the 
administration in East Bengal from 15 March 1971. All classes of people, 
officers, and employees followed the directives fully and carried out his 
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instructions. 
After wasting valuable time, Yahya Khan arrived in Dhaka accompanied 
or preceded by several top most Generals and after through preparation and 
detailed plan, not for negotiation and peacefiil settlement, but to forcibly 
suppress movement in East Bengal. This writer learnt, before 15 March 1971, 
that some Generals had already reached with detailed plan and maps for 
bombing the areas of Dhaka city. 
Yahya Khan started talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and dragged on 
the same from day to day, not to solve the deadlock but to gain time for 
preparation to strike hard and to the finish. As the talks with Sheikh Mujib 
proceeded, all planes from Karachi carried only army personnel and no 
political leaders. Mujib-Yahya talk on constitutional issues started on 15 March 
1971 and continued till 25 March 1971 fruitlessly only to gain time for 
preparation to strike. Had not that been so Yahya, being President of the 
country, would not have left East Bengal surreptitiously and secretly on the 
night following 24 March. 
To deceive people it was given out in newspapers on 25 March 1971 
that Martial Law was going to be lifted. Yahya Khan had no courage to speak 
out what he thought to be correct while in Dhaka. 
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People in East Bengal had observed 23 March as Lahore Resolution 
implementation day or Protirodh Divash (Resistance Day) and not as Lahore 
Resolution Day or wrongly called. The Resolution adopted on 23 March 1971 
was sacrificed for the benefit of non-Bengali leaders of the Muslim League. In 
January and February 1971, Maulana Bhashani and Ataur Rahman Khan had 
demanded constitution to be framed as per Lahore Resolution of 1940. 
While he (Yahya) negotiated with Mujib, his Generals planned carnage. 
His vaunted bluff sincerity (and sincerity of Pakistan's brief return to 
democracy) lies tattered. Hence forth, the country must be regarded as 
particularly brutal intensive military dictatorship, it's elected leadership in 
prison, majority party obliterated by decree. 
So long power was in the hands of West Pakistan leaders by setting one 
party agauist another, the question of two major parties in Pakistan did not arise 
but once it was found that power was sleeping out of their hand, the theory of 
two major parties in Pakistan began to be voiced unwearyingly confirming that 
Pakistan was a two nation State with two major parties in two wings of the 
country. 
The leaders of West Pakistan never thought of or learnt to think of 
Pakistan as one country. They thought of domination of one wing over another 
from the begirming. From their behaviour it was established that Pakistan could 
be called one and indivisible country so long it was dominated by the leaders of 
West Pakistan. 
The demands for the acceptance of the majority party in the National 
Assembly and subsequently for transfer of power to the Awani League in East 
Bengal and to the People's Party in West Pakistan, by Bhutto destroyed the 
very foundation of Pakistan as one country, one nation often repeated by the 
leaders of West Pakistan. Had Bhutto allowed the National Assembly to sit as . 
scheduled for 3 March 1971 and had Yahya Khan not succumbed to Bhutto's 
threats and taken the path of negotiation with the majority party leader,^° the 
history of Pakistan would have been differently written. 
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3.3 1971 WAR & THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH. 
In the midst of discussion with political leaders, Yahya Khan secretly 
and under the cover of darkness left Dhaka in the early hours of 25 March 
1971. It was given out that he had gone to the cantonment for some urgent 
business. The Pakistani army "action" on 25 March 1971 threw the unprepared 
Awani League leaders in Dhaka into complete disarray. They were not in a 
position to control and guide the spontaneous armed resistance offered by the 
East Bengalis to the Pakistani army in the East. 
In the outlying districts, especially in the urban centres, the efforts of the 
various groups at resistance was often coordinated by a sort of composite 
leadership of the chief Bengali civil officials, the local legislators-elect 
(wherever available), student leaders, and, of course, the senior Bengali army 
officers. 
Outside the urban centres, the villages were outwardly tranquil. 
Nevertheless, the countryside, normally the home of more than 90 percent of 
the East Bengali population, swelled in population as many city-dwellers 
flocked to the villages to escape the Pakistani "army-terror".^^ Consequently, 
an unprecedented sense of brotherhood and fellow-feeling grew between the 
various classes and categories of the East Bengali population. Bengali 
nationalism, thus, appeared to have begun bridging the elite-mass and urban-
rural gaps during April and May 1971. 
By early April, most of the central leaders of the Awami League, 
including the vast majority of the legislators-elect, crossed over to India. The 
entire Awani League High Command except for Sheikh Mujib and his 
Constitutional Adviser, Dr. Kamal Hussain, were in India by 10 April 1971. A 
large number of trained East Bengali Civil Servants, including a dozen 
members of the elite corps, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CPS), and some 50 
military officers, were also available in India by early April 1971. The 
insurgent Bengali armed personnel had been fighting the West Pakistani army 
from 25 March under the symbolic authorisation of a political authority-the 
Bangladesh government-that had not come into formal existence even during 
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the first week of April. Their leaders felt that without the formation of such a 
government they would be no more than "brigands" and their struggles would 
not be able to draw international sympathy and support.^^ Hence, they 
attempted to impress upon the senior Awami League leaders the need to move 
quickly in this respect. Several of these leaders, including Syed Nazrul Islam, 
Khondokar Mustaq Ahmed, and General M.A.G. Osmany (at that time a retired 
Colonel), were in Agartala in eastern India by the second week of April, and 
the East Bengali military leaders contacted them and urged them to hasten the 
formation of the Bangladesh Government. Subsequently, on 8-9 April, there 
was a meeting at Agartala of these leaders and Mr. Tajuddin, who had escaped 
to West Bengal on or around 30 March 1971, and had conferred with 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi in Delhi on 7 April.^ "* 
Following their meeting at Agartala, the senior Awami League leaders, 
with the acquiescence of the Indian Government, ^ on 10 April 1971 
announced the formation of a Provisional Government of the independent 
"People's Republic of Bangladesh". Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was proclaimed 
President, while Syed Nazrul Islam and Tajuddin Ahmed were respectively 
appointed Acting President and Prime Minister. Khondokar Mustaq Ahmed 
was appointed Foreign Minster. ^ 
Subsequently, the leaders of the Bangladesh Government issued a 
formal "Proclamation of Independence" and thereby "confirmed the declaration 
of Independence that had already been made by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 26 
March 1971".^^ 
The provisional government of Bangladesh was sworn in on 17 April 
1971 "at a brief, and to the many Bengalis present, evidently moving ceremony 
in a mango-grove on the western-most edge of East Pakistan", speakmg on 
the occasion. Prime Minister Ahmed said, "Pakistan is dead, murdered.by 
Yahya Khan and independent Bangladesh is a reality sustained by the 
indestructible will and courage of 75 million Bengalis". He also appealed "to 
the nations of the world for recognition and assistance both material and moral 
in the struggle for nationhood".^^ 
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The provisional government gave priority to the task of coordinating and 
organising the East BengaU military efforts against the West Pakistani armed 
forces. On 14 April 1971 the Bangladesh provisional government announced 
that Colonel M.A.G. Osmany, retired officer of the Pakistani army and Awani 
League member-elect of the National Assembly, had been appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladesh Liberation Forces, the Mukti 
Bahini.^ ^o 
On the political level the Awami League controlled Bangladesh 
provisional government faced very little difficulty at this early stage in getting 
widespread East Bengali support. The Awami League's principal leftist rivals, 
the pro-Peking NAP led by Maulana Bhashani^^^ and the pro-Moscow NAP led 
by Muzaffar Ahmed, ^ °^  extended unqualified support to the East Bengali 
liberation struggle and the Awami League leadership. So did the Pro-Moscow 
Communist Party of East Pakistan (in April 1971 renamed the Communist 
Party of Bangladesh).'*^^ 
The rightist, religious political parties, such as Jamat-i-Islami and the 
three factions of Muslim League and the Nizam-i-Islam party, as well as the 
right of centre Pakistan Democratic Party, did not support the cause of East 
Bengal's independence. On the contrary, during April, May and June 1971 they 
cooperated with the Pakistani army by forming "Peace Committees" ostensibly 
to maintain intercommunal peace and harmony in East Bengal. Later in July 
and August 1971, the active workers and supports of these parties helped the 
army's counterinsurgency operations in East Bengal by supplying the 
manpower of newly raised civil volunteer forces, such as the Razakars, the Al-
Shams, and the Al-Badr.^ ^"* 
The major political processes of the period extending from June top the 
middle of October 1971 consisted of triangular interactions of moves and 
countermoves by Pakistan, India and the provisional government of 
Bangladesh. The Yahya regime's chief aim was to create a facade of 
"normalcy" in East Bengal. The Bangladesh Government, on its part, stepped 
up its guerilla war against Pakistan to achieve two objectives, (i) to obtain and 
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maintain the support of the East Bengali population by holding out hopes of a 
certain and inevitable, even though possibly long delayed, victory for the 
Bengali nationalists, and (ii) to convince the world at large that the East 
Bengalis were determined to achieve independence at any cost. India 
determined to get rid of the East Bengali refugees and to maintain her 
dominating position over East Bengal, continued and by degrees increased her 
covert help to the East Bengali commandos. She also sought sympathy and 
support from the world conrniunity for the solution of the vast humanitarian 
problem created by the influx of the East Bengali refugees. 
The Pakistan military regime's overture to the "patriotic" Awami 
Leaguers at the end of May gave the provisional government of Bangladesh an 
occasion to spell out the terms of an acceptable settlement. The Acting 
President of Bangladesh on 7 June 1971 enumerated some conditions, which 
the Bangladesh Government considered indispensable for a satisfactory 
settlement. One of the conditions was that the Pakistan Government should 
recognise "the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Bangladesh". 
"Consequently, the Pakistani Governments efforts to mobilise support of a 
substantial section of the Awami League legislators elect failed. It could not get 
more than 20 Awami Leaguers elected to the National Assembly to agree to 
cooperate with it.*''^  
Nevertheless, the military rulers of Pakistan continued their 
uncompromising policy toward East Bengal. On 28 June 1971, President 
Yahya in a countrywide broadcast reiterated the accusations of conspiracy, 
sedition, and rebellion against Sheikh Mujib and the bulk of the Awami League 
Party. He also accused India of attempting to "mislead the world about the 
happenings in East Pakistan" by means of a "malicious campaign of falsehood" 
and charged that India was "utilising coercive measures" against Pakistan 
"including a diplomatic offensive, armed infiltration, and actual threats of 
invasion". Ruling out the possibility of a fresh general election in Pakistan, 
Yahya said the members elect belonging to the defunct Awami League and 
NAP parties, except for those who had participated in anti-State and criminal 
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activities retained their seats in the Assemblies "in their individual capacities". 
The President further announced that the seats made vacant by the 
disqualification of anti-State and criminal members-elect would be "filled in 
through the usual method of by-election".'^^ 
In a sharp and immediate reaction to Yahya's announcement, the 
provisional government of Bangladesh described it as a "farce" and declared 
that the proposed by-elections in East Bengal would be boycotted and resisted 
by the people".'^^ 
India, by then more deeply involved in the East Bengal crisis, also 
rejected the Pakistani proposals. On 28 June 1971, hours after the Pakistani 
President's speech, the Indian Foreign Minister told the Parliament in Delhi, 
"India would reject any make-shift plan for the transfer of power which did not 
take the elected leaders of East Pakistan and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman into 
accounf'."*^ 
Yahya's scheme to set up a civilian government at least in East Bengal 
and perhaps in the whole of Pakistan, with partial Awami League support, was 
thus stillborn. During the month of July 1971, therefore, the Pakistani 
Government tried to internationalise the conflict in Bangladesh by giving the 
world at large the impression that the crisis was merely an aspect of the Indo-
Pakistani mutual antipathy and tension. Accordingly, the Pakistani Government 
tried to get United Nations observers posted on both sides of the Indo-East 
Bengal border. Meanwhile, the secret visit by Dr. Henny Kissinger to Peking 
(in a Pakistani plane and from a Pakistani airport) signified the beginning of 
some degree of detente between the United States and China. The 
announcement by U.S. President Nixon on 15 July that he would visit China 
early in 1972 clearly indicated that Sino-U.S. rapprochement was in the 
making."' Pakistan had acted as an auxiliary courier between her mighty old . 
friends the United States and her zealous "new friend", China. Consequently, 
the possibility of Sino-U.S. understanding raised Pakistan's hopes that the two 
great powers together would back her in her confrontation with India on the 
issue of East Bengal. This together with the ambiguities in the Soviet attitude 
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towards the Bangladesh question probably further encouraged Pakistan to press 
hard for the acceptance of her proposal to have United Nations observers 
posted along the Indo-East Bengal border. Both the provisional government of 
Bangladesh and India resolutely opposed the Pakistani proposal, and it was 
never implemented. The "diplomatic revolution" epitomised in the unfolding 
Sino-U.S. detente eventually proved unless to Pakistan. It resulted in the 
cementing of the existing close Indo-Soviet ties by means of an Indo-Soviet 
Treaty of "Peace, Friendship and Cooperation" signed in Delhi on 9 August 
1971. Subsequently, the Soviet Union backed her new "treaty-ally" India in its 
stand on East Bengal much more effectively than either the United States or 
China backed Pakistan."^ 
The Pakistani Government by the end of August, however, seemed 
unable to fully appreciate the implications of the new developments in the 
pattern of alignment in South Asia. Unable to win over a substantial section of 
the Awami Leaguers, unable also to internationalise the East Bengal crisis by 
getting U.N. observers posted along the Indo-East Bengal border, Pakistan 
went ahead with her plan of "unilateral civilianisation" of the Government of 
East Bengal. On 31 August 1971 it announced the appointment as 
"Government of East Pakistan" of Dr. Abdul Mottalib Malik, an East Bengali 
and former minister in Yahya's cabinet. Dr. Malik replaced the military 
Governor, Lt. General Tikka Khan. In reality, though, the substance of power 
remained in the hands of the West Pakistani army in East Bengal. Dr Malik 
was without any legitimate political support and consequently most of his 
fellow East Bengalis regarded him as a "quisling".^ ^"^ 
The much publicised "civilisation" of the East Bengali Government 
could not thus persuade the East Bengalis to place further trust in the sincerity 
of the Pakistani military regime in searching out a satisfactory solution to the 
political problems of the region. They were by then sadly disillusioned. 
Consequently, the Bangladesh armed movement for separation from West 
Pakistan seemed to obtain a greater measure of support from the vast majority 
of the East Bengalis. 
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With this sense of increasing positive support from the bulk of the East 
Bengalis, the East Bengali nationalist leaders stepped up their protodiplomatic 
activities to persuade the nations of the world to support and assist their cause. 
In its bid to convince the world community of the seriousness of the East 
Bengali commitment to independence, the provisional government 
of Bangladesh encouraged the East Bengali diplomats in Pakistani embassies 
abroad to "defect" to Bangladesh. By October, nearly one-third of the Bengali 
diplomats in the service of Pakistan, including three ambassadors, declared 
their allegiance to Bangladesh. 
By September, the provisional Bangladesh Government also opened its 
"missions" in London^ *^  and New Delhi. *'^  As Bangladesh had not yet been 
recognised by either of the host countries, these missions did not enjoy official 
diplomatic status. Nonetheless, they played important roles as propaganda and 
information offices for the Bangladesh movement. 
During October 1971 the Bangladesh Government also sent a 16 
member "delegation" to the U.N. General Assembly session. The members of 
this unrecognised delegation officially met diplomats of more than one hundred 
States and apprised them of the Bangladesh situation. 
From the middle of October 1971, the regular Bangladesh forces, the 
Niyomito Bahini, launched large-scale attacks against the Pakistani army in 
East Bengal along the Indo-East Bengal border. These attacks by the 
Bangladesh army had the blessings and indirect support of India, who by that 
time had virtually encircled East Bengal with more than seven divisions of her 
army."^ 
The third phase of the East Bengali partisans struggle was, to a large 
measure, foreign-linked-intermixed with complex regional and global 
-international power politics. A comprehensive understanding of this phase of 
the East Bengali struggle, therefore, needs a study of the attitudes and 
involvements of the concerned external actors, especially India the Soviet 
Union, China and the United States. 
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During the second half of October and November 1971, the Bengali 
regular forces under the cover of Indian artillery engaged the Pakistani units 
stationed along the border, while the Bengali guerillas intensified their 
activities within the Pakistani army-held East Bengal. Early in the last week of 
November, the Indian armed forces became increasingly involved in the 
clashes."^ The position of the Pakistani army in the east worsened fast and, 
probably to relieve the pressure faced by the Pakistani forces in East Bengal. 
On the evening of December 3, 1971 Pakistan army began aggression on 
our Western borders. They attacked several Indian posts on our side of cease-
fire line in Kashmir. Pakistan Air Force indulged in heavy bombardment on ten 
Air Force Stations from Srinagar to Agra in Northern India. However, Pakistan 
did not achieve much success because in anticipation of Pakistan air attack our 
aircrafts had been placed in other stations. 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi rushed to New Delhi from Calcutta. The 
President declared State of emergency and Indian authorities decided to destroy 
Pakistan's war machinery. Indian army units based in Agartala were directed to 
march into East Pakistan and defeat the enemy. By mid-night of 3 December 
Indian aircraft organised several air attacks on Pakistan Air Force bases and 
inflicted heavy damage. Yahya Khan described it as the last and decisive war in 
which Pakistani troops would teach a permanent lesson to India. Indeed, it 
proved to be a decisive war, but it was Indian Army and Air Force that taught 
Pakistan a lesson.* °^ The war lasted only till December 16, 1971. The U.S. 
President Nixon ordered his all-powerfiil Seventh Fleet of the Navy to move 
into the Bay of Bengal. This was to bully India with the threat of a nuclear 
attack. But, in view of Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971, neither China nor 
U.S.A. intervened. Pakistan only received their moral support and used 
conventional weapons supplied by them. Pakistan suffered heavy losses both in 
Western and Eastern sectors. 
Lt. Gen. Niazi was Commanding Pakistani troops in East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh). Indian Army in that sector was under the Command of Lt. Gen. 
J.S. Aurora. Indian Army was supported by the Air Force and Navy as well. 
Pakistan army had lost its morale by December 15, but Niazi was still not 
prepared to surrender, though his forces were surrounded by the Indian troops. 
They were not in a position to escape. Niazi wanted India's permission to go to 
West Pakistan. It was denied by India's Chief of Army Staff General 
Manekshaw. Late on December 15, Niazi sent a message for cease-fire. But, 
Indian authorities told him to surrender unconditionally. After some hesitation, 
Pakistani forces agreed to surrender. On December 16, 1971 Gen. Niazi 
surrendered unconditionally to Gen. Aurora in the same ground in which 
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman had raised the banner of revolt 9 months earlier. Niazi 
had tears in his eyes as he signed surrender documents and handed over his 
colours to his one-time fellow-cadet, Lt. Gen. Aurora. About 93000 Pakistani 
troops who surrendered were brought to India as Prisoners of War (PoWs). 
India decided on unilateral cease-fire in the Western sector on 16 night. 
By this time Bangladesh had become a reality, yet Yahya Khan was still talking 
of throwing the enemy (India) out of every inch of Pakistan territory. But, the 
international community had recognised India's victory, and pleaded for 
immediate cease-fire. Within a few hours of his resolve to go on fighting, 
Yahya Khan accepted cease-fire and said that he had always believed that war 
was not solution of international disputes. America tried to take credit for 
cease-fire in the Western sector claiming that it had applied pressure on India 
through the Soviet Union. However, India denied any such pressure. In any 
case, India's decision of unilateral cease-fire in the west was criticised in many 
circles within the country. The argument was that once again when the army 
was on the verge of inflicting total defeat on the enemy, declaring cease-fire 
was against the best interests of the country. ^ '^^  The net result of the war was 
division of Pakistan and creation of sovereign State of Bangladesh, which was 
recognised by India in December 1971. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was released 
from Pakistani jail, but only after power was transferred in Pakistan from 
Yahya Khan to Z.A. Bhutto. The new President took credit for the release of 
Sheikh, though he himself was largely responsible for his arrest and detention. 
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While going to Dhaka, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman stopped in Delhi and thanked 
India for its role in the Independence of Bangladesh. 
3.4 SHIMLA AGREEMENT AND ITS IMMEDIATE IMPACT 
It was the period of 1970-71, which gave a new direction to the 
international politics in South Asia in general and India-Pakistan in particular. 
The reason for lies in the fact that several ups and downs which almost shook 
the political boundary of Pakistan occurred during this period. The period 
witnessed the genesis of an international political crisis within the United 
Pakistan, the secessionist movement and the civil war in East Bengal, the India 
intervention and culminating in the emergence of Bangladesh as a result of the 
Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. The Shimla Agreement of 1972 was a milestone 
because it formed the legal basis for setting the problems arising out of the 
Bangladesh war and for normalisation of India-Pakistan relations and 
establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent. 
The Shimla Agreement was signed on July 2, 1972 by the then Indian 
Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Pakistan President Mr. Z.A. Bhutto.^ ^^ 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, assisted by their, high-level 
delegations, held complex and extensive discussions on various issues arising 
out of the war, as well as on general bilateral relations. The issues ranged from 
the repatriation of prisoners of war, the recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan, 
normalisation of diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan, resumption 
of trade and fixation of international Line of Control in Kashmir. After 
prolonged negotiations, Bhutto agreed on essentially a bilateral approach to 
Indo-Pakistan relations. The accord signed at the end of Shimla Conference 
provided that both the countries would work to end the conflicts and disputes 
between them and pledged to work for lasting friendship in the*sub-continent. 
With these objectives in view Indira Gandhi and Bhutto agreed'^^ to— 
1. seek peaceful solutions to disputes and problems through bilateral 
negotiations, and neither India nor Pakistan would unilaterally change the 
existing situation, and 
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2. not to use force against each other, nor violate the territorial integrity, nor 
interfere in political freedom of each other. 
Both the governments would discourage all propaganda against each 
other, and encourage such news items as would promote friendly relations. In 
order to normalise the relations between two countries: 
1. all communication links would be re-established; 
2. transit facilities would be provided to enable the peoples of two countries to 
have closer contacts; 
3. as far as possible, trade and economic cooperation would be re-established; 
• and 
4. mutual exchange in the fields of science and culture would be promoted. 
Both the governments agreed in the interest of permanent peace that— 
a. the armies of both the countries would return within their respective 
international borders; 
b. both countries would recognise the Line of Control as at the time of cease-
fire on December 17, 1971; and 
c. the armies would go back to their respective territories within 20 days of 
enforcement of this agreement. 
Finally, it was agreed that heads of two governments would meet in 
future and the officials of two countries would in the meantime confer among 
themselves to normalise their relations. 
In her Rajya Sabha speech on August 2, 1972 on the Shimla Pact, 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi stressed the need for peace in the sub-continent in her 
words: "I have always believed, and I do believe even today that India's major 
enemy is not Pakistan, it is not even big powers, which are interested in their 
sphere of influence. India's greatest enemy is the economic backwardness of 
the country. It is the poverty of the country. If we do not have that handicap we 
would have done many things in the world. We can overcome this handicap, if 
we have peace".'^ •^ 
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Mr. Bhutto too had shown positive response in this direction and said, 
"Pakistan wants peace with India, not because it is afraid but because peace is 
necessary for the progress of nation". 
The critics of Shimla Agreement maintained that it was surrender to 
Pakistan in so far as our troops were told to withdraw from the areas that they 
had captured. But, the value of Shimla Agreement lies in the commitment of 
two countries to resolve all their disputes only through bilateral negotiations. 
Thus, Kashmir dispute would not be internationalised just as other disputes 
would also be resolved through direct negotiation. 
At Shimla, India, even after getting success in 1971 war, did not try to 
impose her views over Pakistan but make Pakistan a partner in peace and peace 
based on equality was concluded. In order to initiate the process of the 
establishment of peace, India and Pakistan agreed, "their forces shall be 
withdrawn to their side of the international border. The withdrawal shall 
commence up on entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed 
within a period of thirty days of. 
Both countries implemented almost all the provisions of the agreement 
within a short duration of three years of the conclusion of the pact. In the past 
several agreements were signed between the two countries within the intension 
of resolving their disputes and establishing peace between them as well as in 
the region, but none of them proved useful in establishing cooperative 
understanding and durable peace in full spirit. Upto some extent, Indus Water 
Treaty of 1960 was more helpful in dissolving the controversial problem of 
division of Indus Water between India and Pakistan and it is the only problem, 
which had been settled since 1947 between them, and the rest of the treaties 
were of very short term significance and all of them failed to resolve actual 
tension. , 
It was only the Shimla Agreement that taught Mr. Bhutto about his own 
condition as well as of his own country. Bhutto realised that if he failed to 
establish friendly and cordial relations with India, he would lose considerably 
his prestige in the eyes of Asian countries as well as among his own people, 
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because India had normal relations with all her neighbours. This caused great 
change in his thinking and till yesterday the so called war like Bhutto who was 
always talking about wars and destruction at once realised the importance of 
durable peace, and took necessary and concrete steps to gain durable peace. ^ 
In view of Shimla Agreement and the changing phase of Indo-Pakistan 
relations, it was widely believed that an understanding had been worked out in 
regard to a settlement of Kashmir problem centering around the existing 
realities with certain adjustments. Even if an understanding was reached to find 
a lasting solution to Kashmir dispute by accepting the Line of Control as 
international border, it was felt that Bhutto could not be expected to commit 
himself publicly at that stage. If Line of Control was to become international 
border, implying division of Jammu and Kashmir along the Line of Control, 
time would have to be given to the leaders of two countries to prepare public 
opinion in favour of such an arrangement. 
The repatriation over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war held in India 
was linked with Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh. It was not until late 
1973 that these prisoners of war (PoWs) were returned. Besides, no decision 
about prisoners of war could be taken without the agreement of Bangladesh. In 
addition to prisoners of war, there were about 30,000 Bangladeshi forcibly 
detained in Pakistan and 2,60,000 Pakistani's in Bangladesh.^^^ There were 
many hindrances in the implementation of provision of restoring 
communication and other links. An agreement was reached in August 1973 for 
the repatriation of all prisoners of war except 195 prisoners of war whom 
Bangladesh wanted to try for war crimes.^ '^ ^ Pakistan recognised Bangladesh on 
the appeal of an Islamic conclave in February 1974. An agreement was 
concluded between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh on August 9, 1974 whereby 
Bangla Government agreed to hand over these 195 prisoners of war to India, as 
Pakistan issued a statement condemning war crimes.'^^ 
In pursuance of the Shimla Agreement that trade and cooperation in 
economic and in other fields would be resumed as far as possible, the two 
countries signed a Trade Protocol on November 30, 1974"'* at Rawalpindi 
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providing for resumption of trade from December 7, 1974. According to the 
Protocol, the two countries decided that the trade would be in convertible 
currency and to begin with generally on a govemment-to-govemment basis or 
through government controlled trade corporations of the two countries unless 
otherwise agreed. This would prevent speculative exchanges and illegal 
leakages, and would help in establishing trade through mutually beneficial 
channels. ^ 
Regarding the provision of payments in convertible currency, some 
problems arose between the two countries because it was in the interest of India 
to have trade in rupees. The problem was overcome when India gave 
concession to Pakistan. The two countries also decided in the Protocol that the 
trade would be on the basis of the "most favoured nation" principle in 
accordance with the provisions of the GATT. 
The Protocol noted immediate possibilities of commencing trade in 
cotton, engineering goods, jute manufacturers, iron ore, railway equipment, rice 
and tea. The leaders of Pakistani delegation, Eijaz Ahmad Naik, characterised 
the Protocol as a major step towards normalisation of relations in the Indian 
sub-continent in accordance with the Shimla Agreement. 
No doubt, the signing of the Shimla Agreement laid the foundation of 
new contacts and opened possibilities of meaningful trade. But the actual trade 
started only after the signing of the Trade Agreement of January 23, 1975. This 
agreement firstly was valid for one year and later it was extended for another 
1 T O 
period of two year. 
In this agreement it was made mandatory that both the countries have to 
treat the times of imports and export strictly for home consumption. Both the 
countries also decided that such items under no circumstances would be re-
exported toother countries.'^^ 
In one of the most spectacular developments since the Shimla Pact, 
India and Pakistan agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations by exchanging 
ambassadors and decided to restore rail, road and air links after three days talks 
in the middle of May 1976 at Islamabad. Mrs. Gandhi expressed the hope that 
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the Islamabad accord would lead to a "proper climate of understanding" 
between the two countries. On the other hand, Bhutto also assured Mrs. Gandhi 
that Pakistan would implement the accord by the agreed date". 
Inspite of the above talks, regarding different matters, many 
developmental cooperation were discussed between the two countries. It was 
only in the Shimla Agreement both countries for the first time decided to solve 
the dispute on any issue bilaterally. 
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CHAPTER - 4 
KARGIL OPERATION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Usually relationships between any two countries are assumed to remain 
cordial and harmonious. But when we witness relationship between the two 
neighbouring countries i.e., India and Pakistan, it is conflictual. This 
synchronises with the time of partition when both the dominions were granted 
independence by the departing British authority in the sub-continent. The 
traumatic event of partition was caused by deep-seated religious antagonism 
between the two communities i.e., Hindus and Muslims. It may be added that 
when the Muslim League's leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah staked the claim for 
an independent Muslim State, there was a section of Muslim community who 
differed from him and opted to remain in India. After granting independence to 
India and Pakistan, the British Government did not fully sever its links, but 
retained benevolent interest in the affairs of the sub-continent. Pakistan anti-
India foreign policy, which was also a product of its domestic politics 
compulsion since 1947, waged full-fledged conventional wars and assorted 
mini skirmished across the LoC. So it had both overt and covert dimensions. 
The tribal invasion was an example of brutal intrusion just couple of months 
after independence.' 
Above all, India and Pakistan share a history of rivalry and conflict that 
spans over sixty years. Since their emergence as independent States from the 
detritus of the British Indian empire, India and Pakistan have gone to war four 
times: in 1947-48, almost immediately after independence, they fought a long 
and intense battle over the formerly independent State of Jammu and Kashmir; 
in 1965 they fought another war over the same piece of land; in 1971 the two 
engaged during the civil war that severed East Pakistan into the nascent State 
of Bangladesh; and in 1999 they fought once more in the mountains of 
Kashmir. In addition to these actual wars, twice during the past sixty years the 
two countries have endured crises that brought them close to war. If a single 
most dominant characteristic of the relations between India and Pakistan since 
1947 was to be identified then the finger would almost involuntarily point to 
the mistrust and lack of confidence between the two sovereign States, both 
highly sensitive to their separateness and sovereignty as young modem nation 
States burdened by a deeply shared, historically long continuity of civilisational 
and cultural bonds. Although the manifestation of this in the shape of 
animosities is not necessarily shared by the peoples of the two countries, many 
attitudes and perceptions among them have been shaped by this crisis of 
relationship at the State-to-State level. This factor has been central to the 
growth and sustenance of antagonisms. The degree and form of crisis in the 
relationship, and the rhetoric that goes with it, has varied with time, events and 
personalities; but the substance of it has remained. Both countries face serious 
national challenges of socio-economic development which require an 
environment of peace and stability at the very minimum, and preferably, 
detente and friendship at the optimum level. Conventional wisdom, particularly 
of the type propagated in the West, would have us believe that a deep-rooted 
hostility (between Muslims and Hindus, and thus by extrapolation, between the 
two countries) characterises the relationship. However realities do not support 
such a view. 
Many people, in the two countries and outside them, make a 
fundamental mistake in approach when they cast Indo-Pak relations in the 
framework of 'Hindu-Muslim' relations. This is fiirther compounded by trying 
to give this approach-misdirected legitimacy by the concept of a 'historical, 
traditional' Hindu-Muslim hostility represent a paradigm of inevitable 
confrontation and conflict. However, nothing could be farther from the truth. 
For nearly a thousand years Hindu and Muslim (and other religious) societies 
and States have co-existed in harmony in India; and where excesses were 
committed against one community, they were more a result of the medieval 
feudal approach of the ruling elites rather than a societal conflict. In fact the 
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16* century India represented a model of secular and communal harmony when 
Europe was being torn apart by religious and sectarian strife. 
The thesis of the religious basis of crisis in relationship does not hold 
even in the present times because it is negated by many realities: the friendly 
relations between India and the Muslim world, friendly relations between the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal, the parallel 
crisis of relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan-two overwhelmingly 
Muslim majority States, and so on. Above all, the fact that a very significant 
portion of the Muslim population opted to stay back in India, and now 
constitutes over 12 percent of its population making it the third largest Muslim 
population amongst all countries in the world, and represents an important part 
of the nation and State, and on the other hand, Muslim East Pakistan separated 
from Pakistan in less than a quarter century in a violent struggle, all negate the 
communal approach. The reality is that the two new sovereign States were 
established on not only differing sets of core values, but which are essentially 
contradictory to each other. Here, in fact, Pakistan was, and continues to be 
affected by a serious handicap. 
Thus, religion cannot be the all-affective glue, which can cement and 
bind people for long. Culture, geography, economics, social cohesiveness and 
other variables keeps the people together. Many scholars and thinkers have 
opined that the geographical land mass which comparises India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh today has a deep underlying cultural unity. Unfortunately some 
ideologues and proponents of a separate homeland for Muslims were carried 
away so much with their strongly held belief that they were not averse to 
division of the sub-continent. In this category were men like Mohammad 
Iqbal, Mohammad Ali Jinnah etc. The inevitable corollary of this mind-set and 
worldview meant that the leaders of Pakistan always looked to India with 
jaundiced eyes. Keith Callard, a well-known Canadian writer who insightfully 
observes: "It would be quite right to suggest that the feeling of the Pakistani 
towards India is one of simple hatred. Their attitude is rather one of intense 
rivalry to the point of bitter jealously"."^ 
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Today, relations between India and Pakistan exist in a State of violent 
peace: a State in which friction points erupt into periodic battles or brief gory 
conflicts, but there is no war declared or undeclared. These friction points 
manifest themselves in different forms, ranging from low intensity conflict and 
border skirmishes, to a medium intensity conflict in a localised area. India and 
Pakistan are currently passing through a turbulent phase. There are grave 
misgivings over what the harvest might be of the present situation of neither 
peace nor war in which the two countries find themselves. If peace is to be 
preserved and conflict avoided, it will take all the Statesmanship the leaders of 
the two countries can bring to bear on the events and issues that have brought 
them to the edge of the precipice. 
In view of the above discussion, the present chapter is an attempt to 
analyse and understands the dynamics of Indo-Pak relations in the present 
context and to examine the efforts being made by the government of the two 
countries to resolve the issues between them so far. The conflictual relations 
between the two countries resulted the Kargil war in 1999 causing large 
damages of life and property on both sides. Therefore, the chapter contains the 
detailed discussion of Indo-Pak war in Kargil and also analysis the situation 
thereafter. 
4.2 INDO-PAK WAR IN KARGIL 
It has been discussed in chapter-2 that Kashmir has been the main 
source of friction and conflict in Indo-Pak relations and that the social ideology 
of the people on the two fronts and the political strategies of both the 
governments are by and large responsible of the situation so prevailed. The 
Kargil war that occurred between India and Pakistan in the summer of 1999 
was just the result of long prevailing- conflicts between India and Pakistan over 
Kashmir. It has also been stated in chapter-2 that Atal Behari Vajpayee's 
efforts immediately preceding the Kargil war did not prove of much help in 
restoring peace and solving the pending issues between the two nations. Before 
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going into the detail examination of Kargil war in 1999, let us first discuss 
briefly the root cause, which ultimately laid to this war. 
4.2.1 ROOT CAUSE OF THE KARGIL WAR 
The geographical area of Kargil is mountainous and so the terrain is 
hard rugged sparsely populated rugged, and military planners of Pakistan close 
the area to nibble away some chunk of land falling within the Indian side of 
LoC. The Kargil sector extends 168 km along the LoC, stretching from the 
Kaobal Gali in the West to Chorbatla in the East. The LoC itself runs along 
with watershed from Kaobal Gali to Kaksar and then from Shangruti onwards 
to Chorbatla. This total distance of about 80 km is glaciated and was unmanned 
by both sides till the Pakistan intrusion on May 1999. 
It stretches southwards into the Zanskar range towards Padam, 
extending almost 230 km. Along this avenue there is a district infiltration route 
albeit a lengthy one to Kishtwar and Doda close to Umasila.^ Being Shia and 
Buddhist populated area, this avenue is an operational infiltration route has not 
been given much importance hitherto by Indian defence plaimers and military 
bigwigs. This lacuna underscores the importance of Kargil as its capture by an 
adversary would give a wide, encircling capability and a backdoor entry into 
the valley through the Great Himalayan range. 
Along the LoC, there is glaciated and inhospitable terrain, which has 
below freezing point temperature making it very difficult for a Leh person or 
soldier to pass through. This stretch is almost 80 km. Even Austria-made 
Kolflach snow shoes, very costly Gorfex high-altitude gear, Russian made 
stormier tents does not provide foil-proof protection to the jawans from rigors 
and vagaries of nature.^ 
This area was very difficult for any organised force to negotiate and 
control and as threat was not anticipated, it was left unprotected. Still New 
Delhi had kept 121 (1) Infantry Brigade to look after the Kargil sector. After 
1972, the Brigade was placed under 3 division based at Leh in Ledakh. The 
Kargil Brigade, which provided the only line of communication, found itself 
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always on a limb facing upto Pakistan in the crucial area. The downplaying of 
threat perception by New Delhi was mainly due to its China fixation and for 
which the 3''^ division was deployed. It was undergirded by another variable, 
and that was PoK area posing no threat because of its terrain in military 
thinking and calculation because the positioning of 3 divisions was made in 
such a way that with its limited resources it had to square upto twin threats 
coming from two opposite direction at the same time i.e. Communist China and 
Pakistan from its PoK area. At the same time, the activation of Siachen conflict 
in 1984 and subsequent development of roads and tracks over the years within 
PoK had altered the situation gradually. So the ground reality was gradually 
becommg unfriendly for New Delhi. 
The Dalunang intrusion was noticed in October 1987. It took place at a 
time when the Pakistani attempt had been foiled at Bilafond La in the Siachen 
area. Dalunang intrusion was on the Indian side, which had somehow escaped 
attention. As the track and other communication approaches to Dalunang 
village was widely believed to have residual land mines as a fall-out of the 
1971 operations the area was left unpatrolled. The 121 Brigade was thus forced 
to chance its place of deployment to the Dras-Kaksar area.^ 
The Dalunang intrusion of 1987 was a classic case of Pakistani soldiers 
crossing into LoC and India failed to resolve the issue in a firm manner, which 
emboldened Islamabad to what Pakistan, repeat such activity in 1999. 
The Kargil intrusion did not begin in 1999 but it had its origins three 
years earlier. The Government of India taking cognizance of setbacks in the 
area set up a Kargil Review Committee, which observed, "From 1997 onwards 
there was increased activity in this sector, marked by heavy artillery fire. The 
magnitude of these exchanges rose two-fold in 1997 and three-fold in 1998, 
reports indicated training of an increasing number of militants in the Northern 
Area and the likelihood of their infiltration through the Mashkoh Valley".^ 
It is also believed that the Kargil intrusion of 1999 was originally 
conceived during 1987. After Altaf Gauhar, who once upon a time was 
Information Secretary to President Ayub Khan wrote in the daily Nation. 
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" the Kargil intrusion was authorised by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in 
1987. But at the final committee meeting where Gen. Zia was to approve 
it, the then Foreign Minister, Gen. (Retired) Sahibazada Yaqub Khan 
opposed it on the plea that as a former general, he knew that the posts 
that Pakistani soldiers would occupy were totally covered with snow 
almost throughout the year and it would be extremely difficuh to have 
communication with them and meet their day to day needs. He said that 
some soldiers had died there and their bodies remained untraced so far". 
The academic and military question, which always crops up during the 
discussion of Kargil misadventure is why after all Islamabad backed up 
infiltration policy in and around Kargil and for what military and diplomatic 
gains. The following discussion attempts to unravel the true reason of the 
skirmish. 
Pakistan is an Islamic State and increasingly it transformed itself into a 
fiindamentalist country. At the same time, we notice that in Pakistan, there are 
three segments of society viz, civil, military and religious fundamentalist. In 
order to continue ruling, the government in power try to divert attention from 
the snowballing internal crises of Pakistan. Sometime they create tension on the 
border to internationalise the Kashmir issue. This is done to pollute the minds 
of ordinary Pakistani citizens so that the army, political leader and bureaucracy 
can rule Pakistan without any dissent or hindrance. 
It is said that the Kargil intrusion followed the sequential nuclear tests 
conducted by the two South Asian adversaries in May 1998. 
It is also understood that the real reason for Kargil war lies in Pakistan's 
repeated failures to annex Jammu and Kashmir through full-fledged 
conventional wars. During the Kargil war, Pakistan planned a big operation to 
strike the Indian army's centre of gravity in the northern part of Kashmir. It« 
strategic aim was to internationalise the Kashmir issue. Besides this Pakistan 
had also specific objective for Kargil war. They are as follows. 
1. "Choke the strategic road linking Srinagar with Leh and prevent vital 
supplies for the ensuing winter reaching Indians troops in Ladakh. 
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2. Occupy Dras and Kargil and open up the LoC issue. 
3. Capture heights in Battalik and Turtok areas to initially sever the Southern 
Siachen Glacier, and later, choke access to both the northern and southern 
glaciers along the Nubra river, and force India to back down on Siachen. 
4. Control the Mushkoh Valley near Dras and use it as a major route for fresh 
infiltration. 
5. Spread insurgency in Kargil district of Ladakh to ease the heat unleashed on 
military groups in the valley. 
6. To bury the Shimla Agreement by altering the LoC and bring the Kashmir 
issue back on international stage".^^ 
It is said that the intrusion plan was reportedly the brainchild of Pakistan's 
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Prevez Musharraf and Lt. Gen. Mohammad 
Aziz, Chief of the General Staff (CGS). They obtained 'in principle' 
concurrence, probably without any specifics, from Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif After direction to President Bill Clinton's point blank maintaining the 
sanctity of LoC, the Sharif agreed to withdrew its troop. But still Kargil can be 
remembered as a very important landmark in Indo-Pak tension-ridden relations. 
The Kargil war encompassed the area from Turtok in the north to 
Mushkoh Valley. The important sectors pertaining to the terrain are Turtok, 
Chorbat La, Batalik, Kargil, Kaksar, Dras and Mushkoh Valley. Turtok lies on 
the Shy ok river and has a population of about 1,500. Indian troops stationed at 
Turtok have to travel upto Leh from where they are transported across the 
18,380 ft. high Khardung La. Therefore, the route lies along the Shyok Valley. 
Over 1/3 of the route to Turtok is the same as that for Siachen. Any Pakistani 
advance upto Shyok Valley would put pressure on the flanks of Indian soldiers 
traversing the route to Siachen and make the 3,000 m. high. The area of 
Chorbat La is part of the Batalik sector for operational purposes. Batalik sector 
lies to the north of the Indus River. There are many important villages along 
the river form the east to the west. They are Dah, Garkhum, Urdas and Batalik 
on the Indian side. There are three major nullahs (streams) flowing south from 
the LoC broadly dissecting the sector. These three streams join the Indus at 
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Batalik, Garkhum and Dah. Batalik's ridges are less steep from the Pakistani 
side, and this is advantageous for the intruders who attempt of breach the LoC 
and occupy heights at 16,000 to 18,000 ft. without their movement being 
noticed. On Indian side, these positions had to be approached from very steep 
height i.e. upto 12,000 ft.^^ 
Kargil town Hes at the junction of Shingo and Suru rivers. If one goes on 
along the Shingo, one would come to the village of Gangam, Bielargo, 
Olthingthang and Marol. They all come on the Pakistani side of LoC and were 
used as logistics bases. Point 4151 dominates Kargil town. It is 4 km North 
East of Kargil and about 3 km from the LoC on the Indian side. It is the key to 
the town's safety from the barrage of Pakistani guns. This height was captured 
by India in 1965 war, but was returned to Pakistan after the Tashkent 
Agreement. Again it was captured in 1971 by Indian troops. Kaksar is a village, 
which lies to the west of Kargil. It is situated on the Southern bank of the 
Shingo river. Point 5299 dominates Kaksar, which is very close to LoC. 
The Dras sector is dominated by the Tololing heights to the north and 
the Tiger Hills complex to the north-west. In between there is Sando Nullah. 
Tololing is on the Srinagar-Leh highway and one can monitor all the 
clandestine activities from this place. A road running along the Sando Nullah 
goes right up to Morpo La on the LoC. Beyond, on the Pakistan side, is the 
road to Gultari, one of their important bases. Road from Gultari lead to 
Faranshat in (PoK) and on to Shaqma. From the Pak side the Mushkoh Valley 
is reached through the 5,353 m. high altitude Marpola Pass. There is no other 
pass in the vicinity, hence, control of this pass is very vital otherwise it cuts off 
access to the Mushkoh Valley. On the Western side, the Mushkoh Valley 
empties itself through the Kaobal Gali and the Tillel Valley into Gurais, Spurs 
from this vantage-point Tiger Hill dominate the Mushkoh Valley. - . 
Between April and June 1999, India and Pakistan almost plunged into 
another full-scale war along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. The conflict 
can be traced to the Pakistani attempt to infiltrate regular troops from the 
Northern Light Infantry and Kashmiri insurgents across a 150 Kilometre stretch 
of the LoC at the three points in BataUk, Dras and Kargil in the spring of 1999. 
The intrusion proved to be a complete surprise for Indian military and 
intelligence officials, who had failed to anticipate a Pakistani military incursion 
across a most inhospitable terrain.^" 
The central plan of Kargil strategy was to launch a big operation to 
strike at the Indian army's nerve-centre in the northern part of Kashmir. Again 
Pakistan thought of bringing back the Jammu and Kashmir issue as a centre of 
Indo-Pak tumultuous relations. 
After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998, both countries had 
come under significant pressure from the United States and many of the other 
major powers to reduce bilateral tensions in South Asia. The pervasive belief in 
New Delhi and Islamabad that their overt acquisition of nuclear capabilities 
had significantly reduced the likelihood of war was not shared in other 
international capitals. In fact, a number of key American and other officials had 
underscored the increased risk of nuclear war in the region, given its conflict 
prone history.'"* 
It is impossible to adduce incontrovertible evidence that these pressures 
led Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Atal 
Behari Vajpayee, to attempt the improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations that 
were seen in early 1999.'^ However, it is not unreasonable infer that the 
widespread international condemnation of the Indian and Pakistani tests and the 
imposition of a raft of economic sanctions against both countries had induced 
the two leaders to initiate a dialogue on a series of outstanding issues. 
In February 1999, Vajpayee with much fanfare had personally 
inaugurated a bus service between the border cities of Amritsar in India and 
Lahore in Pakistan. At the end of this bus trip, the two Prime Minister signed 
an agreement at Lahore, the capital of the Pakistani State of Punjab, reiterating 
the principles embodied in a number of previous agreements, including the 
Shimla Agreement of 1972. No doubt with a view toward addressing the 
professed concern of the great powers, most notably the United States, about 
the dangers of nuclear war in the region, the agreement also called upon the 
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two sides to take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or 
unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a 
view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and 
conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.'^ 
Indian officials had placed much hope in the Lahore process and 
genuinely believed that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was interested in 
ushering in a new era in Indo-Pakistani relations. They genuinely believed that 
it was in the mutual interest of both countries to work toward a pragmatic 
settlement of many outstanding disputes and felt that the moment was ripe to 
take steps toward those ends. 
4.2.2 INTRUSION FROM PAKISTAN: A SHOCK TO PEACE 
PROCESS 
Though Kargil stand-off had its genesis since the time of Zia-ul-Haq, 
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but it got real momentum after Lahore Declaration (February 22, 1999). 
Despite the positive and cooperative sentiments expressed in the Lahore 
Agreement and in the weeks thereafter, the Pakistani military, with the 
acquiescence of Nawaz Sharif, planned a military operation in Kashmir 
designed to revive the Kashmir issue on the international agenda and possibly 
1 Q 
jump-start the flagging insurgency. Again, the all-too-familiar propensity of 
assuming eternal support without seeking proper confirmation characterised 
Pakistani decision-making.'^ 
A combination of Pakistani false optimism and Indian complacency 
contributed to the Kargil crisis of the summer of 1999. Pakistani decision-
makers made a number of unwarranted assumptions about the likely response 
of the global community, particularly the United States, when they embarked 
on a bold manoeuvre to breach the LoC. They believed that even if they 
initiated a conflict along the LoC, it would be difficult for the great powers to 
accurately pin responsibility on Pakistan and, in any case, the United States 
would be loath to support the Indian position. The latter belief stemmed from 
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the Pakistani assessment of past American behaviour during Indo-Pakistani 
conflicts and tensions. 
Indian obliviousness to the possibility of a Pakistani attempt to breach 
the LoC in the Kargil sector provided the requisite opportunity for Pakistan to 
undertake this enterprise. In fairness, this sector, according to military sources, 
is exceedingly difficuh to adequately patrol because of the harsh and 
inhospitable terrain. Poor weather conditions also limit reconnaissance 
activities, and heavy snows, especially m the winter months, render movement 
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.^" 
The events unfolded are as follows. On May 5, the Indian army's 121^ ^ 
Brigade sent out a routine reconnaissance patrol in the Kaksar area along the 
LoC in Kashmir. The purpose of this patrol was to ascertain if the snows had 
melted sufficiently to enable the Indian forces to reoccupy the mountain 
redoubts that they normally abandoned in the winter months. The patrol was 
never heard from again. It was probably ambushed and all its members killed. 
Shortly thereafter, as a consequence of the disappearance of the patrol, 
and increased reconnaissance, the Commanders of the 121^' Brigade estimated 
that there were approximately 100 hostile intruders in the mountain peaks near 
Kargil. They also concluded that their Brigade had sufficient capabilities to 
dislodge the intruders. By May 15, their assessment of the strength of the 
intruders was dramatically revised upward, to some 800 intruders. The military 
authorities soon found that these groups had also breached the LoC in Mushkoh 
Valley, Kaksar and Batalik.^' Not until the last week of May did the Indian 
army realise that these hostile actors-regular Pakistani forces and Kashmiri 
insurgents-had occupied as many as 70 positions along the LoC. They now also 
came to the belated realisation that well over the initial estimate of 800 men 
were involved in this operation. Worse still, the intruders had occupied a 
number of strategic salient directly above the road from Kargil to Leh and were 
now in a position to cut off the northern portion of Kashmir from the rest of the 
State. Aerial surveillance revealed that the intruders were equipped with 
snowmobiles, artillery and substantial stocks of supplies. 
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The initial Indian reaction was clumsy due to a lack of good information 
about the intruder's strength, disposition, and capabilities. Indian troops 
attempted to push their way upto heights of 16,000 ft and higher. But because 
of the lack of ground cover and the intruder's command of the heights, the 
advancing Indian troops became easy targets for Pakistani snipers and gunners. 
After taking substantial casualties, the Indians realised that they would need 
considerably greater firepower to dislodge the Pakistani intruders. 
These incidents had an important fall out as in an important meeting 
between the Army Chief and the Prime Minister, it was decided that any 
necessary action has to be taken to evict the intruders. The military strategy 
was changed, as it was decided now to bring in the Indian Air Force to help out 
the Army in the common goal. 
Accordingly, the Indian Air Force (lAF) carried out a first round of air 
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strikes against the peaks on May 26. On May 27, the lAF launched a second 
round of air strikes with the objective of dislodging the intruders from Batalik, 
Turtuk and Dras. During the length of 'Operation Vijay' (literally, 'operation 
victory'), as it was called, the lAF flew as many as 550 sorties. In conducting 
these air operations the lAF relied on Mirage-2000, MiG-21, MiG-23, and 
MiG-27 airplanes,^ "* of which it lost two: a MiG-21 and MiG-27.^^ Indian 
authorities insisted that all air attacks were confined to areas that India deemed 
to be on its side of the LoC. Pakistani officials, however, claimed that the lAF 
planes had crossed the LoC and had struck targets within 'Azad Kashmir'.^^ 
On the same day May 27 the lAF also used MI-17 helicopter which was 
lost in the Kargil operation after a very successful attack on Tololing in the 
Dras sector. Intruders using a shoulder-fired surface to air stinger missile hit 
the chopper when it veered close to their hideout. MI-17 helicopters were not 
used in the war zone thereafter. Five air personnel died in this incident. These 
were to be the last losses suffered by the lAF, and has a spokesman said on 
May 28, "We have been operating in a very self-restrained manner and using 
air power in confined and difficult terrain".^^ 
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The military engagement on land still continued with greater intensity. 
On May 26, an eighteen-man patrol from Grenadiers until ran into heavy 
concentration of infiltrators in the area of Tiger Hill. Suddenly, machine guns 
started firing from three sides. In this process of exchange of fire four Indian 
soldiers were killed.^^ On May 29, a company led by Maj. Adhikari attempted 
an assault in the Tololing area. But they were stopped just 15 metres before 
their objective. The intruders rained fire on the attacking troops and pushed the 
company back 30 metres and even a little more backwards. 
The decision to permit the use of air power marked a significant 
departure from past Indian attempts to deal with Pakistani incursions along the 
LoC. Indeed, not since the 1971 war had air power been used in support of 
military operations in Kashmir. The Indian forces resorted to the use of air 
power because they realised that it would be all but impossible to dislodge the 
intruders through the use of ground troops in frontal assaults, since crossing the 
LoC was rejected for political reasons. 
The Government of India seeing that the contours of war is changing, 
decided to use another wing of its force i.e. Navy. Indian Navy employed its 
satellites, reconnaissance planes and other modes of intelligence gathering to 
monitor the movements of the Pakistan Navy. The Indian Navy came to know 
that Pakistani had alerted its Navy. Indian Navy was placed under high alert; it 
moved its Eastern fleet to join the Western Fleet in the Arabian Sea and 
deployed its maritime surveillance capabilities. These naval maneuvers ensured 
that the Indian Navy quickly took a forward position, thus denying Pakistan the 
initiative. Even the Navy had to take its position in order to improvise and use 
its ground based assets such as the Jaguar fighter-bombers. 
Pakistan was surprised by Indian Navy's deterrent deployment, which 
was given code name (Operation Talwar) that bottled up the Pakistani fleet in 
Karachi. This objective was mainly achieved by showing a massive build-up in 
the Arabian Sea. The navy was thus ready to impose a naval blockage of 
Pakistan's coastline in the event of war. 
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Logistical, organisational and topographic limitations significantly 
hobbled Indian military operations. In the initial stages of the conflict troops 
deployed in counter insurgency operations in Kashmir were hastily moved to 
significantly higher altitudes, thereby seriously endangering their health. 
Furthermore, this drawing-down of troops engaged in counter-insurgency 
operations left other parts of the State vulnerable to terrorist actions. Finally, 
the terrain along the LoC greatly favoured the Pakistani forces. Nevertheless, 
by early June, the Indian army had made dogged progress and had managed to 
recapture some 21 positions. In launching their assaults, the Indian army 
brought in its Bofors how-itzers and also relied on lAF sorties to soften up 
targets.^' These gains were made at considerable cost, as the Indian soldiers 
had to assault bunkers and redoubts at considerable heights while facing 
punishing fire fi-om well-entrenched, fortified positions above them. 
Though Operation Vijay was eventually successfiil, it proved to be extra 
ordinarily costly in both human and material terms. While these operations 
proceeded, Indian decision-makers took considerable comfort from the fact that 
few, if any, States were supporting the Pakistani position. Most significantly, 
perhaps, the United States showed little inclination to support a Pakistani effort 
to bring the issue before the United Nations Security Council. Indian 
diplomacy moved into high gear as the Minister for External Affairs, Jashwant 
Singh, while preparing to leave for China, agreed to meet with his Pakistani 
counterpart, Sartaz Aziz, in New Delhi.^ "* Although he showed a willingness to 
entertain diplomatic solutions to the crisis, Prime Minster Vajpayee took a 
tough stance in a public speech, stating that his government would not rest until 
every intruder had been dislodged.^^ 
He also made clear that while India was prepared to hold talks with 
Pakistan, these discussions would be strictly confined to the resolution of th€ 
Kargil crisis. Eventually, New Delhi set a date for Sartaz Aziz's visit (June 
12) but insisted that the talks remain limited to Pakistan's role in precipitating 
the Kargil problem.^'' 
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The talks between Sartaz Aziz and Jashwant Singh proved infmctuous. 
Aziz sought a 'partial de-escalation' in Kargil and made it contingent on an end 
to the Indian artillery barrages and air strikes. More to the point, he insisted that 
Pakistan had no control over the intruders. Singh, however, refused to accept 
any of Aziz's formulations and insisted that the Pakistanis simply withdraw 
their troops."^ 
Only around June 14-16 did the Indian forces manage to retake key 
positions near Dras and Batalik. These two positions were deemed to be of 
considerable importance because they overlook the principal supply route for 
the Indian military to the Siachen Glacier, where India and Pakistan had been 
fighting a costly and stalemated battle since 1984. Around June 20, they 
managed to re-establish control over Batalik itself.'*^ Some several hundred 
Indian troops and officers perished in this battle and at least two lAF aircraft 
and one helicopter were shot down. 
As the hostilities showed few signs of abating, in the last week of June 
Gen. Anthony Zinni, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command 
visited Pakistan and pointedly told Prime Minister Sharif to call off his 
troops." '^ In the aftermath of Zinni's visit, Gordon Lanpher, a U.S. Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, visited New Delhi to apprise his 
Indian counterparts of the substance of Gen. Zinni's message to Islamabad and 
also to counsel restraint by the Indians. According to a well-known Indian 
journalist and commentator, Lanpher informed the Indians that Zinni had told 
the Pakistani's to start a prompt withdrawal of their forces from the Kargil 
region. More to the point, Zinni had reputedly refused to entertain Pakistani's 
efforts to link the Kargil question with the broader Indo-Pakistani dispute over 
Kashmir."*^ 
Despite Zinni's warning, the conflict continued into early July. No doubt 
surprised by the intensity of the Indian attacks and the inability to persuade the 
United States and other powers to back Pakistan, Sharif visited Washington, 
DC, on July 4 in search of a face saving device.'*^ Much to Sharif s surprise, 
President-Bill Clinton was unwilling to accept Pakistan's claim that India was 
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responsible for provoking the crisis. By not accepting the Pakistani version of 
the origins of the Kargil crisis, the United States helped hasten its end.'*'^  Unlike 
in the past, the United States also rejElised to mediate betv^een the two parties.'*^ 
Although Sharif s visit to Washington underscored his realisation of the 
scope of his misadventure, various Kashmiri groups who were participating in 
the Pakistani effort in Kargil showed little inclination to bring their fighting to 
a close. One of the principal leaders involved in the insurgency, Syed 
Salahuddin, the head of the United Jihad Council, proclaimed that Sharif s 
willingness to withdraw his troops was 'tantamount to stabbing the movement 
in the back'.^^ 
The U.S. unwillingness to mediate stood in marked contrast to the 
Clinton administration's propensity to intervene in a variety of regional 
disputes. Two factors explain in large part the American unwillingness to 
invest time and resources in mediating an end to this conflict. At one level, 
even in the post-cold war era. South Asia has remained a fairly low priority for 
most American administrations. At another level, although keen on preventing 
a full-scale conflagration in South Asia, the United States did not have any vital 
interests implicated in the region. Consequently, it remained loath to step into a 
region riven by a long-standing dispute with little or no prospect of easy or 
quick resolution. 
As Sharif sought American intercession to find a face-saving way out of 
the imbroglio, India maintained its military pressure. These efforts started to 
meet with success by the first week of July, when the Indians recaptured yet 
another strategic peak. Tiger Hill.'*' By the second week of July, the Pakistani 
forces were facing relentless artillery barrages and air attacks from the Indian 
military. A more sympathetic American response to Sharif might have 
emboldened him to allow the Pakistani military to persist with their plans. 
However, in the face of escalating losses and a paucity of international 
diplomatic support, Sharif was forced to reconsider the value of continuing 
military operations. By June 9, Pakistan had offered to send a special envoy 
to New Delhi to discuss de-escalation. Veteran diplomat Niaz Naik went to 
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New Delhi to meet the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister (and national 
Security Adviser), Brajesh Mishra, to find ways to withdraw Pakistani forces 
from Kargil."*^ Initially, India expressed little interest in talks but later agreed.^° 
On July 12, following his visit to Washington DC, Sharif gave a 
nationwide television address in which he called for the withdrawal of the 
mujahideen from the mountain redoubts/' It should be noted that Sharif 
carefully avoided making a public Statement about altering any deployments of 
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the Pakistani army. In effect, he was trying to maintain the fiction that the 
mujahideen had scaled these heights and seized the redoubts of their own 
accords. (Only in late July did Pakistani sources start admitting that their 
military forces had been deeply involved in the Kargil conflict). By July 14, 
the first set of infiltrators started to withdraw from their positions, ceding them 
to the advancing Indian forces.^'' It was only toward the end of the month, 
however, that the conflict finally came to a close. 
As mentioned earlier, the Pakistani infiltration had in part been designed 
to jump-start the flagging insurgency in Kashmir. On this score the Pakistanis 
saw a partial success. With the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kargil, the 
insurgency within the State of Kashmir continued unabated. On July 19 
insurgents struck at the village of Lihota, in the Doda District of Jammu, killing 
fifteen civilians. In another attack, five other villagers lost their lives.^^ 
In India, which was in the midst of a national election campaign, the 
Pakistani climb-down was played up as a major military success.^^ It remains 
an open question whether or not the Indian victory in Kashmir shaped the 
electoral outcome. The failure to anticipate and respond suitably to the 
Pakistani incursions, however, did lead to some self-assessment on the part of 
en 
the Indian leadership. 
And even as the government began its self-examination and sought to 
pinpoint the sources of the incursion, Indian defence planners started to draw 
up plans to prevent a fiiture incursion. Among other measures, the Indian army 
planned to set up permanent posts every 200 yards along the LoC. It also 
decided to build all-weather bunkers at high altitudes, to enhance long-range 
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patrols, and to purchase a variety of sophisticated equipment needed for 
mountain warfare, including direction-finding equipment, snow clothing and 
goggles, snowmobiles, and heating equipment.^^ 
The Defence Minister Mr. George Femandes, in his written reply to a 
question in Lok Sabha, Stated that the Indian Forces suffered the following 
casualties during 'Operation Vijay'. This table shows the Indian casualties 
under different headings. 










It is not only that Indian soldiers were killed in Kargil war, but there was 
also Pakistani casualties. There were various estimates of Pakistani Army 
casualties, based on published material in Pakistan and from Indian calculation 
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It is estimated that cost of war for India has skyrocketed upto Rs. 15 
crore per day.^' It cost more than 8,000 crore for India to make Pakistan 
understand that it meant business. Reverse mobilisation of the troops back to 
the barracks cost Rs. 3,000 crore. Nearly the entire border and areas around the 
Line of Control (LoC) were mined. It cost the government Rs. 850 crore in 
giving compensation to civilians for any physical disability during the 
mobilisation period.^^ 
A review of the total cost incurred during the Kargil conflict gives one a 
full picture of costs and expenditure. The government claimed that the 74-day 
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'Operation Vijay' total cost was Rs. 1,894 crore. The total number of shells 
used for firing was 2.5 lakh and the total expense for it was Rs. 1000 crore. The 
defence spending exceeded allocations by Rs. 2,409 crore in 1999-2000. The 
bill for supplies bought from ordinance factories has risen from Rs. 3,876 crore 
in 2000-01 to Rs. 5,972 crore in 2001-02. A leading Indian weekly India Today 
has observed. 
The effect of Kargil on defence spending has been significant capital 
expenditure increased from Rs. 12,631 crore in 1999-2000 to Rs. 43,589 crore 
in 2002. "In the past three years, the government poured in Rs. 1,11,461 crore 
in the defence budget Rs. 79,725 crore as revenue expenditure and Rs. 31,736 
for new technology armaments and replenishment".^'^ The following graph 
shows how India had spent on defence.^ '* 
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Source: India Today, 28 October 2002, p. 22. 
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4.3 POST KARGIL WAR DEVELOPMENT IN INDO-PAK 
RELATIONS 
4.3.1 MILITARY COUP OVERTHREW THE REGIME OF 
NAWAZ SHARIF IN PAKISTAN 
After the Kargil war, the relationship between India and Pakistan settled 
back into a pattern of mutual recrimination. Outside pressure on the two to 
resolve their differences over Kashmir continued; some external powers 
particularly the United States, argued that the Kargil war had demonstrated that 
the nuclearisation of the sub-continent had not in fact reduced the likelihood of 
war. Before relations could be repaired following Kargil, however, a military 
coup overthrew the regime of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan. Pakistan thus, once 
again came under army rule in October 1999. Prime Minster Nawaz Sharif 
sacked the Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, when he was away 
to Sri Lanka, on 12 October 1999.^ ^ The army immediately revolted in support 
of its chief The General returned to Pakistan in the evening, and announced 
dismissal of Nawaz Sharif and his government. Sharif was put under house 
arrest, television stations and airports brought under army control. General 
Musharraf was in control of the situation. He declared himself to be the Chief 
Executive of Pakistan.^^ This fourth coup in Pakistan was the outcome of 
ongoing tussle between armed forces and the Nawaz Sharif Government. This, 
yet another failure of democracy in Pakistan was a matter of serious concern 
for India. Even the United States expressed unease at the coup. The U.S. had, 
reportedly warned the Sharif Government of likely civil-military confrontation 
and of a possible coup. 
In the background of Kargil conflict, India had to prepare itself to face 
any consequences of developments in Pakistan. It was felt by Asia experts in 
Britain that Pakistani army knew that it was inferior to Indian armed forces in 
every respect. Therefore, it was not likely to undertake another misadventure 
against India. But, India's foreign policy-makers had to constantly keep a 
watch on Pakistan's future defence and foreign policy initiatives and changes. 
The only disturbing factor for India would be a nuclear Pakistan without a civil 
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government to ensure that the button was not pressed. Meanwhile, immediately 
after Pakistani coup Indian armed forces were put on full alert. But, Pakistan-
sponsored militancy was intensified. 
The military coup contributed to Pakistan's further isolation in the 
global community, as the United States imposed additional sanctions against 
the military regime. The international community's disapprobation of Pakistan 
accused to India's benefit. When U.S. President Bill Clinton visited the sub-
continent in March 2000, he spent several days in India but made only a 
cursory stop of a few hours at the airfield in Islamabad-a pointed rebuke to the 
military regime. Nevertheless, in the first year after the Pakistani coup, bilateral 
relations slowly deteriorated. Two events held the potential to change the status 
quo: the opening of bilateral talks in Agra in July 2001, and the sudden 
reinvigoration of U.S. interest in sub-continental politics following the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon, and the ensuing war to oust the Taliban in Afghanistan.^^ 
4.3.2 AGRA SUMMIT 
Both Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistan 
President Pervez Musharraf understood that the Kashmir dispute severely 
restricted their national goals, yet neither leader could, even if they wanted to, 
offer substantial concessions to the other side. That was the reality between the 
two countries. Capitalising on the surge in goodwill, the Indian Goveniment 
decided to try to make progress in its own conundrum in Jammu and Kashmir. 
On November 19, 2000, at the start of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the 
government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared a unilateral 
cease-fire in the State. Initially, the cease-fire was to last until the end of 
Ramadan, but it was subsequently extended to cover the succeeding seven 
months. Yet despite this long cease-fire, the levels of violence in Kashmir 
showed few, if any, signs of ebbing. Vajpayee came under increasing pressure 
from all domestic quarters-popular, political, and institutional-to terminate the 
cease-fire. '^^  
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Indeed, the cease-fire was earning the government no dividends. 
Particular insurgent groups, most notably the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen, had simply disregarded its. Despite the restraint of the army and 
the paramilitary forces, the insurgents continued their random attacks on both 
military and civilian targets in the valley. The Vajpayee regime had also seen 
its efforts to engage the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) falter despite 
the appointment of a veteran politician, K.C. Pant, as an interlocutor. 
Politically, too, the cease-fire was exacting a significant toll, as more 
conservative elements within Vajpayee's party and its ancillary organisations 
argued that the insurgents had construed the cease-fire as a form of weakness. 
Finally, pressures against this one-sided cease-fire were building within the 
armed forces. Thus, the cease-fire was called off on May 23, 2001. Prime 
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on 24 May 2001 extended, an invitation to Gen. 
Pervez Musharraf, the Chief Executive of Pakistan (soon to declare himself 
President), to visit India to discuss possible means to improve bilateral 
relations.^' In his letter of invitation Prime Minister wrote: "India has, through 
dialogue, consistently endeavoured to build a relationship of durable peace, 
stability and cooperative friendship with Pakistan. Our common enemy is 
poverty. For the welfare of our people, there is no other recourse but a pursuit 
of the path of reconciliation, of engaging in productive dialogue and by 
building trust and confidence. I invite you to walk this high road with us". 
Prime Minister also reiterated India's desire to pick up the threads of Lahore 
and resume of Composite Dialogue. Musharraf readily accepted Vajpayee's 
invitation, and a Summit was planned for July 14-16 in the northern Indian city 
of Agra, the home of the famed Taj Mahal. 
In this regard Musharraf s Statement made on June 25, 2001 is worth 
mentioning he said, "South Asia must come out of the pit of poverty and learn 
to live in peace and harmony. It is in this spirit that I have accepted the 
invitation of the Indian Prime Minister".'^ 
India's initiative to resume dialogue with Pakistan, at the highest level, 
was consistent with our traditional approach towards Pakistan, based on the 
179 
Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, which commits both countries 
to pursue good neighbourly relations through dialogue and reconciliation. It is 
not surprising that the initiative was widely acclaimed, both nationally and 
internationally, as an act of great Statesmanship on the part of the Indian Prime 
Minister.'"* 
President Musharraf, accompanied by his wife. Begum Musharraf, 
arrived in New Delhi on 14 July. He called on the President, who hosted a State 
banquet in his honour. The Vice President, Home Minister, the Minister of 
External Affairs, and the leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha called on 
him.'^ 
When Musharraf arrived in Agra, popular and elite expectations on both 
sides of the border about the Summit were low. Prior to the Summit, Musharraf 
and his principal foreign policy advisers had made it clear that Kashmir would 
be the 'core issue' that they wanted to discuss at the Summit and demanded 
that the All Party Hurriyat Conference be made a party to the bilateral talks. 
Most of Pakistan's attentive public, however, had made it clear that they would 
not accept the transformation of the Line of Control into an international 
77 
border. On the other hand, Vajpayee and his political allies had insisted that 
they wanted the Summit to focus on Pakistani support for the Kashmiri 
terrorism. Additionally, they wanted to deal with bilateral issues such as to stop 
narcotics trafficking, and give up its claim to the disputes over Sir Creek and 
7S 
the Wular Barrage. Key individuals within Vajpayee's party who advocated a 
tougher stance vis-a-vis Pakistan had publicly ruled out any territorial 
7Q 
compromise on the Kashmir question. Additionally, a senior Indian army 
officer in charge of a critical command had publicly commented that the army 
was opposed to any troop withdrawal from the Siachen Glacier. Indian 
unwillingness to withdraw forces from the Siachen Glacier too upset the plans 
of Pakistan. Finally, and much to Pakistan's Chagrin, New Delhi had made 
known that the APHC would not be a party to the bilateral talks.^' 
Consequently, there was a clear-cut divergence between the two sides on the 
agenda for the Summit. 
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As could be expected, the political atmosphere immediately prior to the 
formal meetings in Agra was decidedly mixed. The Indian side was unhappy 
with Musharraf s decision to invite an APHC delegation to a pre-Summit 
reception hosted by the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi. And 
during a dinner speech at Rashtrapati Bhavan, hosted by the President of India, 
K.R. Narayanan, Musharraf Stated that the Kashmir dispute could not be 
militarily resolved. 
Despite these initial knots, an atmosphere of cordiality and civility 
seemed to prevail in the first formal meeting of the Agra Summit: the official 
Indian statement held that the talks had been 'very frank, cordial, and 
constructive'. However, matters quickly started to go wrong. The first 
evening, for reasons that remain the subject of speculation, acrimony, and 
debate, the Indian Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Sushma Swaraj, 
held a press briefing for Doordarshan (India's State-run television network), 
during which she summarised the issues that had been discussed at the talks. In 
her account she included such matters as India's misgivings about 'cross-
border terrorism', a full accounting of Indian prisoners of war held in Pakistan, 
and the need to initiate discussions on reducing nuclear tensions on the sub-
continent. Missing m her remarks was any mention of the critical Kashmir 
issue. Whether her failure to mention the Kashmir issue was deliberate or 
inadvertent, the Pakistani side promptly took exception to it. Later that evening, 
following her press briefing, the Pakistani delegation issued a statement 
indicating that Vajpayee and Musharraf had spent most of their one-to-one 
meeting discussing Kashmir. ^ ^ Prime Minister focused on terrorism being 
promoted in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and conveyed in clear terms that 
India had the resolve, strength and stamina to counter terrorism and violence 
until it is decisively crushed.^^ 
The second day of the Summit, July 16, started inauspiciously, as 
Musharraf chose to hold a breakfast press conference for Indian newspaper 
editors. To the surprise of this assemblage, the entire proceedings were 
broadcast live by a satellite news network. In this briefing Musharraf took an 
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especially tough line on the Kashmir issue and also made some intemperate 
remarks about ongoing violence in Kashmir.^^ In the light of this statement and 
the remarks of the night before, the afternoon talks quickly unraveled. The two 
sides failed to agree even on the language for a joint communique, despite 
apparently valiant efforts on the part of the negotiators received little 
satisfaction from the Pakistanis on the question of their assistance to the 
Kashmiri insurgents, while the Indians themselves simultaneously refused to 
concede that Jammu and Kashmir constituted a 'dispute'. 
Later that evening, following a visit with Vajpayee, Musharraf called for 
another press conference. His request was, however, turned down on the 
grounds that adequate security precautions could not be taken in the time 
oq 
available. Following this refusal the Pakistani delegation left for Islamabad. 
Pervez Musharraf departed grim faced at midnight on the 16 July 2001. 
He was deprived even of the spiritual succour by not being able to visit the 
shrines of the Chisti saints at Delhi and Ajmer. India's official spokesman 
Niroopama Rao expressed disappointment at joint declaration not being made. 
Two things became clear at the midnight of 16 July. The first that the high 
expectations built up between the 14 July and 16 July afternoon among people 
of both Pakistan and India were abruptly shattered. Second that the 
fundamental differences between India and Pakistan on the core issues of 
cross-border terrorism and Kashmir instead of being resolved at the high level 
Vajpayee-Musharraf interaction were only re-affirmed by the two leaders.^° 
Foreign Ministers Jashwant Singh and Abdus Sattar at their press conferences 
on July 17 asserted that the Summit though not leading to any definite forward 
looking conclusions, was not a failure. It, according to them, marked the 
beginning of a process of re-engagement and dialogue between the two 
countries.^' Public perceptions, however, maintained that the Summit ended in 
a break down. 
In the aftermath of the Summit, the BJP-led government came under 
considerable criticism both from the opposition in parliament and from within 
its own ranks.^^ Some hard-line members of the BJP aimed their ire at Foreign 
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Minister Jashwant Singh, in particular, while exonerating Vajpayee. Jashwant 
Singh, defending the government's decision to hold talks with Pakistan, 
contending that, contrary to the opposition's claims, the Indian side had made 
adequate preparations in fact had had an eight-point agenda.^ "* 
The mood in Pakistan was much more upbeat. Musharraf largely and 
successfully blamed the failure of the Summit on the putative choices of Indian 
hard-liners. Some commentators attributed the perceived intransigence of 
certain members of Vajpayee's Cabinet to the upcoming State-level elections in 
Uttar Pradesh. Also, not surprisingly, Pakistani analysts arrived at a markedly 
different assessment of Musharraf s remarks and performance at the breakfast 
conference in Agra. Unlike the largely acerbic Indian assessment, in Pakistan 
his remarks and his maimer were interpreted in a mostly positive light.^ ^ 
After all, what could be expected of Musharraf who openly though 
sarcastically had said while at Agra that he had better purchase his ancestral 
property and live safely in his native land than return to Pakistan setting all 
disputes with India? Once the disputes with India were settled, he knew, he 
would leave to face more serious domestic problems of Pakistan which the 
General would not be able to solve. Therefore, he too like his predecessors felt 
it convenient to continue playing the Kashmir card.^^ But to Musharraf his 
India visit proved a personal success. His aggressive postures in his meetings 
with Indian editors sent his popularity graph soaring in Pakistan where the 
major parties like Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan Muslim League were 
opposed to his military dictatorship.^^ And the Pakistani delegation left for 
Islamabad blaming the hardliners in the Bhartiya Janta Party for the failure of 
the Summit. 
Against the backdrop of markedly divergent assessments of the Summit, 
the two sides agreed to hold ministerial-level and foreign secretary-level talks. 
The failure of the Agra Summit, however, had significantly undermined any 
constituency in India in support of talks with Pakistan. Soon after the Agra 
Summit, Pakistan extended formal invitations to Prime Minister and External 
Affairs Minister to visit Pakistan. However, a series of terrorist attacks in 
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Jammu and Kashmir including the massacre of Hindu pilgrims on 3 August and 
the attack on the Jammu Railway Station on 7 August, served to underscore the 
fact that though Pakistan professed a desire for dialogue in public, it was 
continuing to sponsor cross-border terrorism in India. It was thus obvious that 
Pakistan was unwilling to give up its strategy of confrontation, violence and 
deception, while dialing with India. 
4.3.3 ATTACK ON WORLD TRADE CENTRE (WTC) AND 
REACTIONS BY INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
Some desultory discussions in India proposed that Vajpayee meet with 
Musharraf at the United Nations General Assembly session in September 2001 
to try to rejuvenate the peace process. The event of 11 September 2001, 
however, not only forced the postponement of the General Assembly but also 
transformed the terms of discussion between the two sides. On 11 September 
2001, the United States became the victim of a set of well-planned and highly 
coordinated terrorist attacks. The perpetrators of the terror, who had hijacked 
four commercial airliners, managed to strike three out of four intended targets-
the two towers of the World Trade Centre in New York city and the Pentagon 
just outside Washington, DC-Killing several thousand people, wreaking untold 
physical and economic damage on the United States and the world economic, 
and fundamentally transformed the international order. The attacks, without a 
doubt, had significant and far-reaching consequences for American national 
security and foreign policies, including those directed at South Asia. They were 
also likely to transform the dynamics of regional security in South Asia, 
although their full consequences in that area might not emerge for years. The 
immediate consequences of the attacks, however, particularly for Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, were clear and profound. The attacks also subdued the nascent 
efforts of the new administration of President George W. Bush to improve 
relations with India.^^ 
Prior to September 11, Pakistan had been consigned to the status of a 
virtual pariah State in the international system and especially in the U.S. 
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foreign policy calculus. Pakistan's decision to test nuclear weapons in the 
aftermath of the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998, its disastrous violation of the 
Line of Control in Kargil in April 1999, and General Musharraf s military coup 
had reaped only international disapprobation and brought on an increasing 
isolation from the world/°° That downhill spiral, combined with India's 
seemingly rising star, seemed to signal the start of a bleak period in Pakistani 
foreign relations. 
But the exigencies of the prosecution of the anti-Taliban war in 
Afghanistan and the urgency of the hunt for terrorist mastermind Osama bin 
Laden instantly turned this trend around, as Pakistan became a 'valued ally' in 
the U.S. fight against terrorism. Two factors contributed to Pakistan's renewed 
significance in U.S. eyes. American authorities asserted that bin Laden and his 
Al-Qaeda orgnisation were closely involved in the September 11 terrorist 
attacks. Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda commanders had taken refuge in 
Afghanistan in 1996 after having been ousted form their previous base in 
Sudan.^ '^ Pakistan's shared border with Afghanistan and its extensive links 
with the Taliban regime made it necessary for the United States to renew and 
strengthen its diplomatic and military relationship with Islamabad. Any air 
sorties flown over Afghanistan fi-om aircrafts carriers or from the U.S. airbase 
at Diego Gracia in the Indian Ocean would have to overfly Pakistani territory 
and therefore required Pakistani support. 
Unlike during most of the cold war and after, when most Indian 
reactions to U.S. diplomatic difficulties and security threats had been equivocal 
at best, the attacks on the World Trade Centre produced in India a chorus of 
support for the United States. Indian officials, while lamenting the American 
failure to adopt a more forthright stance on Indian's problems with terror, 
nevertheless, offered to cooperate with the United States to address the new 
threats. Some Indian commentators called for strong and unequivocal 
support for the U.S. position.^ '^^  But Indian support was not crucial for the 
conduct of the war, whereas Pakistan's was. Furthermore, despite India's 
expressions of solidarity with the United States and the U.S. war effort, 
1 e'; 
Washington could not forthrightly link the September 11 attacks to India's 
concerns about terror in Kashmir emanating from Pakistan for fear of 
alienating a State that it urgently needed to prosecute the war effort.'°^ Thus, m 
the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, no surge in Indo-U.S. 
relations was evident. 
Pakistani support for the American war effort, however, was at best 
equivocal-General Musharraf s personal pledge notwithstanding. Many groups 
and individuals within Pakistan did not support Musharraf s decision to cast his 
country's lot with the United States. The specific groups opposed to Pakistan's 
support for the prosecution of a war against Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden were 
entirely predictable: among them were the Islamic political wing parties Jamat-
i-Islami and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam.^°^ Additionally, key members of the ISI 
actively worked to undermine the attempts at cooperation with the United 
States. Even some scientists connected with Pakistan's nuclear weapons 
programme appeared to harbour pro-Taliban sympathies. 
Musharraf s decision to aid the United States, public Statements aside, 
stemmed less from his sympathy for the American cause and more from the 
exigencies confronting his beleaguered regime. Pakistan's foreign debt at the 
time the crisis ensued stood at $ 38 billon, and the country's ability to meet 
upcoming payments was in considerable doubt.'°^ Furthermore, despite his 
having dormed civilian garb after declaring himself President in July 2001, 
Musharraf had not succeeded in bolstering his regime's domestic or 
international legitimacy. No act of moral courage or altruism, casting his lot 
with the United States and the rest of the civilised world made virtue out of dire 
necessity. Musharraf also correctly calculated that if Pakistan did not cooperate 
with United States, at the very least the Vajpayee administration in New Delhi, 
which had been steadily improving its ties with the United States, would seek 
to marginalise Pakistan; at worst, Pakistan itself could be targeted because of 
its support for the Taliban. There was also every possibility of Pakistan 
becoming vilified for its supporting and sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir, 
which had so far received America's silent approval.'^° Having found itself 
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trapped between the devil and deep sea, Pakistan masqueraded as the strong 
U.S. ally in fighting the terrorists and at the same time lending secret help to 
Osama Bin Laden's network in his Jehad against America. It may be surprising 
to know that America's most important ally in the sub-continent was 
sabotaging its war efforts. Evidence was not in wanting to prove that Pakistan 
was passing on crucial intelligence to its Taliban allies in Afghanistan. More 
than 7000 Pakistani 'tribesmen' equipped with automatic weapons, rocket 
launchers, and shoulder fured missiles had made their way to Afghanistan to 
fight alongside the Taliban. This was an exact repetition of what Pakistan did in 
Kargil in 1999 in its attempt to wrest Kashmir by force. This led to the ground 
troops from the U.S. and the Northern Alliance to face thousands of heavily 
armed 'tribesmen', trained and equipped by Pakistan, carrying mostly U.S. 
made weapons.^^^ 
During the Afghan war U.S., like its Afghan war ally, has followed its 
usual double-dealing in its relations with India though the Bush administration 
tried its best to assuage India's suspicions about its renewal of the military and 
economic tie-up with Pakistan. While the U.S. Secretary of State Gen. Collin 
Powell highlighted Kashmir as central to the relations between India and 
Pakistan, later Donald Rumsfeld assured India that U.S. policy towards 
Pakistan would not be allowed to overlook the best interests of India. "^ 
However the U.S. attitude towards India remained unchanged. Even after 
Taliban was weakened considerably and the U.S. war efforts ended, India's 
problems remained as they were, especially with regard to the Kashmir 
question. 
In fairness, Musharraf s decision to aid the global effort against the 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda was not free of risk. As noted already, he faced 
considerable domestic opposition to his decision. As a consequence, even after 
agreeing to support the prosecution of the war effort in Afghanistan, he 
repeatedly expressed reservations about a protracted war in Afghanistan, for he 
was acutely cognizant of the tenuousness of his own position within the 
Pakistani polity."^ 
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4.3.4 PRESENT PHASE OF INDO-PAK RELATIONS: 
A CRUCIAL APPRAISAL 
In fact, growing terrorism in Kashmir and other areas constituted the 
post-Agra message from Pakistan whose acts of hate and violence continued. 
The Indo-Pak equation has changed to such an extent in recent years that, apart 
from asking the familiar question whether Pakistan can still threaten India 
seriously, one also asks whether the chances of normal relations between the 
estranged neighbours have improved, and if they have, whether in due course 
can one expect long-term peace. This question has assumed added significance 
in view of Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee's latest offer of 
friendship to Pakistan and reciprocal gesture on the part of Pakistani leaders. 
India has announced resumption of air links with Pakistan and reposting of its 
High Commissioner in Islamabad, which was withdrawn in the wake of 
Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001. 
Though this underlines political message of hope, yet if both the neighbours do 
not seize the qualitative opportunity and take more salutary steps than before to 
de-escalate the abnormal tensions in their relations, the war cloud could gather 
once again. 
As we approach the crossroad in India-Pakistan relations, the reasons 
behind India's largest-ever military mobilisation need to be recalled. To put it 
briefly, the Indian Government's decision that the December 13 attack was the 
last straw on the camel's back was not surprising. For more than a decade New 
Delhi had just chosen to absorb the pain from Islamabad's strategy of bleeding 
it through a thousand cuts. Convinced that India would not be able to retaliate it 
for supporting cross-border terrorism, Pakistan believed that it had a free hand 
in fermenting violence across the border in Jammu and Kashmir and take it to 
high value targets in rest of the nation as well.' '^  -
More significantly, attack on Parliament came after Pakistan's repeated 
betrayal of several peace initiatives by the Vajpayee administration. As against 
a widely held expectation about pursuit of an unduly tough line in dealing with 
Pakistan by the BJP-led government, it actually exhibited on the contrary a 
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remarkable willingness to travel away from the 'beaten path' to explore the 
possibility of bringing a measure of peace and civility in relations with Pakistan 
and within Jammu and Kashmir. This is evident from the fact that despite 
Pakistan's rebuffing of Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee's Lahore peace 
initiative through Kargil perfidy in 1999, he took yet another bold peace 
initiative by implementing a unilateral cease-fire in Kashmir in the Islamic holy 
month of Ramzan in November 2000."^ Besides, he invited the Pakistan 
President, General Pervez Musharraf, for talks in the historical town of Agra in 
July 2001.*''' Unfortunately, Islamabad responded to these peace initiatives by 
engineering attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly on 1 October, 
on the Indian Parliament House on December 13, 2001. 
As India could not forever continue to absorb the pains of this support to 
the so called 'fi-eedom struggle', which is nothing but an euphemism for 
Pakistan's encouragement and abetment to terrorist violence in Kashmir, the 
attack on the Parliament house obliged India into confronting the source of the 
threat once and for all. Accordingly, New Delhi mobilised its troops on the 
India-Pakistan borders to demonstrate its resolve to fight the war against 
terrorism at all cost. Being a mature and responsible nation having 
understanding of the implications of a war between two nuclear armed 
neighbours and its international ramifications. New Delhi, however, and rightly 
decided to give diplomacy one more chance even while preparing for exercise 
of the last option, i.e., war.^ ^^ That is why, even while readying its defence 
forces for military action after the attack on Parliament, New Delhi did give 
priority to diplomatic offensive including recalling of its High Commissioner 
from Islamabad, slicing down the presence of Pakistani staff in its High 
Commission in New Delhi, terminating the New Delhi-Lahore bus service as 
well the Samjhauta Express, withdrawing permission to Pakistan to fly its 
aircraft through the Indian sky, and demanding the extradition of 20 persons 
accused of committing various terrorist acts in India. New Delhi also demanded 
from Pakistan an effective action against Pakistan based terrorist group such as 
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). 
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As the Vajpayee Government did not expect any voluntary action on the 
part of Pakistan, it banked on the moral indignation of the international 
community, apart from mobilising its military forces. It made intensive 
consultation v i^th leaders of important countries such as the U.S., Britain, 
Russia, Japan and China etc.^'^ This three-pronged Indian strategy-military 
build up, mobilising international pressure, and mounting bilateral pressure on 
Pakistan produced certain results. These moves not only obliged the Pakistan 
President Pervez Musharraf, to condemn religious extremism in his open 
address to his country on 12 January 2002, but also to ban certain terrorist 
outfits including LeT and JeM. Besides, he arrested hundreds of terrorists and 
detained their kingpin Maulana Masood Azhar, though as a balancing exercise 
he refused to handover any Pakistani national demanded by India and declared 
the Kashmir issue as forming the blood stream of every Pakistani. 
But it soon became apparent that the Pakistani President was either 
unwilling or incapable or both to control the extremist forces radiating out of 
Pakistani soil against India. The Musharraf regime's decision to soon free the 
detained extremists on the ground that no charges could be sustained against 
them was indicative of this reality. This emboldened the terrorist groups to first 
attack the Raghunath temple in Jammu and then to commit the gruesome 
massacre of Indians including 22 army personnel at Kaluchak in Jammu on 
May 14; and to kill a moderate and peace-inclined Kashmiri leader, Abdul 
Gani Lone in the same month of 2002. Islamabad on its part conducted a series 
of missile tests and reportedly shifted some of its forces deployed along 
Pakistan-Afghanistan borders to the eastern side bordering India to deter the 
Indian forces and warn the international community about implications of any 
Indian move to attack the terrorist camps operating within Pakistan. The 
Pakistani forces also resorted to heavy shelling across the Indian side, of LpC 
forcing India forces to return the firing. ^ *^ 
Besides, President Musharraf chose to address his country on May 27 in 
which he simply declined Pakistan's involvement in cross border terrorism in 
India and appealed the global community to "ask India to move towards 
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normalisation of relations" with his country.'^^ This was quite contrary to his 
earlier address of January 12 assuring the world community to dismantle the 
terrorist networks active within Pakistan. ^ ^^  Not surprisingly India described 
this statement as "mere verbal denial" about Pakistan's "lethal export of 
terrorism". The then Indian Foreign Minister, Jashwant Singh, described this 
statement as "both highly disappointing and dangerous". ^ "^^  The various 
spokesmen of the Indian Government, too, clearly declared, "India can not be 
penalised forever for its patience".^^^ India's expulsion of Pakistan's High 
Commissioner in New Delhi, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, reflected India's cascading 
anger and a strong sense of frustration over Pakistan's belligerent behaviour. 
After the Kaluchak massacre, India and Pakistan were thus on the verge 
of fighting the fifth war with much more devastating potentials than the earlier 
ones. As indicated at the outset, while the Anglo-American pressures-
beginning with South Asia trip of the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, 
followed by visits to this region by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Rechard 
Armitage, and the U.S. Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, could defuse the 
escalating crisis and General Musharraf once again promised this time to the 
visiting U.S. Defence Secretary that he would permanently dismantle the 
infrastructure of terrorist network in Pakistan, but Islamabad had not 
implemented its commitment.'^'' 
This is evident from continued terrorist violence in India including the 
attack on Akshardham temple in Gujrat in August 2002, killings and 
intimidation to disrupt the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly election in 
September 2002, the massacre of Kashmiri Pundits at Nadimarg village in the 
troubled State in March 2003, and attack on Jammu and Kashmir Radio Station 
in April 2003. This showed that the fragile peace now obtaining in South Asia 
could get disturbed and Prime Minister Vajpayee's third bold attempt to make 
peace with Pakistan after failure of his Lahore and Agra mission might fail 
again due to the Musharraf regime's incapacity to control the influx of 
terrorists into the Indian side of LoC and their subsequent acts of violence. In 
the nine years that Pakistan had succeeded in artificially prolonging the 
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violence in Kashmir, more that 9,000 Kashmiri civiUans lost their lives at the 
hands of their self-proclaimed liberators. Despite or perhaps because of this, as 
the MORI poll in April-May 2002 revealed, even fewer Kashmiris (6 percent) 
were prepared to contemplate their future as Pakistanis. The reign of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party too ended without having found a final solution to the 
Pakistan malady and its by product, the terrorist violence in Kashmir. 
But Pakistan continued to masquerade as peacemaker on the one side 
while on the other went on sponsoring terrorist activities in Kashmir. One may 
recollect that the very day Gen. Musharraf expressed his desire to have lasting 
peace with India there were terrorist attacks on Indian establishment in 
Kashmir. To the press query about his meeting with India's External Affairs 
Minister, Mr. Natwar Singh, Musharraf expressed his longing to see India-
Pakistan peace process move on a smooth channel. Both, he said, "need to 
move on CBMs and the dialogue process in tandem with each other". But the 
very same day the press reported on the sluggish progress of the Indo-Pakistan 
talks on the Siachen. The first discussion since 1999 on this area of conflict 
"remained deadlocked over the 'authentication' of maps showing the existing 
positions of Indian soldiers on the heights of the Saltoro range and Pakistani 
soldiers at its base". While the Indian side took the stand that an agreement 
on Siachen would take place only if both sides agreed to authenticate maps, 
which marked out the Indian positions on the Actual Ground Position Line 
(AGPL) Pakistan wanted to resolve it on the basis of the Shimla Agreement of 
1972, implying that India had 'violated' the Shimla accord by occupying the 
Saltoro in 1984.'"' Simultaneous was the terrorist strike on the Central Reserve 
Police Force (CRPF) camp in the Rajbagh area of Srinagar killing nine 
personnel.'-^^ Thus, from the very beginning the talk on Siachen appeared 
unlikely to bear any fruit. The Foreign Ministers level talks on Kashmir was 
again bound to collapse with Pakistan Foreign Minister, Khurshid Mahmud 
Kasuri making controversial statement on Kashmir which according to India's 
External Affairs Ministry was "not in consonance with the spirit" with which it 
has conducted the dialogue so far.'^ ^ There was again attempt from the 
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Pakistani side to complicate the Kashmir issue further. Pervez Musharraf s 
urge for British mediation in the Kashmir question was not in line with the 
Shimla Agreement. He said, "I would love Britain to play a role as an 
intermediary in resolving the Kashmk dispute" and that the "British help 
behind the scenes will keep up the pressure".^ ^"^ Besides, the increasing 
America-Pakistan arms deal was bound to derail all attempts at solving the 
Kashmir dispute since it made Pakistan arrogant. ^ ^^  India, raising concerns over 
the proposed U.S. arms supply to Pakistan told the United States in December 
2004 that the nature of the arms sought to be supplied had little relevance to the 
war against terrorism.*^^ Attacking the move for U.S. arms supply to Pakistan, 
Indian defence officials said, "the Indo-Pak peace process has started gaining 
momentum and the cease-fire has been holding smce November last year and 
induction of sophisticated weapons at this stage will start an arms race and 
disturb the dialogue".'^' 
Again there started the Bus-Diplomacy, which the Indian authorities 
thought would lead to better bilateral relations. By December 2004 Islamabad 
had agreed to start a bus service between Amritsar and Lahore. According to 
Pakistani Punjab's Chief Minister, Parvez Elahi Pakistan Government agreed in 
principle for this bus service and he said, "it was your (India's) turn to 
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complete the rest of formalities". There were moves to have Memorandum 
of Understandings (MoUs) signed between the agricultural universities of 
Faislabad and Ludhiana to undertake research in agriculture, horticulture and 
agro-processing.'^^ Punjab Chief Minister Amrinder Singh mooted several 
schemes including the waiving of entertainment tax on Punjabi films made in 
Punjab especially in view of Elahi's statement, "we have an age old common 
cultural heritage and civilisation and, therefore, it is our foremost duty to 
respect the sentiments of the Sikh community".''*'' 
The year 2005, a landmark in Indo-Pakistan relations, proved eventful 
with the starting of Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and the India's visit of 
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, which happened almost simultaneously. 
The launch of the bus service from 7 April 2005, as agreed between India and 
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Pakistan during the visit of India's External Affairs Minister to Pakistan in 
February 2005, was acclaimed by Pakistan as a "significant development and a 
confidence building measure". "The decision to launch the bus service is a very 
good gesture which will revive links among the Kashmiris on both sides of the 
LoC", Pakistan's Foreign Ministry said in a press briefing.'"^' Both the nations 
as well as Kashmiris on either side of the Line of Control were jubilant over the 
bus service as they saw in it an unprecedented opportunity to solidify the 
bilateral relations and the people-to-people contact between Indians and 
Pakistanis. The Kashmiris celebrated the occasion ignoring all the terrorist 
threats since it would help them meet their long lost kith and kin from both 
sides of the LoC. Hopes ran high when the bus moved from Srinagar carrying 
the passengers despite the previous day's terrorist attack on the hotel they were 
lodged in. It was a moment of emotional bursting for the passengers, mostly of 
the pre-partition days. India's Prime Minster Dr. Manmohan Singh used the 
occasion to thank ail those who made the new move a success. This, he said, 
"would not have been possible but for the cooperation of the Government of 
Pakistan and especially President Pervez Musharraf. Mr. Singh hoped that this 
would lead to the settlement of many unsolved issues between the two notions, 
and he expressed his readiness to "hold the hand of Pakistan so that we could 
usher in peace and development for our people, especially in the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir".'"*^ He also took advantage of the occasion to announce 
several schemes for the all-round development of Kashmir including plans for 
employment generation, electrification of villages and incentives for industries. 
He declared the starting of the Urban Employment Scheme with Rs. 12 crore 
being set apart for it. Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister, Mufti Mohammad 
Sayeed described it as "the road to peace in Jammu and Kashmir" which could 
not be cowed down by the militants' threat.''^ '^  Things appeared to have 
improved though the terrorists still had their hideouts in the Valley. 
Commenting on the general situation in Kashmir born out of the newly started 
diplomacy and strict military vigilance India's Chief of Army Staff, General 
J.J. Singh said, "there is smile on the face of the common man, they are 
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speaking out and there are visible sings of prosperity" and expressed the hope, 
"the region will soon become the centre of South-East-Asia". '^^ '^  
But, despite all the media hype of the bus launch as a "historic moment" 
and a great step among the latest Confidence Building Measures, some crucial 
issues remained unsolved. Because, this bus service did not evoke any warmth 
from Pakistan as it did in India. Indeed it was India alone that became over-
jubilant over it. Comparing to the over-enthusiasm shown at the function 
arranged to celebrate the bus service, which was marked by the presence of 
India's Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh and the Chairperson of India's 
ruling United Progressive Alliance, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and the carnival-like 
atmosphere it created in Srinagar, the arrival and departure of the bus was not a 
high profile affair in Muzaffarabad. Neither the Pakistan President, nor Prime 
Minister, nor even its Foreign Minister was present to flag off the bus. India 
achieved nothing diplomatically, politically, culturally or economically from 
this venture.'"^^ Thinking it right, one can only say that it was one more addition 
to the bunch of follies India has been committing over the years in respect of 
Indo-Pakistan relations. Indeed in an adolescent joy, everyone seemed to have 
forgotten that as far as India was concerned Muzaffarabad formed a part of 
India under Pakistani occupation. Having made too much of the bus service, 
India was only strengthening the claim of Pakistan over 'Pakistan Occupied 
Kashmir'. By describing the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service as India-
Pakistan bus service India was inadvertently affirming that Muzaffarbad as 
well as the entire PoK is Pakistani territory. One may hereafter naturally doubt 
India's propriety in calling this area as 'Pakistan Occupied' any more. It would 
only strengthen the aggressor's claim to a piece of territory it had unlawfully 
grabbed from India and continues to occupy. Besides, by allowing the 
passengers to come only on the strength of scant travel documents, India has 
made it easy for terrorists to cross over. There was no way of checking whether 
the passengers are bonafide citizens of PoK. Especially in a State where the 
control of the Government of India has often been in a paralyzed State, where 
almost all its administrators with their scant pro-Indian credence could only 
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remain mute spectators to the terrorists ruling the roost, all the rigours on the 
terrorists' spree in crossing the LoC could only go loosened. These were facts, 
which the usual run of Indian political leadership found it difficult to digest. 
Closely following the launch of the bus service was the visit of General 
Pervez Musharraf on 16 April 2005. In his first visit after the failure of the 
Agra Summit of 2001 India once again rose from her somber mood to welcome 
the General. "For India" as an expert on Indo-Pakistan relations commented, 
"the external environment has never been so good for pursuing a vigorous 
peace process with Pakistan".^ '*^ True, Pakistan's policy of patronising 
terrorism against India and its people had not been given up. However, it 
appeared that the over-all situations had much changed owing to many 
developments. Islamabad's attempt to masquerade as the global level fighter on 
terrorism in the company of the U.S. government and simultaneously 
sponsoring terrorist activities in Kashmir had been successfully exposed by 
India soon after the attack on Parliament in December 2001. Besides, India's 
status had steadily risen, especially in her relations with China and the US. The 
fact that China, which was an ally of Pakistan, changed her stand disheartened 
Pakistan very much. Her call to forge a CPC-BJP relation along with the 
govemment-to-govemment contact proved path breaking. By 2004 the B JP had 
gone from power, but as such the Indo-Chinese goodwill started during the rule 
of Vajpayee's National Democratic Alliance did not die out.^ "*^  It may be noted 
that just days before Musharraf s arrival in India there was signed the Indo-
Chinese accord on some guiding principles to resolve the boundary dispute 
with China. This achieved considerable gains in bilateral trade and the 
promotion of strategic partnership with Beijing. The Washington visit of 
India's External Affairs Minister in the third week of April 2005 with 
blueprints to create a new strategic partnership with the United States was 
certainly a new development. This visit, which Mr. Natwar Singh termed as 
constructive and positive received a warm welcome in Washington. It was 
indeed a great acceptance India got when the U.S. Secretary of States 
Ms. Condoleezza Rice acknowledged that, "... international organisations in 
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general will have to take into account India's growing role in the world in order 
to be updated and to be effective".'"^^ India was soaring high in U.S. opinion. 
"The message from Beijing and Washington" was thus "unlikely to be lost on 
General Pervez Musharraf .'"^ ^ Naturally India, as its Foreign Secretary 
Mr. Syam Saran said, looked forward to the friendly visit of the Pakistan 
President, which it hoped would be "constructive" with "forward-looking 
results". ^ °^ 
In a moment of high emotion Musharraf touched down at the Sanganer 
airport of Jaipur, Rajisthan's capital city on his way to pay homage at the 
Mausoleum of the Sufi saint Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti. Describing his India 
visit as 'historic', he expressed his confidence that there were chances of 
optimism in boosting up the neighbourly relations, as there was a change in the 
environment, which had become more congenial and friendly than that-which 
had prevailed in Agra during his last visit. He said "We have come here with a 
massage of peace and unity ... we have prayed that in times to come, all 
differences between India and Pakistan are resolved and peace returned". 
The visiting delegation that accompanied the General who was in India to 
watch the final one-day cricket match between India and Pakistan at 
Ferozeshah Kotla on April 17 included Pakistan's first lady, Begum Sheba 
Musharraf, the Information Minister, Sheik Rashid Ahmad, Foreign Minister, 
Khurshid Mehmud Kasuri, the Minister of State for Religious Affairs, Amir 
Liaqat Hussain, Minister of State for Education, Gulam Bibi Bharvana, 
Advisor to Prime Minister on Women's Welfare, Nilofer Bhaktiar, the Foreign 
and Information Secretaries and other dignitaries.^^^ 
The talks between General Musharraf and India's Prime Minister 
Dr. Manmohan Singh were marked with all cordiality and friendship, which 
according to reports, sent a clear message across the world that the two nations 
born of the common tradition are out to cut the long drawn ice. Both the leaders 
agreed that their army had required acting in close cooperation so that 
differences over implementing Confidence Building Measures might well be 
addressed, especially in regard to Siachen issue and maritime boundary in Sir 
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Creek. Dr. Manmohan Singh and General Musharraf had a 40-minute one-to-
one dialogue after a two-hour-long delegation level meet during which they 
came up with a broad vision to cooperate more effectively to promote cross 
border exchanges along the Line of Control as well. At the meeting held in 
Hyderabad House, Singh zeroed in on the responsibility of both the countries to 
project themselves as role models for the entire region in opening up trade 
routes and adding transport links that would expedite economic cooperation.'^^ 
The discussions led to emergence of ideas regarding a range of possible 
steps desirable to improve bilateral amity. These included Kashmir centred 
CBMs leading to a more porous LoC like the suggestion of seven meeting 
points for the relatives, cross-LoC trade, increasing transport linkages and 
establishing more communication links, reviving the joint commission on trade 
and business and setting up a joint business council to improve contacts 
between private sectors on both sides, giving top priority to Iran-Pakistan-India 
gas pipeline proposal along with looking at other energy resources in the 
region, and developing appropriate transit facilities to improve trade relations 
with Central Asian and West Asian regions.'^ "^ Dr. Singh however reminded the 
Pakistan President that all steps could be expedited if only Pakistan would stick 
to and honour its commitment to curb terrorism and that it was the duty of both 
the countries to ensure that no terrorist elements thwart positive movements 
and ambience. 
Friendship seemed at its emotional heights with the Pakistan President 
having met his Indian counterpart Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam who waxed on the 
need of maintaining fraternal relation between the two countries. Dr. Kalam, 
India's top philosopher scientist thus put it in his usually imaginative diction: 
"It is essential for India and Pakistan to place all their acts CBMs in one 
incubator or basket and then watch the eggs nurture in this basket of goodwill 
and also see that no one kicks it over". He further adds, "We should harness or 
direct all our energy to nurture this goodwill and no third party should be 
allowed to enter and damage it".'^^ 
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General Pervez Musharraf found this a good occasion to share 
pleasantries with L.K. Advani, Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha. He 
presented the BJP leader with an album containing photographs from Advani's 
school days till his last visit to Pakistan. Along with this, which Advani termed 
a "precious gift" Musharraf extended his nation's invitation to India's rightist 
Hindu wing leader to visit Pakistan. Advani accepted it and hinted at his 
probable visit likely to take place in June 2005 itself. Later, expressing 
satisfaction at the outcome of the talks between General Musharraf and 
Dr. Singh, Advani hoped that it would lead to "concrete measures". To him it 
was a matter of gratification that "the whole process which was initiated by the 
previous National Democratic Alliance government and the joint statement in 
2004 are moving forward". He described the talk as another step in the 
ftilfiUment of the 2004 Islamabad agreement signed between General 
Musharraf and India's former Prime Minister, Mr. A.B. Vajpayee wherein the 
former had agreed that, "he would not allow Pakistani soil to be used for anti-
India terrorist activities". "It is desirable that we should continue talks like this 
to resolve our mutual differences since one of the reasons for the growth of 
terrorism is the mutual mistrust between the two countries". Advani said, 
appreciating the Singh-Musharraf meeting.'^^ 
Musharraf invited Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, the Chairperson of the ruling 
United Progressive Alliance, on a discussion. She accepted the invitation, and 
the meeting was marked with great fondness and enthusiasm. In his thirty-
minute meeting with her he discussed various aspects of the bilateral 
relations.'^^ 
He also called on former Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee with 
whom he struck a personal rapport and developed a lot of respect despite the 
failure of the Agra Summit. Vajpayee was all admiration of the General who 
sought support for carrying forward the peace process and there were exchange 
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of pleasantries and gifts. 
But as usual Kashmir continued to be a hard nut to crack. True, both 
General Musharraf and Dr. Singh agreed that there could not be any time 
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bound solution to Kashmir. But differences arose with the Pakistani leader 
having raised the possibility of including Kashmiris in the dialogue process and 
the Indian Prime Minister pointing out the Kashmir issue as one India was 
committed to address and that it did not take Kashmiri Muslim outfits into 
account. The Kashmiri Muslim separatist organisations have urged General 
Musharraf to include them in the ongoing talks relating to the Kashmir 
imbroglio. The meeting between President Musharraf and Kashmiri Muslim 
organisations held at Pakistan House on 17 April was attended by moderate 
Hurriat leader Mirwaiz Umar Sheik, hardliner Syed Ali Shah, Democratic 
Freedom Party Chief Shabir Shah, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front's 
Yaseen Malik and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Forum Chief, Javeed Mir. 
"Any talk between India and Pakistan are incomplete without the involvement 
of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, who are a primary party to the dispute. 
So we asked General Musharraf to press India to include the true 
representatives of the people in the ongoing dialogue process", said Mirwaiz 
Umar Farooq, the Hurriyat Chairman. They said that they had apprised the 
General of their views on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir.'^^ Mr. Syed Ali 
Shah Geelani in his 90-minute meeting with Musharraf told him that the 
current Confidence Building Measures were meaningless unless human rights 
violations and killings were stopped in Jammu and Kashmir. To bring about a 
"just and amicable" solution India should take some tangible steps in line with 
the spirit of the U.N. Security Council resolutions, he said. In a three-paged 
memorandum to Musharraf detailing the alleged killings and human rights 
violations in Jammu and Kashmir, Geelani demanded that India withdrew its 
military, central forces and released all "Freedom fighters" detained in jails. He 
unrolled before Musharraf the allegedly sad plight of the people of Jammu and 
Kashmir as if to some one in whom he saw the saviour expected to help the so-
called "freedom fighter" to bail Kashmir out of the hell into which India had 
put it.'^° Naturally this helped Musharraf to act in the best interest of Pakistan 
by using the Kashmiri separatist organisations as a cat's paw in continuing his 
country's proxy war with India. But for this, the government of India was to be 
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blamed since its having played into the hands of Pakistan by letting the ball of 
Kashmir issue rolled into the enemy's court, because Kashmir issue, 
exclusively India's national question, is something to be decided by India alone 
without allowing Pakistan to thrust its oars into it. Besides, a nation's 
interference in the neighbouring country's internal affairs is against all 
accepted canons of international relations. As Kashmir issue was India's 
internal affair, India should not have approved of Musharraf s talk with the 
Kashmir separatists, nor have given them permission to go to Pakistan with a 
memorandum of their grievances against Indian security forces. Indeed India 
should have ensured that the General behave as an honoured guest. She should 
not have helped him contribute to the worsening of Kashmir situation. By 
allowing Musharraf to do so India was committing another blunder. If 
Jawaharlal Nehru committed the blunder of taking the Kashmir issue to the 
United Nations what the then governments were doing was more foolish than 
what Nehru did. It is as if they were seeking the help of an alien and enemy 
nation and its virtual agents, the secessionist outfits of Kashmir to resolve the 
dispute. And the General returned making the Kashmir as well as all issues 
concerning Indo-Pakistan relations more messy than earlier. Consequently, the 
talks could only end in utter failure. Even the warmth and goodwill generated 
by India's Leader of Opposition's visit in June 2005 failed to ensure better 
relations with Pakistan. Advani's assertion that Mohammad Ali Jinnah was 
highly secular though he happened to fall into the rut of communalism, and that 
he wanted the nation he fathered to follow the secular credentials, as could be 
expected, could not lead to any positive improvement in Indo-Pak relations. 
Indo-Pak relations are passing through critical stages which require concerted 
efforts by both the governments to change their mind set and political ideology 
against each other and to join hand in hand to extend all kinds of political, 
economic and social cooperation for each other and to face the challenges 
posed by developed countries. But presently the violation of cease-fire 
agreement of 2003 by Pakistan reflects that both the countries will take still 
many more years for building up their mutual understanding. 
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CHAPTER-5 CONCLUSION 
In the present study, an attempt has been made to examine the Indo-Pak 
relations. In an attempt of doing so, various dimensions that have a direct or 
indirect association with Indo-Pak relations are considered. The country was 
partitioned into Bharat (India) and Pakistan, now two independent nations. In 
this tragedy thousands of innocent people were killed. Whereas no body 
expected that independence would lead to instant paradise, yet majority thought 
that well begun would be half done. However, the ground reality stared us in 
face it was obviously had begun and half undone. It was but natural for India 
and Pakistan to be mutually antagonistic. 
In the last sixty years, four wars were fought between India and Pakistan 
in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999 and they came close to war in 1987, 1990 and 
again they are on the border. But it has been found from this study that since 
India's partition, Indo-Pak relations have been facing conflict and discord, 
mutual distrust and suspicion. It has resulted from a number of intricate factors 
like legacy, the difference in religion, race, conflicting national interests and 
objectives of ideology, power struggle between the two countries, the role they 
have played in international politics and various territorial disputes including 
Kashmir. 
The major factor, however, has been perception of each other and of 
themselves. Most of the problems had arisen out of the perceptual divergence. 
This distance was created by the parity syndrome of Muslim League before the 
partition and the new State of Pakistan could not free itself from that syndrome. 
Indo-Pak relations have been sensitive and are found to be based on 
psychological consideration rather than actual circumstances. Furthermore, 
foreign policies of both the nations have been influenced by action and reaction 
against each other. Guided by various complexities and deficiencies that 
Pakistan inherited from the history, it had always a fear that India would try to 
destroy, in one way or the other, its very existence. In order to safeguard its 
political interest and to make herself secure, Pakistan had made all possible 
efforts and even succeeded to a considerable extent in increasing a friendship 
with China and other West Asian countries. It had also been in the good books 
of United States, The purpose of extending her hand of friendship to these 
countries was to divert all political power and the support of these nations in 
her favour. 
Thus, relations between India and Pakistan have always been adverse 
and frictional. There had been different irritants on many occasions. In the 
beginning, the issue of minorities, evacuee property, division of military stores, 
canal-water dispute, border problem and the future of India States deteriorated 
its relations with India and worked as blocking factors in the relations of the 
two countries. This has generated a huge loss of life and property and destroyed 
the close complimentarily of the two nations. Later the conflicting roles that 
India and Pakistan played in World Politics put strains on Indo-Pak relations. 
Pakistan's policy of aligning with the Western and Islamic power added 
to the problems and resulted in the worsening of its relations with India. By the 
early 1960's India and Pakistan have acquired enough experience in respect of 
each others strategies and have also build up their armies to have grasp over the 
situation of unforeseen war. The armies build up, coupled with Pakistan's 
membership in CENTO and SEATO had drawn both super powers into the 
sub-continent. Finally, the Chinese invasion of 1962 on India had led to a 
major infusion of U.S. arms into India and had strained U.S.-Pakistani 
relations. 
Although, a genuine equilibrium between India and Pakistan could not 
and can't be achieved because of the tremendous disparity in the inherent 
strength and resources of the two countries. In terms of capabilities India is the 
fifth largest country of the world, second in population, fourth in armed forces, 
tenth in industrial potential, third largest pool of technical and scientific 
manpower, six nuclear power and fourth to launch its own satellites. Pakistan 
on the other hand, is strategically handicapped against India's military might. 
India has 3:1 superiority ratio in army, 5:1 in air force and 7:V in navy. Due to 
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this disequilibrium, Pakistan will always watch for weakness in India and 
attempt to take advantage of this where possible. 
The present Kashmir problem is not and should not be an issue between 
India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, given the unstable nature of Pakistani polity. 
the politicians of various hues and the military in Pakistan are attempting to 
fish in the troubled waters of Kashmir, after having significantly contributed to 
making it show, in their internal struggle for power. It is to be earnestly hoped 
that they understand the limits of the Pakistani mischief India would tolerate. 
Pakistan can not damage Indian integrity or unity without its splintering into 
Sind, Punjab, Baluchistan, Pashtunistan and other component parts. This is not 
because India wants to do it, but any encouragement to Kashmir secessionism 
will have such a backlash effect on Pakistan. The history of the last four wars is 
before them. India does not want war. India considers a stable, strong and 
united Pakistan vital to its national interest. 
The politicisation of the Kashmir question at the United Nations 
undermined India's faith in multilateral diplomacy. The unanticipated adverse 
outcome, wherein the victim and the aggressor were placed on the same plane, 
drove India's leadership away from multilateral initiatives to resolve the 
Kashmir problem. Indian intransigence, however, did not deter Pakistan from 
its quest for Kashmir. For the Pakistani leadership, the absorption of all of 
Kashmir into its realm remained a normative and strategic goal. At a normative 
level, Pakistan's claims to Kashmir remained illogical: Pakistan's identity as 
the homeland of the Muslims of South Asia made it a moral imperative to 
include Kashmir in its domain. But it was also a strategic imperative: Pakistan 
could be better defended if the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir were within 
its ambit. Committed to the pursuit of these ends, the leadership remained 
fundamentally unreconciled to the status quo and sought to exploit any 
opportunities to bring diplomatic and military pressures on India to cede 
ground on the Kashmir question. Pakistan's inability to make India budge on 
this question in the multilateral and diplomatic arena led its leaders several 
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more times to formulate military strategies to wrest Kashmir from India. In this 
quest, they frequently exhibited false optimism, exaggerated the support of 
potential allies, and bolstered their self-image on the basis of dubious and 
flawed inferences. India remained equally determined to hold on to Kashmir to 
demonstrate its commitment to secularism. It ignored Pakistan's demands and 
steadily lightened its grip on the State. These two antithetical strategies placed 
the two states on a collision course toward another war in 1965 and this war 
was also failed to resolve the Kashmir dispute. 
Till 1965, India and Pakistan became rigid in their political ideology for 
each other. Whereas India followed the philosophy of secularism, a sense of 
communalism was reflected in Pakistan's policy which pretended to be a 
Islamic friend for all Muslims within or outside the sub-continent. This was the 
chief reason why Pakistan always tried to get its hold on Kashmir, a 
predominantly Muslim populated State. But India being a secular State is 
always committed not to give away Kashmir at any cost as it is an integral part 
of the country. Thus, the Indian Government is shouldered by an additional 
responsibility of preserving the national integrity by ensuring sound security in 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indo-Pak war of 1965 had made it clear 
that neither Pakistan's claim for occupying Jammu and Kashmir as Muslim 
State was genuine nor Pakistani army was capable enough of routing away 
Indian soldiers. 
It did, however, have a number of unintended consequences for the 
politics of the region, and for India and Pakistan. At a regional level, the United 
States largely disengaged itself from South Asia in the aftermath of the war. 
American withdrawal from the region permitted the Soviets to expand their 
influence in the region and to curb Chinese efforts to play a significant role. At 
another, the war set a precedent for future Indo-Pakistani war: Indian and 
Pakistani Commanders relied on similar and mostly British battle tactics, 
lacked significant fire power, and did not engage in any significant tactical 
innovation. The consequences of the war for India were not far reaching. It's 
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military, while not distinguishing itself, nevertheless performed far more 
creditably than it had in the 1962 border war with China. The Indian armed 
forces also did not suffer significant casualties. 
In the Tashkent Agreement which was signed between the two countries 
by Shastri and Ayub, the important concessions were given by both sides. The 
Indians withdrew from a number of strategic positions that they had captured in 
Azad Kashmir, two of which were significant: the Haji Pir Pass and the town 
of Tithwal. The Pakistanis also gave up some of their territorial gains. But 
inspite of all these achievement, Tashkent Declaration had achieved nothing 
new at all in terms of permanent settlement of India-Pakistan problem. But it 
proved to be a temporary settlement of their problems and the ever lasting 
Kashmir issue could not be resolved because of suspicious and unyielding 
nature of the two nations. 
It will be better for both countries if they devote themselves to the task 
of storming the fortress of poverty and economic backwardness. Ultimately the 
people may feel and realise that they need not antagonistic but friendly towards 
each other with a view to tackling the challenges before new millennium. 
Because the greatest enemy of India today is not Pakistan or China, but Indians 
themselves. Similarly, the greatest enemy of Pakistan is not India or America 
but the Pakistani themselves. The mutual mistrust is their common enemy, and 
they need to build up the bridges of understanding. 
A peaceful solution to the Kashmir imbroglio which takes into account 
all these pros and cons is imperative. It would be rash to suggest instant 
solutions because there are many imponderables which affect and afflict the 
power structures in both India and Pakistan. But some aspects are clear. First, 
the issue related to Jammu and Kashmir can not be resolved by coercive force 
or military means alone. Secondly, India has to look at itself in the mirror and 
acknowledge the frustrations and alienation of a section of its citizens who live 
in an area of paramount strategic and security interest to us. These frustrations 
have to be overcome by political means and positive responses on the basis of 
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democratic principles. This can be done only by reviving the basis of 
democratic principles and the political dialogue by all available means. Perhaps 
a purposive beginning has been made in this regard with the elections to the 
Lok Sabha held in Jammu and Kashmir in May-June 1996 and the 
establishment of an elected government in Jammu and Kashmir with 
Dr. Farooq Abdullah as the Chief Minister. Thirdly, India must have the 
patience to counter all Pakistani efforts aimed at disrupting the political 
processes which we want to initiate despite our own constraints and limitations. 
In the later years, Pakistan was seeking to significantly strengthen its 
defences to blunt any future Indian offensive. The war had also certain 
unanticipated consequences for the future of the security and stability of the 
sub-continent. Most significantly, the West Pakistani elite's decision to leave 
East Pakistan only lightly defended stoked the embers of Bengali sub-
nationalism. Significant numbers of Bengalis were already unhappy with the 
imposition of Urdu as the national language, inadequate Bengali representation 
in the civil services and the armed forces, and the disproportionate allocation of 
foreign assistance to West Pakistan. These incendiary conditions in East 
Pakistan would flare up within the next several years into civil war, which 
evolved into the third Indo-Pakistan war. 
A gloomy picture emerged in the relations of the two nations when the 
war of 1971 burst out. In this war Pakistan was suffered more because she lost 
her eastern wing. This war once again proved and declared the superiority over 
Pakistan in respect of military power in South Asia region. The historical 
defeat of Pakistan in the 1971 war had made it realised the threat to its security 
and a challenge to its military capabilities. Pakistan thus, determines to develop 
its nuclear capabilities and the programme of nuclear armaments. This feeling 
of Pakistan got an impetus when India performs its T^ nuclear test in Pokhran in 
1974. Pakistan's claim of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of religious 
composition got eroded and western Pakistani leaders persuaded East Pakistan 
to remain in the same quality. 
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The Bangladesh struggle for sovereign statehood owed its unique 
success to certain unique factors; the peculiar genesis and geographical and 
cultural nature of the pre-1971 Pakistan State, the policies and activities of the 
central ruling ehte which facilitated the transition of the Bengali movement 
from an autonomist to an eventually secessionist struggle, the positive and 
decisive role played by a powerful and contiguous external patron, India, and 
finally, a favourable balance of global and regional forces. 
Each and all of these factors helped and hastened the process of the 
emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign State. At the climax of the struggle in 
November-December 1971 these factors became intertwined, affecting and 
being affected by one another, separately and collectively leading to the 
definitive outcome, the sovereign independent Bangladesh. 
After 1971 the irritants were the fall out of the Indo-Pak war i.e. 
repatriation of the prisoners of war, delineation of the line of actual control in 
Kashmir, recognition of Bangladesh, resumption of over flights and means of 
communication and trade. Though Pakistan temporised on the above issues, yet 
they were amicably settled. But then it is difficult to change the psyche and 
equally difficult to change geography. There are certain environmental inputs, 
both exogenous and indigenous which make the South Asian sub-system 
confrontational. The contemporary irritants, however, are -
a. perception of each other's nuclear capability, 
b. conflicting perception of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, 
c. divergent response to the threat posed by the super powers presence in the 
Indian Ocean and 
d. Kashmir issue. 
The war had ended; the cease-fire had come-but peace has not yet been 
achieved. India held over 90,000 prisoners of war and was in occupation of 
nearly 9,000 square kilometers of Pakistani territory. Pakistan was yet to 
recognise Bangladesh. Indira Gandhi realised that a mutually arrived at Indo-
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Pak settlement was necessary for a durable peace. A hostile Pakistan would not 
only force to India to maintain a high level of defence expenditure but also 
enable outside powers to interfere in sub-continental affairs. A summit 
conference between Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the newly elected 
Prime Minister of Pakistan, was held in Shimla in June 1972; a great deal of 
hard bargaining took place and the two signed an agreement which came to be 
known as the Shimla Declaration. India agreed to return the Pakistani territory 
it had occupied, except some strategic points in Kashmir, mainly in the Kargil 
sector, which were necessary to safeguard the strategic road link between 
Srinagar and Leh in Ladakh. In return, Pakistani agreed to respect the existing 
Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir and undertook not to alter it unilaterally by 
force or threat of force. The two countries also agreed to settle all their disputes 
through bilateral negotiations without any outside mediation by the U.N. or any 
other power. Indian also agreed to return the prisoners of war to Pakistan but 
this was to be contingent upon a Bangladesh-Pakistan agreement. This 
occurred the next year when Pakistan recognised Bangladesh in August 1973. 
The justification Indira Gandhi offered to the Parliament in July 1972 
for signing the Shimla Declaration was significant. She said: 'All I know is that 
I must fight for peace and I must take those steps which will lead us to peace... 
The time has come when Asia must wake up to its destiny, must wake up to the 
real needs of its people, must stop fighting amongst ourselves, no matter what 
our previous conflicts, no matter what the previous hatred and bitterness. The 
time has come today when we must bury the past.' 
The Shimla Agreement helped to give a sense of direction to Pakistan's 
search for national identity and it has given an opportunity to India show its 
sense of responsibility as a power which seeks a durable peace system with its 
neighbours. This agreement provided a congenial atmosphere and favourable 
opportunity in the region for trade and economic development. 
The euphoria of India's decisive victory over Pakistan lasted for a 
considerable span of time. Between 1972 and 1983, various governments in 
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New Delhi showed skill, tact and intelligence in dealing with the internal 
dimensions of the Kashmir problem. From 1984 onward, however, they 
returned to the extraordinary clumsiness, thoughtlessness, and downright deceit 
that had characterised domestic policy toward Kashmir in the 1950s and 1960s. 
These highly uneven policies of accommodation and manipulation ultimately 
culminated in an ethno-religious insurgency in December 1989 that once again 
gave Pakistan a chance to pray Kashmir out of the Indian Union. As the 
insurgency gathered strength in early 1990, some of the more astute and 
thoughtful Indian decision makers would privately question the sagacity of 
India's 1971 intervention in the internal politics of Pakistan. 
It has been feh that in the last sixty years, the reason has been the 
witness of many conflicts but one thing that emerges out on a thorough 
examination is that peace in the region has never been threatened-when a 
conflict has arisen between States whose economic stake holding on both sides-
e.g., disputes between India-Nepal, India-Sri Lanka, India-Bangladesh-in all 
these cases the crisis have blown over mainly because of the large scale 
economic interests on both sides. But the same can not be said for Indo-Pak 
relations mainly because there are no economic and business stakes involved. It 
is here the catch lies-it is recommended that economic as well as political 
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) be designed to help negate the feeling 
of hatred being fuelled on both sides of the border. The need to find sustainable 
development solution to the problems of the region might just be the queue that 
might bring about a rethinking in political brass of the two nations. 
On 28 May 1990, India proposed a set of political Confidence Building 
Measures following which seven rounds of Foreign Secretary Level talks were 
held between July, 1990 and January 1994. The proposed CBMs were both 
military and non-military in character and included suggestions like 
introducing greater transparency in mutual military interactions, modalities to 
ally Indian concerns at Pakistan's support of terrorism, chemical and biological 
weapons etc. Unfortunate, in the six rounds of discussions Pakistan demanded 
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that talks on Jammu and Kashmir should be taken under Article 6 of the Shimla 
Agreement. This clearly indicates that Pakistan wanted to give the highest 
priority to Kashmir in these talks, while pushing every other issue to the 
background. The Indian response was that the Shimla Agreement did not 
envisage compartmentalised and fragmented talks. Just one Article of the 
Shimla Agreement could not be picked up selectively. In January 1994, India 
and Pakistan exchanged non-papers on different aspects of the bilateral 
relationship. The six Indian non-papers dealt with CBMs, maintenance of peace 
and tranquility along the LoC, Siachen, Sir Creek, The Tubul Navigation 
Project and an Indo-Pak Joint Commission. The two Pakistani non-papers 
given in response dealt with a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir and measures 
to create a climate for peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. 
There were several clear cut divergences between the positions taken by the 
two countries on different issues in their respective non-papers. Consequently, 
the CBMs process initiated by the Indians got derailed. This process was again 
resumed in 1997 by the then Prime Minister I.K. Gujral. Prime Minister 
I.K. Gujral and his counterpart met four times during May 1997 and January 
1998, but the divergent views on the irritants had again derailed the entire 
process. 
The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, added an 
additional dimension to the Indo-Pakistan relations. Prime Minister A.B. 
Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif met on July 29 in 
Colombo and again on September 23 in New York. Both of them had agreed to 
restart the process of CBMs as early as possible. In February 1999, Prime 
Minister A.B. Vajpayee traveled to Lahore at the invitation of Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif in a bid to normalise relations and begin a new chapter. At 
Lahore both sides agreed to "intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, 
including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir", and also reaffirmed their 
"condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations " The 
Lahore Declaration reiterated the determination of both parties to implement 
the Shimla Agreement "in Letter and Spirit". 
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In a broader perspective, the Lahore Declaration was a sincere effort on 
India's part to tackle the difficult and complex irritants between the two nations 
against the nuclear backdrop and was acclaimed the world over. Unfortunately, 
Pakistan did not give a chance to the Lahore Declaration. The Kargil intrusion 
constituted a cynical breach of the trust on which the Lahore process was 
posited. 
The 1999 war between India and Pakistan in Kargil offers one useful 
test of the two competing positions about nuclear stability and instability in 
South Asia. Despite the over nuclearisation of the region, an undeclared war 
did take place. However, no reliable evidence has yet emerged that either side 
contemplated a resort to nuclear weapons during this conflict. More to the 
point, unlike in the 1965 war, when Pakistan attacked India in Kashmir, in 
1999 India did not resort to prompt horizontal escalation. Instead, it carefully 
limited the war to a particular arena and did not even attempt to cross the Line 
of Control into Pakistani territory after dislodging the Pakistani troops from its 
own lands. 
A meeting of the Indo-Pak Joint Commission was held in August 2000, 
in which Iran attempted to persuade India to consider the economical and 
technically sound trans-Pakistan pipeline. It is expected that Pakistan would 
gain an estimated $ 600 million in transit fees. Therefore, this project will be 
really heavily beneficial for Pakistani economy. Similarly, another project has 
been under consideration between the two countries is the export of surplus 
electricity from Pakistan to northern India. The estimate was that if Pakistan 
had a surplus capacity of 200 megawatts for export, it could earn as much as 
$ 1.2 billion per year for perhaps upto twenty years. 
To start these projects, Pakistan has to change track on its 'Kashmir 
first' policy, shifting gear to a process of building cooperation and confidence 
in other areas without necessarily giving up its position on Kashmir. Pakistan 
should also stop cross border terrorism in India. On the other hand, India must 
also take the lead in economic openness to its smaller neighbour. The gulf 
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between the two is too wide to be bridged in the foreseeable future without 
major geostrategic or radical policy changes in the region, but we should 
always remember one thing: "The difficult we can do straight away, the 
impossible takes us a little time". 
In order to improve bilateral relations with Pakistan, India extended an 
invitation to Pakistan's chief executive, Gen Musharraf to visit India. 
Musharraf who was soon to declare himself President of Pakistan accepted it 
and the meet slated for 14-16 July 2001, took place at Agra. However, this did 
not produce anything as expected. Musharraf and his foreign policy makers 
wanted to bring Kashmir into focus and demanded that the All Party Hurriyat 
Conference be made a party to the bilateral talks. Vajpayee and his 
government's coalition friends on the other hand insisted on Pakistan 
withdrawing support to Kashmiri terrorism, stop narcotic trafficking and give 
up its claims on Sir Creek and the Wular Barrage and stood stoutly against 
Musharraf s no-compromise stand on Kashmir question. Indian unwillingness 
to withdraw forces from the Siachen Glacier too upset the plans of Pakistan and 
naturally the summit ended a failure. The attack on US World Trade Centre and 
Pentagon allegedly by the Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda terrorists on 11 
September 2001 brought some changes in the American attitude to Asiatic 
affairs, and Pakistan proved to be its fortunate beneficiary. She gained greater 
importance against the backdrop of the US decision to fight Taliban and 
Afghan terrorist. 
India's military deployment on the borders after 13 December 2001, 
terrorist attack on Indian Parliament all cumulatively have kept the cup of 
embittered relations overflowing without any let-up. Again twice in the year 
2002 in January and June India was on the range of war against Pakistan. Prime 
Minister A.B. Vajpayee wanted to strike on PoK-based terrorists, but Pakistan 
cleverly shifted their camps pre-empting Indian options. Government wanted 
limited action. The military thought otherwise, saying the forces should cross 
the Indo-Pak borders. The leader of Pakistan especially Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's 
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dreamt of attaining parity with India in nuclear field was realised in May 1998. 
General turned President Pervez Musharraf on 4 January 2000 stated that 
Pakistan would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if its security was 
threatened. On 24 January 2000, while inaugurating an international conference 
on Asian Security in New Delhi, Defence Minister Mr. George Fernandes had 
declared "India's readiness to fight any limited conventional war under the 
nuclear shadow". 
Kuldip Nayar who led an Indian Parliamentary delegation in the middle 
of 2003 was indeed jubilant over the warm reception the team got from the 
Pakistanis. He wrote, "We, the nine parliamentarians were swept off our feet 
by love and affection showered upon us at Lahore, Islamabad and Karachi. It 
was almost a people's war against the age-old prejudice and hatred against 
India". At Lahore Nayar and his team was surprised at the rousing reception 
accorded to them and the warmth with which they were entertained at the 
dinner hosted by the India-Pakistan Soldiers Initiative for Peace (IPSIP). The 
Jamat-i-Islami, which too did not seem to be averse to the move for peace, has 
given their first ever reception since the birth of Pakistan. Indeed many of the 
people and organisations in Pakistan are for shedding all differences with India 
and they find fault with the military set up for its abhorrence for achieving a 
solution to Indo-Pak problem. 
There started the Bus-Diplomacy, which the Indian authorities thought 
would lead to better bilateral relations. In December 2004 Islamabad had 
agreed to start a bus service between Amritsar and Lahore. According to 
Pakistani Punjab's Chief Minister, Parvez Elahi Pakistan Government agreed in 
principle for this bus service and he said, "it was your (India's) turn to 
complete the rest of formahties". There were moves to have Memorandum of 
Understandings (MoUs) signed between the agricultural universities of 
Faislabad and Ludhiana to undertake research in agriculture, horticulture and 
agro-processing. Punjab Chief Minister Amrinder Singh mooted several 
schemes including the waiving of entertainment tax on Punjabi films made in 
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Punjab especially in view of Elahi's statement, "we have an age old common 
cultural heritage and civilisation and, therefore, it is our foremost duty to 
respect the sentiments of the Sikh community". In the year of 2005, a landmark 
in Indo-Pakistan relations, proved eventful with the starting of Srinagar-
Muzaffarabad bus service and the India's visit of Pakistan President Pervez 
Musharraf, which happened almost simultaneously. The launch of the bus 
service from 7 April 2005, as agreed between India and Pakistan during the 
visit of India's External Affairs Minister to Pakistan in February 2005, was 
acclaimed by Pakistan as a "significant development and a confidence building 
measure". "The decision to launch the bus service is a very good gesture which 
will revive links among the Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC", Pakistan's 
Foreign Ministry said in a press briefing. 
But, despite all the media hype of the bus launch as a "historic moment" 
and a great step in Confidence Building Measures, some crucial issues 
remained unsolved. Because, this bus service did not evoke any warmth from 
Pakistan as it did in India. Indeed it was India alone that became over-jubilant 
over it. Comparing to the over-enthusiasm shown at the function arranged to 
celebrate the bus service, which was marked by the presence of India's Prime 
Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh and the Chairperson of India's ruling United 
Progressive Alliance, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and the carnival-like atmosphere it 
created in Srinagar, the arrival and departure of the bus was not a high profile 
affair in Muzaffarabad. Neither the Pakistan President, nor Prime Minister, nor 
even its Foreign Minister was present to flag off the bus. India achieved 
nothing diplomatically, politically, culturally or economically from this 
venture. 
Closely following the launch of the bus service was the visit of General 
Pervez Musharraf on 16 April 2005. In his first visit after the failure of the 
Agra Summit of 2001 India once again rose from her somber mood to welcome 
the General. In a moment of high emotion Musharraf touched down at the 
Sanganer airport of Jaipur, Rajisthan's capital city on his way to pay homage at 
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the Mausoleum of the Sufi saint Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti. Describing his 
India visit as 'historic', he said "We have come here with a massage of peace 
and unity ... we have prayed that in times to come, all differences between 
India and Pakistan are resolved and peace returned". The visiting delegation 
that accompanied the General who was in India to watch the final one-day 
cricket match between India and Pakistan at Ferozeshah Kotla on 17 April. 
The talks between General Musharraf and India's Prime Minister 
Dr. Manmohan Singh were marked with all cordiality and friendship, which 
according to reports, sent a clear message across the world that the two nations 
bom of the common tradition are out to cut the long drawn ice. Both the leaders 
agreed that their army had required acting in close cooperation so that 
differences over implementing Confidence Building Measures might well be 
addressed, especially in regard to Siachen issue and maritime boundary in Sir 
Creek. Dr. Manmohan Singh and General Musharraf had a 40-minute one-to-
one dialogue after a two-hour-long delegation level meet during which they 
came up with a broad vision to cooperate more effectively to promote cross 
border exchanges along the Tine of Control as well. At the meeting held in 
Hyderabad House, Singh zeroed in on the responsibility of both the countries to 
project themselves as role models for the entire region in opening up trade 
routes and adding transport links that would expedite economic cooperation. 
The discussions led to emergence of ideas regarding a range of possible 
steps desirable to improve bilateral amity. These included Kashmir centred 
CBMs leading to a more porous ToC like the suggestion of seven meeting 
points for the relatives, cross-LoC trade, increasing transport linkages and 
establishing more communication links, reviving the joint commission on trade 
and business and setting up a joint business council to improve contacts 
between private sectors on both sides, giving top priority to Iran-Pakistan-India 
gas pipeline proposal along with looking at other energy resources in the 
region, and developing appropriate transit facilities to improve trade relations 
with Central Asian and West Asian regions. Dr. Singh however reminded the 
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Pakistan President that all steps could be expedited if only Pakistan would stick 
to and honour its commitment to curb terrorism and that it was the duty of both 
the countries to ensure that no terrorist elements thwart positive movements 
and ambience. 
There had been open and proxy wars between two countries India and 
Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan should take a concrete step to resolve the 
dispute and inaugurate a new chapter of cooperation and to solve the much 
deferred domestic social problem. 
A serious effort should be made by both the countries who are 
geographically proximate, yet have acted as distant neighbours. The first fall 
out should be serious pruning of bloated defence budgets and the ruling elites 
of both the countries should divert the funds for socio-economic development 
of toiling masses who suffer from endemic poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy and 
backwardness of all sorts. Even outstanding economists, social thinkers, 
intellectuals politicians, human rights activists have been harping on this theme 
unremittingly since long time. And to top it well-meaning friends in both India 
and Pakistan and all across the world. India spends on its defence just 2.8% 
from hs Gross Domestic Product, while Pakistan significantly spends 4.8% 
from its GDP. Much of its defence allocation is used by Islamabad in 
prosecuting a low intensity conflict against India. It become obvious that 
military expenditure is draining both the poor nations and one random 
examples speaks a lot. It costs Rs.lO crore a day to maintain troops along the 
Line of Control (LoC) to prevent another Kargil war. Over and above this other 
hefty financial outlay has to be made for hinterland security. And this applies to 
Pakistan too. 
A kind of pessimism is reflected from our assessment of Indo-Pak 
relations. The on going study has witnessed frictions in the relations between 
the two countries ever since the partition of India. A strong disagreement has 
always been observed between the two nations in all fields, particularly in arms 
build up and acquisition of nuclear technology. With the passage of time, both 
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India and Pakistan have acquired strong military power equipped with 
sophisticated weapons. This may resuhs in heavy losses on both fronts if a new 
war is provoked from either side. 
Our analysis of the past events and present scenario of Indo-Pak 
relations suggest that the prospects of a modus vivendi are still not very bright. 
Even after the commentable efforts made by the two countries to improve their 
mutual relations, sharp differences are often visible in respect of their policies 
and responsibilities for each other. Though the internal political tension in 
Pakistan during a last couple of years has somewhat diverted its attention and 
has marginally reduced the terrorist activities in India sponsored by it. Even the 
elections are over there; less sign of political stability in Pakistan is seen. This 
is not in favour of India too. Political stability in both the countries is a pre-
requisite for continuous bilateral talks between India and Pakistan. 
In order to ease the tension of on-going dialogue and Confidence 
Building Measures should be encouraged. We have many examples from 
histor}' that war can not bring peace, and it applies to Indian sub-continent as 
well. Both India and Pakistan should come to the negotiating table and discuss 
their mutual problems. Both the governments should be people friendly 
irrespective of the divide of religion, caste, languages etc. Kashmir is the part 
and parcel of Indian Union and it can not be given to Pakistan under any 
circumstances. Even if Kashmir is given to Pakistan, whether Pakistan would 
ever stop terrorist activities in India is million dollar question and another 
issue will come up to increase the tension. 
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APPENDIX 
THE KASHMIR WAR 1947-48 
MAJOR GENERAL AKBAR KHAN, D.S.O. (RETD.) 
In the 1971 war we lost half of Pakistan. In the 1965 war we achieved 
nothing. In the struggle of 1947-1948, we acquired territory that now makes the 
whole of Azad Kashmir. It is a story of success and therefore worth studying. 
The difference in the three wars was that the 1971 and 1965 wars were wars of 
the armed forces only-the nation was not involved, neither were the tribal 
guerrillas used at all. In the 1947-48 struggles, the army was not there at all for 
the first eight months, it was only the people of Azad Kashmir and the 
tribesmen who acquired all the territory. The army was sent in the second half 
of the struggle for the last eight months, to hold the territory against the Indian 
army. 
How big a part the tribesmen played on the Indian mind may be guessed 
from the opinion of Mr. V.P. Menon of India who said: 
Personally when I recommended to the Government of India the 
acceptance of the accession by the Maharajah of Kashmir, I had in mind one 
consideration and one consideration alone, viz: that the invasion of Kashmir by 
the raiders was a grave threat to the integrity of India. Ever since the time of 
Mahmud Ghazni, that is to say, for nearly eight centuries, with but a brief 
interval during the Mughal epoch, India had been subjected to periodical 
invasions from the North West. Mahmud Ghazni had led no less than seventeen 
of these incursions in person. And within less than ten weeks of the 
establishment of the new State of Pakistan, its very first act was to let loose a 
tribal invasion through the; North West. Srinagar today, Delhi tomorrow. A 
nation that forgets its history or its geography does so at its peril. (Integration 
of Indian States: V.P. Menon). 
At the time of partition it was expected that Kashmir, a Muslim majority 
State would join Pakistan but the Maharajah was not willing to accede to 
Pakistan. The population of Kashmir was mentally in a State of revolt but their 
voice, their protests and their actions were fruitless, because they were 
unarmed and the Maharajah had an army of 9,000 and the poUce with which to 
hold them down with a strong hand of repression. Some external help to the 
Kashmiris was necessary but our government could not ask the army because 
the C-in-C and senior officers were British. The senior Pakistani officers were 
also not known to the politicians. I, although junior to more than twenty of 
these, was known to Dawat Ali Khan and others when, before partition at 
Delhi, I had been a member of the Armed Forces Partition Committee and I 
had prepared a note for them on how to divide the armed forces. 
Thus, it came about that in the beginning of September 1947 I was asked 
to prepare a plan as to how to help the people of Kashmir. I was Director of 
Weapons and Equipment (DW&E) in GHQ and I found from my records that 
there were 4,000 rifles due to be issued to the Punjab police. Surely these could 
be diverted to the people of Kashmir. I also found from officers in the 
Ordnance that the army had a lot of condemned ammunition waiting to be 
dumped in the sea-this could be secretly issued to the Kashmiris. Further rifles 
and ammunition could be obtained from the Frontier and abroad depending on 
availability of funds. Some trained volunteers would be necessary to handle 
these. I wrote a plan called 'Armed Revolt in Kashmir' based on these facts, 
suggesting a distribution of weapons in various sectors. I sent twelve copies 
above. 
A few days later I was called to Lahore for a conference with the Prime 
Minister. The plan was adopted. Khurshid Anwar was appointed commander of 
the northern sector. Zaman Kiani, of the southern sector. Sardar Shaukat Hayat 
was to be the overall Commander. Sometime later I was appointed Military 
Adviser to the Prime Minister-to cover my absence from duty. 
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HARI SINGH FLEES SRINAGAR 
The first shots were fired and the movement of the people gathered 
weight. On the 24 of October 1947, the tribesmen crossed the border and 
successfully attacked Muzaffarabad and Domel from where the Dogra troops 
withdrew in complete disarray. The tribesmen in their lorries moved forward in 
the Srinagar road the next day and again beat the Dogras at Uri. On the 27" 
they captured Baramula and sacked it. They were now only 30 miles from 
Srinagar and the Maharajah decided that was enough. He left his capital and 
went to Jammu, from where he sent his papers of accession to Delhi asking for 
help. He was so despondent that he instructed his ADC that if by the next 
morning help did not come from India, he was to shoot him in his sleep. The 
Maharajah, however, was not destined to be shot because at the moment a 
hundred aircraft in India were getting ready to fly over troops to Kashmir the 
next day. 
GRACEY'S 'NO' TO QUAID 
On the evening of the 27*. the Prime Minister held a conference at 
Lahore to consider the situation arising out of Kashmir's accession and India's 
military intervention. I proposed that an attempt should be made to liquidate 
Jammu in order to block the only road along which India could send 
reinforcements. I suggested that tribesmen should be sent there, and I offered to 
go with them. This was not agreed to on the ground that it would lead to war. 
This did not make sense because the tribesmen were already at Baramula and 
India had accused us of aggression. How important Jammu was may be judged 
from the fact that the same night, when we were in conference, the Quaid-e-
Azam himself had also ordered an attack by the army upon Jammu. According 
to Allan Campbell in 'Mission with Mountbatten' the order had been given to 
General Gracey, the acting C-in-C. Gracey had refused on the ground that he 
could not issue such an order without approval of the Supreme Commander in 
Delhi. 
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I returned in Rawalpindi and next day proceeded to Bramula to see how 
the tribesmen were doing. When I reached them at night they were just four 
miles from Srinagar and they had just finished an attack. At the 4^  milestone, 
there was a road-block with machine guns, which had checked their advance. 
The tribesmen had crept forward using the broken ground but the whole area 
was permanently under water, rain, marsh, lake, river and paddy fields all 
contributing. I stayed overnight and the next day carried out a thorough 
reconnaissance of the whole area. The tribesmen needed help to overcome the 
road-block. The block was not of concrete pillars but just a barbed wire 
obstruction, which a single armoured car might be able to break through. That 
was the answer. I rushed back to Pindi and was immediately able to find 
Colonel Masud who volunteered to take a troop of armoured cars of his unit. 
His men, he said, would go in plain clothes without official permission and at 
their own risk. I rang up Karachi but the proposal was stoutly opposed. Thus, 
the armoured cars did not go to the assistance of the tribesmen and the 
tribesmen could not find some other way of entering Srinagar. 
The atmosphere in Pakistan was full of great expectations. News of the 
tribal success was still spreading and assuming legendary proportions with 
every hour. But the Indians had been landing troops fast in Srinagar. A week 
later news came that the Indians were coming out of Srinagar and the tribesmen 
were falling back without offering resistance. They withdrew totally first to 
Baramula and then to Uri. Their actions consisted of mobile and aggressive hit 
and run tactics, which were successful in the attack. But they were not prepared 
to sit in defensive positions along the road. In their own country, they did take 
up defensive positions but there the locals were there to help. Here they wanted 
that either the locals or the army should hold these defensive position. But none 
of these were available. So they withdrew to the safety of Uri and refused to go 
back to the front. 
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SHOW MUST GO ON! 
At this stage, I was asked to take over responsibility. But what was there 
that I could do? I was only a staff officer, having no troops or guns to rush 
forward. But the show was to go on at all costs. So I decided to go to Uri. I 
took with me a wireless set and volunteer signallers and a junior staff officer 
and arrived at Uri on the 7 of November 1947. Twenty-four hours of desperate 
arguments with the tribal chiefs failed to convince them and two thousand 
tribesmen left Uri for Abbottabad. I was left with a dozen volunteers only. For 
me the die was cast. I decided to carry on against the Indians until the locals 
rose and we armed them or until the tribesmen returned to the front. We had 
burnt our boasts behind us as it were, like Tariq twelve centuries earlier. So for 
myself, I adopted the name of General Tariq. We had two jeeps and plenty of 
weapons. We bunt a bridge at Uri and for ten days fired at the Indians giving 
the impression that the tribesmen were still there. We raised 75 local volunteers 
and armed them with rifles, 300 tribesmen came back and we re-established the 
front at Chakothi. 
A thousand more tribesmen came and I sent 500 of these to surround 
and isolate Poonch. In the weeks that followed the tribesmen went into the 
other areas too. The locals rose at Bagh and everywhere else and were armed 
with rifles. Volunteers came from Pakistan too. Among them were ex-
servicemen who were suitable for a defensive role. A dozen volunteer army 
officers were allowed to come and these went into different areas as 
Commanders. Azad Kashmir Government was formed and Sardar Ibrahim 
appointed as its President. We received a great deal of publicity. Foreign 
correspondents also came to the front and the claim of the Azad Kashmiris 
received world recognition. In the winter, snow fell heavily and our actions 
were confined to the roads. But the claim of Pakistan for the accession of 
Kashmir was at last admitted at the United Nations. 
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PANDU TAKEN 
In February 1948 I had to go back to the army, as I had to take over a 
brigade at Kohat. In April, the Indians concentrated a division for a summer 
offensive to advance on Muzaffarabad. Pakistan at last decided to send troops 
into Kashmir to prevent the Indians from advancing further. I was ordered with 
my brigade to the same area where I had been before, the Uri-Chakoti Area on 
the Srinagar road. In May the Indians began their offensive from Uri on both 
sides of the river. They had twelve battalions to do this with. I had only three 
battalions but also the tribesmen and Azad Kashmiris. They captured Pandu but 
in six weeks on the main road we bought them to a standstill at Chakoti where 
our original position was. The Indians abandoned the offensive. But we 
attacked Pandu and re-captured 90 square miles. Our army's role was defensive 
and in this we were successful except in the southern sector where we lost 
Poonch to the Indians due to negligence. However, at the United Nations our 
claim was accepted and a cease-fire was ordered which was to be followed by a 
plebiscite in Kashmir. 
At midnight on 31 December 1948, both sides ordered a cease-fire and 
the war came to an end. The right of a plebiscite now stood accepted. That was 
all right. But to some of us it was the line along which the cease-fire took place 
that appeared unsatisfactory, because as it stood now it left India virtually 
everything that she wanted for the security of the valley. There was no pressure 
point or compelling factor in our possession with which we could discourage 
India from delaying the plebiscite. 
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APPENDIX 
U.N. RESOLUTION AUGUST 13,1948 
(Resolution Adopted by the Commission at its 40* Meeting, 
13 August 1948) 
The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. 
Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by 
the representatives of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir; and 
Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostihties and the 
correction of conditions, the continuance of which is likely to endanger 
international peace and security are essential to implementation of its 
endeavours to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final 
settlement of the situation; 
Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan 
the following proposal: 
PART-I: CEASE-FIRE ORDER 
A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High 
Commands will issue, separately and simultaneously, a cease-fire order to 
apply to all forces under their control and in the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir, as of the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed 
upon within four days after these proposals have been accepted by both 
governments. 
B. The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistani forces agree to refrain 
from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the 
forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
(For the purpose of these proposals, forces under their control shall be 
considered to include all forces, organised and unorganised, fighting or 
participating in hostilities on their respective sides.) 
C. The Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of India and Pakistan shall 
promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in present 
dispositions, which may facilitate the cease-fire. 
D. In its discretion and as the Commission may fmd practicable, the 
Commission will appoint military observers who, under the authority of the 
Commission and with the cooperation of both Commands will supervise the 
observance of the cease-fire order. 
E. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal 
to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an 
atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations. 
PART-II: TRUCE AGREEMENT 
Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate 
cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part-I, both the governments accept the 
following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the 
details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives 
and the Commission. 
A. 
1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was 
represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the 
Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State. 
2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the 
withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and 
Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State 
for the purpose of fighting. 
3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will 
be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the 
Commission. 
B. 
1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the 
tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in Part-II, A. 2, hereof have 
withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation v^ h^ich was represented by the 
Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the 
presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, 
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that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of 
its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. 
2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the 
situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will 
maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire, the 
minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission 
are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law 
and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems 
necessary. 
3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within its powers to 
make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguard and that 
all human political rights will be granted. 
C. 
1. Upon signature, the full text of the truce agreement or a communique 
containing the principles thereof, as agreed upon between the two 
governments and the Commission, will be made public. 
PART-III 
The Goverrmient of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their 
wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be 
determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end upon 
acceptance of the truce agreement, both governments agree to enter into 
consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions 
whereby such free expression will be assured. 
The UNCIP unanimously adopted this resolution on 13-08-1948. 




RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS 
COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN ON 
5 JANUARY 1949 
The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. 
Having received from the Governments of India and Pakistan, in 
communications, dated 23 December and 25 December 1948, respectively, 
their acceptance of the following principles which are supplementary to the 
Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948: 
1. The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India 
or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and 
impartial plebiscite; 
2. Plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the 
cease-fire and truce arrangements as set forth in parts I and II of the 
Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 have been carried out and 
arrangement for the plebiscite have been completed; 
3. (a). The Secretary-General of the United Nations will, in agreement with the 
Commission, nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who shall be a 
personality of high international standing and commanding general 
confidence. He will be formally appointed to office by the Government 
of Jammu and Kashmir. 
(b). The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir, the powers he considers necessary for organising and 
conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring the freedom and impartiality 
of the plebiscite. 
(c). The Plebiscite Administrator shall have authority to appoint such staff, 
assistants and observers as he may require. 
4. (a). After implementation of parts I and II of the Commission's resolution 
of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful 
conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the 
Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consuhation with the 
Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed 
forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State 
and the freedom of the plebiscite. 
(b). As regard the territory referred to in A. 2 of part II of the resolution of 
13 August 1948, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will 
be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in 
consultation with the local authorities. 
5. All civil and military authorities within the State and the principal elements 
of the State will be required to cooperate with the Plebiscite Administrator 
in the preparation for and holding of the plebiscite. 
6. (a). All citizens of the State who have left it on account of the disturbances 
will be invited and be free to return and to exercise all their rights as 
such citizens. For the purpose of facilitating repatriation there shall be 
appointed two Commissions, one composed of nominees of India and 
the other of nominees of Pakistan. The Commissions shall operate under 
the direction of the Plebiscite Administrator. The Governments of India 
and Pakistan and all authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
will collaborate with the Plebiscite Administrator in putting this 
provision into effect. 
(b). All persons (other than citizens of the State) who on or since 15 August 
1947 have entered it for other than lawful purpose, shall be required to 
leave the State. 
7. All authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will undertake to 
ensure in collaboration with the Plebiscite Administrator that: 
(a) There is no threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue 
influence on the voters in the plebiscite; 
(b) No restrictions are placed on legitimate political activity throughout the 
State. All subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste or party shall 
be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting, in the question 
of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan. There shall be freedom 
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of the press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the State. 
including freedom of lawful entry and exit; 
(c) All political prisoners are released; 
(d) Minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection; and 
(e) There is no victimisation. 
8. The Plebiscite Administrator may refer to the United Nations Commission 
for India and Pakistan problems on which he may require assistance, and 
the Commission may, in its discretion, call upon the Plebiscite 
Administrator to carry out on its behalf, any of the responsibilities with 
which it has been entrusted; 
9. At the conclusion of the plebiscite, the Plebiscite Administrator shall report 
the result thereof to the Commission and to the Government of Jammu and 
Kashmir. The Commission shall then certify to the Security Council 
whether the plebiscite has or has not been free and impartial; 
10. Upon the signature of the truce agreement, the details of the foregoing 
proposals will be elaborated in the consultations envisaged in part-Ill of the 
Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. The Plebiscite Administrator 
will be fully associated in these consultations; 
Commends the Governments of India and Pakistan for their prompt 
action in ordering a cease-fire to take effect from one minute before midnight 
of 1^ ' January 1949, pursuant to the agreement arrived at, as provided for by the 
Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948; and 
Resolves to return in the immediate future to the sub-continent, to 
discharge the responsibilities imposed upon it by the resolution of 13 August 
1948 and by the foregoing principles. 
5 January 1949 
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APPENDIX 
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA 
AND PAKISTAN REGARDING SECURITY AND RIGHTS OF 
MINORITIES (NEHRU - LIAQUAT AGREEMENT) 
New Delhi 8 April 1950 
A. The Governments of India and Pakistan solemnly agree that each shall 
ensure, to the minorities throughout its territory, complete equality of 
citizenship, irrespective of religion, a full sense of security in respect of life, 
culture, property and personal honour, freedom of movement within each 
country and freedom of occupation, speech and worship, subject to law and 
morality. Members of the minorities shall have equal opportunity with 
members of the majority community to participate in the public life of their 
country, to hold political or other office, and to serve in their country's civil 
and armed forces. 
Both governments declare these rights to be fundamental and undertake to 
enforce them effectively. The Prime Minister of India has drawn attention 
to the fact that these rights are guaranteed to all minorities in India by its 
Constitution. The Prime Minister of Pakistan has pointed out that similar 
provision exists in the Objective Resolution adopted by the Constituent 
Assembly of Pakistan. It is the policy of both goverrraients that the 
enjoyments of these democratic rights shall be assured to all their nationals 
without distinction. Both governments wish to emphasise that the allegiance 
and loyalty of the minorities is to the State of which they are citizens, and 
that it is to the government of their own State that they should look for the 
redress of their grievances. 
B. In respect of migrants from East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura, 
where communal disturbances have recently occurred, it is agreed between 
the two governments: 
i. That there shall be freedom of movement and protection in transit; 
ii. That there shall be freedom to remove as much of his moveable personal 
effects and household goods as migrant may wish to take with him. 
Moveable property shall include personal jewellery. The maximum cash 
allowed to each adult migrant will be Rs. 150 and to each migrant child 
Rs. 75; 
iii. That a migrant may deposit such of his personal jewellery or cash, as he 
does not wish to take with him with a bank. A proper receipt shall be 
furnished to him by the bank for cash or jewellery thus deposited and 
facilities shall be provided, as and when required for their transfer to him, 
subject as regards cash to the exchange regulations of the government 
concerned; 
iv. That there shall be no harassment by the customs authorities. At each 
customs post agreed upon by the governments concerned, liaison officers of 
the other government shall be posted to ensure this in practice; 
v. Rights of ownership in or occupancy of the immoveable property of a 
migrant shall not be disturbed. If, during his absence, such property is 
occupied by another person, it shall be returned to him provided that he 
comes back by the 31 December 1950. Where the migrant was a cultivating 
owner or tenant, the land shall be restored to him provided that he returns 
not later than the 31 December 1950. In exceptional cases, if a government 
considers that a migrant's immoveable property cannot be returned to him, 
the matter shall be referred to the appropriate Minority Commission for 
advice. Where restoration of immoveable property to the migrant who 
returns within the specified period is found not possible, the government 
concerned shall take steps to rehabilitate him. 
vi. That in the case of a migrant who decides not to return, ownership of all his 
immoveable property shall continue to vest in him and he shall have 
unrestricted right to dispose of it by sale, by exchange with an evacuee in 
the other country, or otherwise. A committee consisting of three 
representatives of minority and presided over by a representative of 
government shall act as trustees of the owner. The Committee shall be 
empowered to recover rent for such immoveable property according to law. 
The Governments of East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura shall 
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enact the necessary legislation to set up these Committees. The Provincial 
or State Government, as the case may be, will instruct the District or other 
appropriate authority to give all possible assistance for the discharge of the 
Committee's functions. The Provisions of this sub-paragraph shall also 
apply to migrants who may have left East Bengal for any part of India, or 
West Bengal, Assam or Tripura for any part of Pakistan, prior to the recent 
disturbances but after the 15 August 1947. The arrangement in this sub-
paragraph will apply also to migrants who have left Bihar for East Bengal 
owing to communal disturbances or fear thereof 
C. As regards the Province of East Bengal and each of the States of West 
Bengal, Assam and Tripura respectively the two governments further agree 
that they shall: 
1. Continue their efforts to restore normal conditions and shall take suitable 
measures to prevent recurrence of disorder. 
2. Punish all those who are found guilty of offences against persons and 
property and of other criminal offences. In view of their deterrent effect, 
collective fines shall be imposed, where necessary. Special Courts will, 
where necessary, be appointed to ensure that wrong doers are promptly 
punished. 
3. Make every possible effort to recover looted property. 
4. Set up immediately an agency, with which representatives of the minority 
shall be associated to assist in the recovery of abducted women. Any 
conversion effected during a period of communal disturbance shall be 
deemed to be forced conversion. Those found guilty of converting people 
forcibly shall be punished. 
5. Set up a Commission of enquir}' at once to enquire into and report on the 
causes and extent of the recent disturbances and to make recommendations 
with a view to preventing recrudescence of similar trouble in future. The 
personnel of the Commission, which shall be presided over by a Judge of 
High Court, shall be such as to inspire confidence among the minority. 
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6. Take prompt and effective steps to prevent the dissemination of news and 
mischievous opinion calculated to rouse communal passion by press or 
radio or by any individual or organisation. Those guilty of such activity 
shall be rigorously dealt with. 
7. Not permit propaganda in either country directed against the territorial 
integrity of the other or purporting to incite war between them and shall 
take prompt and effective action against any individual or organisation 
guilty of such propaganda. 
D. Sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (7) and (8) of C of the agreement are 
of general scope and applicable according to exigency to any part of India 
or Pakistan. 
E. In order to help restore confidence so that refugees may return to their 
homes the two governments have decided: 
i. To depute two ministers, one from each government, to remain in the 
affected areas for such period as may be necessary; 
ii. To include in the Cabinets of East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam a 
representative of the minority community. In Assam the minority 
community is already represented in the Cabinet. Appointments to the 
Cabinets of East Bengal and West Bengal shall be made immediately. 
F. In order to assist in the implementation of this agreement, the two 
governments have decided, apart from the deputation of their ministers 
referred to in E, to set up Minority Commissions, one for East Bengal, one 
for West Bengal and one for Assam. These Commissions will be constituted 
and will have the functions described below: 
i. Each Commission will consist of one Minister of the Provincial or State 
Government concerned, who will be Chairman, and one representative each 
of the majority and minority communities from East Bengal, West Bengal 
and Assam, chosen by and from among their respective representatives in 
the Provincial or State Legislatures, as the case may be. 
ii. The two ministers of the Governments of India and Pakistan may attend and 
participate in any meeting of any Commission. A Minority Commission or 
243 
any two Minority Commissions jointly shall meet when so required by 
either Central Minister for the satisfactory implementation of this 
Agreement. 
iii. Each Commission shall appoint such staff, as it deems necessary for the 
proper discharge of its functions and shall determine its own procedure. 
iv. Each Commission shall maintain contact with the minorities in districts and 
small administrative headquarters through Minority Boards formed in 
accordance with the Inter-Dominion Agreement of December 1948. 
V. The Minority Commissions in East Bengal and West Bengal shall replace 
the Provincial Minorities Boards set up under the Inter-Dominion 
Agreement of December 1948. 
vi. The two Ministers of the Central Governments will from time to time 
consult such persons or organisations as they may consider necessary. 
vii. The functions of the Minority Commission shall be: 
a. To observe and to report on the implementation of this agreement 
and, for this purpose, to take cognizance of breaches or neglect; 
b. To advise an action to be taken on their recommendations. 
viii. Each Commission shall submit reports, as and when necessary, to the 
Provincial and State Governments concerned. Copies of such reports will be 
submitted simultaneously to the two Central Ministers during the period 
referred to in E. 
ix. The Governments of India and Pakistan and the State and Provincial 
Governments will normally give effect to recommendations that concern 
them when such recommendations are supported by both the Central 
Ministers. In the event of disagreement between the two Central Ministers, 
the matter shall be referred to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan 
who shall either resolve it themselves or determine the agency and 
procedure by which it will be resolved. 
X. In respect of Tripura, the two Central Ministers shall constitute a 
Commission and shall discharge the functions that are assigned under the 
Agreement to the Minority Commissions for East Bengal, West Bengal and 
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Assam. Before the expiration of the period referred to in E, the two Central 
Ministers shall make recommendations for the establishment in Tripura of 
appropriate machinery to discharge the functions of the Minority 
Commissions envisaged in respect of East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam. 
G. Except where modified by this agreement, the Inter-Dominion Agreement 
of December 1948 shall remain in force. 
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APPENDIX 
ARTICLE 370 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 
Temporary provisions with Respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
1. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, 
a. the provisions of Article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir, 
b. the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to -
i. those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in 
consultation with the Government of the State are declared by the President 
to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing 
the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with 
respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State; 
and 
ii. such other matters in the said List as, with the concurrence of the 
Government of the State, the President may by order specify. 
Explanation-^or the purposes of this article, the Government of the State 
means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the 
Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of 
Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja's proclamation dated 
the fifth day of March, 1948 : 
c. the provisions of Article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to that 
State; 
d. such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to 
that State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President may 
by order specify: 
Provided that no such order, which relates to the matters specified in the 
Instrument of Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause 
(b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State: 
Provided further that no such order, which relates to the matters other 
than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with 
the concurrence of that government. 
2. If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph 
(ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (1) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) 
of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of 
framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before 
such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon. 
3. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this article, the 
President may by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to 
be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and 
modifications and from such date as he may specify: 
Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the 
State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues 
such a notification. 
In exercise of the powers conferred by Article 370 the President, on 
recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir, declared that as from the 17* Day of November, 1952, the said 
Article 370 shall be operative with the modification that for the explanation in 
CI. (1) thereof, the following explanation is substituted namely. 
"Explanation-Vor the purpose of this article, the Government of the 
State means the person for the time being recognised by the President on the 
recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadr-i-Riyasat 
(now Governor) of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of 
Ministers of the State for the time being in office". (Ministry of Law, Order 
No. CO. dated 15 November 1952). 
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APPENDIX 
TASHKENT DECLARATION, JANUARY 10,1966 
The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met at 
Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and 
Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful 
relations between two countries and to promote understanding and friendly 
relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these 
objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India 
and Pakistan. 
i. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both 
sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between 
India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They 
reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and 
to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the 
interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan sub-
continent and, indeed, the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan 
were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It 
was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and 
each of the sides set forth its respective position. 
Troops Withdrawal 
ii. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that 
all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 
25 February 1966 to the positions they held prior to 5 August 1965, and 
both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line. 
iii. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that 
relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of each other. 
iv. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that 
both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other 
country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development 
of friendly relations between the two countries. 
V. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that 
the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of 
Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of 
diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both governments 
shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Intercourse. 
vi. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to 
consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, 
communications, as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan, 
and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India 
and Pakistan. 
vii. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that 
they will give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the 
repatriation of the prisoners of war. 
viii. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that 
the two sides will continue the discussion of questions relating to the 
problems of refugees and eviction of illegal immigrantions. They also 
agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus 
of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of the property and 
assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict. 
Soviet Leaders Thanked 
ix. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that 
the two sides will continue meetings both at highest and at other levels on 
matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognised the 
need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies, which will report to their 
governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken. 
X. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan record their 
feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet 
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Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR for their constructive, friendly and noble 
part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually 
satisfactory results. They also express to the government and friendly 
people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming 
reception and generous hospitality. 
They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to 
witness this declaration. 
Prime Minister of India President of Pakistan 
Lai Bahadur Shastri Mohammad Ayub Khan 
Tashkent, January 10, 1966 
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APPENDIX 
SHIMLA AGREEMENT, 2 JULY 1972 
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved 
that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have 
hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and 
harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-
continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and 
energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their peoples. 
Harmonious Relationship 
In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the 
Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows: 
1. That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall 
govern the relations between the two countries. 
2. That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful 
means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means 
mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of 
the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter 
the situation and both shall prevent the organisation, assistance or 
encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and 
harmonious relations. 
3. That the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable 
peace between them is a commitment by both countries to peaceful co-
existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and 
non-interference in each other's internal affairs, on the basis of equality and 
mutual benefit. 
4. That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the 
relations between the two countries for the last twenty-five years shall be 
resolved by peaceful means. 
5. That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial 
integrity, political independence and sovereign equality. 
6. That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they will refrain 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of each other. 
Both governments will take all steps within their power to prevent 
hostile propaganda directed against each other. 
Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as 
would promote the development of friendly relations between them. 
Communications and Trade 
In order progressively to restore and normalise relations between the 
two countries step by step, it was agreed that: 
7. Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, 
land including border posts and air links including overflights. 
8. Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals 
of the other country. 
9. Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed 
as far as possible. 
10. Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted. 
In this cormection delegations from the two countries will meet from 
time to time to work out the necessary details. In order to initiate the process of 
the establishment of durable peace, both governments agreed that: 
11. Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the 
international border. 
12. In Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the cease-fire of 
December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to 
the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it 
unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. 
Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force 
in violation of this line. 
13. The withdrawals shall commence upon entr>' into force of this agreement 
and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof. 
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This agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in 
accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into 
force with effect from the date on which the Instruments of Ratification are 
exchanged. 
Second Summit 
Both governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a 
mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the 
representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and 
arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalisation of 
relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian 





Republic of India 
(Sd/-) 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
President 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
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APPENDIX 
THE LAHORE DECLARATION 
The Prime Ministers of the Repubhc of India and the Islamic RepubHc of 
Pakistan: 
Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of progress 
and prosperity for their peoples; 
Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and 
friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two 
countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future; 
Recognising that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two 
countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two 
countries; 
Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, 
and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence; 
Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Shimla 
Agreement in letter and spirit; 
Committed to the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation; 
Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures 
for improving the security environment. 
Recalling their agreement of 23 September 1998, that an environment of peace 
and security is in the supreme national interests of both sides and that the 
resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential 
for this purpose; 
Have agreed that their respective Governments: 
• shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
• shall refrain from the intervention and interference in each other's internal 
affairs. 
• shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early 
and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda. 
• shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or 
unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines 
with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear 
and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict. 
• reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to 
concert their efforts towards the realisation of the SAARC vision for the 
year 2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples 
of South Asia and to improve their quality of life through accelerated 
economic growth, social progress and cultural development. 
• reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations 
and their determination to combat this menace. 
• shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Signed at Lahore on the 2V^ day of February 1999. 
Atal Behari Vajpayee Muhammad Nawaz Sharif 
Prime Minister of the Prime Minister of the Islamic 
Republic of India Republic of Pakistan 
255 
APPENDIX 
TEXTS OF THE G-8 STATEMENT ON THE KARGIL CRISIS 
Kashmir 
We are deeply concerned about the continuing military confrontation in 
Kashmir following the infiltration of armed intruders which [sic] violated the 
Line of Control. 
We regard my military action to change the status quo as irresponsible. 
We, therefore, call for the immediate end of these actions, restoration of the 
Line of Control and for the parties to work for an immediate cessation of the 
fighting, full respect in the future for the Line of Control and the resumption of 
the dialogue between India and Pakistan in the spirit of the Lahore Declaration. 
Missile and Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan 
One year after the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, we reiterate our 
concerns and reaffirm our statement from the Birmingham communique. 
Recent missile tests have further increased tension in the region. We 
encourage both countries to follow first positive steps already undertaken by 
joining international non-proliferation and taking the steps set out in the U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1172. 
Source: The Hindu. 21 June 1999. 
APPENDIX 
Agenda Points for the Meeting with President Pervez Musharraf 
(The Agra Summit, 14-16 July 2001) 
1. Welcome his visit to India and express satisfaction that he has responded to 
Prime Minister Vajpayee's invitation. Also express satisfaction that Begum 
Musharraf has come to India. 
2. Express the hope that the summit meeting at Agra will revive the process of 
normalising Indo-Pakistan relations, a process which commenced during 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's tenure, with his interaction with General 
Zia-ul-Haq, and later on with Benazir Bhutto. Emphasise that the Congress 
Party is not concerned with Pakistani personalities or political parties but is 
deeply concerned about the need for peaceful and cooperative relations with 
Pakistan in the larger interests and wellbeing of the peoples of both 
countries. 
3. Convey that Prime Minister Vajpayee has national consensus and national 
support transcending party politics, for the initiative that he has taken to 
organise the Agra summit. 
4. Enquire what President Musharraf hopes and expects from the summit 
discussions in realistic and practical terms, leaving aside public postures 
taken by the two governments on various issues. 
5. Emphasise that while the Congress, in particular and India, in general, is 
serious about finding a practical and realistic solution to the Kashmir 
problem. Neither the Congress Party nor the country can agree to further 
partitions of Indian territories or alienation of territory from the Indian 
Republic under any circumstances. 
6. Mention that the Congress Party supports a dialogue with all political 
groups in Jammu and Kashmir as well as with Pakistan to find a mutually 
acceptable solution. 
7. Emphasise that Indo-Pakistan discussions to ensure nuclear risk reduction is 
a matter of immediate importance, perhaps even more important than the 
Kashmir issue. 
8. Express the hope that Musharraf s discussions with Vajpayee commence a 
process of continuous dialogue aimed at all round normalisation of Indo-
Pakistan relations. 
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Source: Russell, Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict, Pall Mall Press 
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